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This dissertation follows the transformations in Russian biomedical epistemology 
occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The analysis focuses on the 
epistemic foundations of Russian biomedical science—what counted as valid clinical 
evidence, what the appropriate methods for producing such evidence were, and who 
got to make these decisions—and how these criteria, methods and power relations 
have changed in response to the collapse of the Soviet political economy and the 
introduction of a capitalist system. Drawing upon extensive archival research as well 
as ethnographic data, the analysis proceeds on three levels—that of institutions and 
organizations, practices, and ideas and rhetoric.  On the level of institutions and 
organizations, the project focuses on the Soviet system of health protection, 
particularly those institutions within it that were involved in biomedical research and 
science policy, and examines their operation in the context of the Soviet-American 
exchange in oncology during the 1970s.  On the level of practices, it examines Soviet 
drug development efforts in oncology, paying particular attention to clinical trial 
practices.  And on the level of ideas and rhetoric, it traces two attempts to revise 
biomedical knowledge production and knowledge application practices.  The first 
takes place in the Soviet period, and centers on the attempt to introduce the methods 
and concepts of cybernetics into Soviet biomedicine. The second takes place after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, and centers on the attempts to integrate the epistemic 
commitments of evidence-based medicine into Russian medical practice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The world is vulnerable, the world is fragile, 
Surrogates are replacing everything. 
…And people are growing 
anabolic muscles, 
silicone chests 
and plastic faces. 
Timur Shaov, Surrogates 
 
 In the summer of 2005 I went to Russia to investigate the impact of the 
monetization reforms on access to medication.1 The plan was to write an article, and then 
get back to my main research interest at the time—the global pharmaceutical industry and 
the impact of its business practices on American medicine. Of course, nothing ever goes 
according to plan.  
 In one of the first interviews I conducted with a Russian physician, I came across 
the puzzling term dokazatel’naia meditsina, or, as it is known in the English-speaking 
world, evidence-based medicine (EBM). Actually, it was not so much the term that was 
puzzling (the term itself struck me as redundant—what other kind of medicine is there, I 
naively thought to myself) as the way that my informant, an endocrinologist in her early 
forties dressed in a crisp, dazzling white robe, used it in our discussion. When I asked her 
about her drug selection practices under the new benefit scheme, she threw the term out 
at me like a shield: “there is evidence-based medicine… By the way it is the same all 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Monetization reforms were supposed to replace long-standing social benefits, such as free public 
transportation for seniors or free medication, with cash payments. They were getting a lot of Western press 
coverage at the time as a cause of civic unrest in Russia. Upon arriving in Russia, however, I found that 
there was no there there, at least not where medical benefits were concerned. With the possible exception of 
Moscow, Russians were long resigned to the fact that these benefits—particularly the free medication—had 
become a fiction since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and actually preferred the cash payments, no 
matter how small. 
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over the world…we have already reached the level where we have become interested in 
this.”2 
 This response was puzzling for two reasons. For one thing, coming from a family 
of physicians who trained, practiced and taught in the very same town where the 
interview was taking place, it would have never occurred to me to suggest that Russian 
medicine was based on anything other than scientific evidence.  
 Nor did I understand what exactly she meant by this word ‘level’, and how this 
‘level’ that Russian medicine has reached was in any way superior to that of an earlier 
period. In fact, the doctor’s professional demeanor notwithstanding, what I saw around 
me indicated that the hospital (a branch of the regional hospital, and thus theoretically a 
better funded facility than most) had, at least on the material level, slid down several 
steps from where it had been in the Soviet era.3 We were talking in a very old, cramped 
building that sat in the back of what, from my outsider perspective, had at first seemed to 
me to be an overgrown empty lot. The façade of the building, obscured in part by gnarled 
old plum trees, was more reminiscent of an abandoned tool shed than a hospital wing, 
with peeling walls and dark windows thrown open against the summer heat. Outside the 
hospital doors a small group of patients in battered bathrobes chatted and smoked, 
enjoying the refuge of the tree shade. The office we were sitting in was cramped and 
bare, and was being shared by at least four physicians. The room did have an old rotary 
phone, but none of the desks in the room had a computer.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Interview, Stavropol, July 2005. 
3 For more on the crisis in Russian medicine following the collapse of the USSR, see Mark Field and Judith 
Twigg (eds.), Russia’s Torn Safety Nets: Health and Social Welfare during the Transition (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000) and Vicki Hesli and Margaret Mills, Margaret (eds.), Medical Issues and Health 
Care Reform in Russia (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press., 1999) as well as D.D. Venediktov, 
Zdravoohranenie Rossii: krizis I puti preodoleniia (Moscow: Meditsina,1999). 
!3!
 In this particular local context, the narrative of progress the physician was 
presenting seemed to be out of place. One can, of course, erase the incongruity by 
adopting a more global perspective. In fact, this is exactly what my interlocutor was 
doing by invoking Evidence Based Medicine and its global prevalence. From this global 
perspective, when it comes to the question of the efficacy of a drug, there is only one 
right way to go about producing a reliable answer—by conducting a double blind 
randomized clinical trial (RCT).4 The RCT is taken as the gold standard because it is seen 
as the methodology best able to produce objective medical knowledge.5 Properly 
designed trial protocols, and strict adherence to them, promise to rein in the biases of the 
investigator and the research subject. The former might feel invested in an experimental 
treatment or the well-being of the research subject and allow that investment to color his 
or her interpretation of the results. The latter may place a lot of faith in the experimental 
treatment or the investigator, and the power of this faith could actually alter those results 
(this is known as the placebo effect). 
 The double blind RCT promises to take the biases of both the investigator and the 
research subject out of the equation, rendering the results objective. The RCT 
accomplishes this in two stages. First, at the stage of producing the actual trial results, it 
removes clinical research from the realm of therapeutic medicine, thereby reining in the 
subjectivities of the investigator and the research subject.6 This is accomplished by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Although within the EBM hierarchy, the RCT is not the absolute highest grade of evidence—the meta 
analysis is.  
5 Gerald Kutcher, Contested Medicine: Cancer Research and the Military (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009). 
6 Harry M. Marks, The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 
1900-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Ilana Löwy, Between Bench and Bedside: 
Science, Healing, and Interleukin-2 in a Cancer Ward (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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forcing both to subordinate their agency to the trial protocol.7 For investigators, this 
means reformulating their goals and accepting limits on their judgment in accordance 
with the protocol. Medical decision-making in a clinical trial is driven by the imperative 
to maintain the integrity of the data, not to produce the best outcome for individual 
subject.8 For research subjects, it means surrendering their agency virtually completely 
(now with informed consent, of course) to the trial protocol.9 Criteria for drug efficacy 
are defined largely in quantitative terms so as to prevent investigators from forming 
qualitative evaluations of the drug’s impact on the condition of the test subjects. Because 
numerically defining the impact of a drug on the condition of a test subject is a fraught 
undertaking, definitions of efficacy often focus on what is known as surrogate end 
points—physiological phenomena that lend themselves to quantification and precise 
measurements, such as T-cell counts or cholesterol levels.10 Finally, at the stage of result 
evaluation, statistical methods are employed to abstract trial outcomes from the level of 
individual subjects to the level of the population. Individual research subjects and their 
bodies’ reaction to the drugs are translated into numerical values subjected to various 
statistical manipulations, and the clinical trial produces population data on the impact of 
drugs on surrogate end points—information that is purged of the subjectivity of both the 
investigator and the research subject and abstracted from the messy reality of the doctor-
patient encounter. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Practice does not always map exactly onto theory, of course. For example, Steven Epstein has shown how 
AIDS patients successfully resisted the clinical research system in their quest for access to new 
medications. See Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
8 Jill Fisher, Medical Research for Hire: the Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009). 
9 Carl Elliott, “Guinea-Pigging,” New Yorker, January 7, 2008. 
10 Jeremy A. Greene, Prescribing by Numbers: Drugs and the Definition of Disease (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007). 
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 Evidence-based medicine strives to bring the same kind of objectivity promised to 
clinical research by the RCT to the realm of therapeutic medicine—that is, to the doctor-
patient encounter. However, unlike the RCT, EBM targets only the subjectivity of the 
doctor. The goal is to achieve a uniformity of practice so that a patient can rely on 
receiving the same standard of care whether he turns to a physician in a teaching hospital 
of a major metropolitan area or a country clinic.  
 Since the ability to discover and employ objective truths is the hallmark of 
science, the RCT and EBM fit neatly into the narrative of scientific progress in medicine 
which the endocrinologist who introduced me to the term dokozatel’naia meditsina 
invoked. This narrative traces the progression of medicine from an art of healing into a 
science of disease, marking the bacteriological revolution as the first major event in this 
transformation, because it provided medicine with a firm scientific basis by yielding a 
new understanding of disease causation. A scientific approach to the etiology of disease, 
however, still left a gap between the bench and the bedside—figuring out how to arrive at 
equally reliable knowledge in clinical research, as well as how to use this knowledge at 
the patient bedside was far from a straightforward matter.11 The development of the 
clinical trial promised to bring this progress into clinical research itself by ensuring the 
objectivity of clinical research.12 EBM, according to its advocates, is the current 
culmination of this progress because it brings objectivity into therapeutic medicine, 
enabling the objective application, not just generation of medical knowledge. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 A problem that persists beyond the bacteriological revolution. See Löwy, Between Bench and Bedside. 
12 Marks, Progress of Experiment and J. Rosser Matthews, Quantification and the Quest for Medical 
Certainty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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 What my informant was telling me was that Russian medicine was finally 
catching up to this global medical progress by adopting the epistemic commitments that 
had fueled this progress in the rest of the world. From this global perspective, the peeling 
walls and the bare office were comparatively trivial problems. What mattered was that 
Russian medicine was now on a firm epistemic footing—that it mastered the right way of 
knowing, and was committed to mastering the right way of acting on its knowledge. 
 Implicit in her invocation of progress was a condemnation of Soviet science as 
backwards—a condemnation that was later made explicit by other Russian physicians I 
spoke with. As I go on to demonstrate, this condemnation mirrors the understanding of 
Soviet science held in the West—both in the Soviet period itself and in the present. 
Soviet science was then in the West and is now in the West and in Russia largely 
understood to be a ‘dwarf’ version of its western counterpart—a practice co-opted and 
deeply distorted by the Soviet state and its ideological and bureaucratic apparatus.13  
 The global perspective reproduced by Russian advocates of EBM, with its 
narrative of epistemic progress, is problematic for two reasons. First, because it isn’t 
global at all. Epistemology has a history, with various times and places giving rise to 
different epistemic forms.14 And second, because the invocation of global progress 
obscures the evolution of knowledge production and power relations in the local context. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The terms ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are very loaded and problematic, but they occur so often in the Russian 
context that avoiding them would distort the representation of that context. I do not want to rehash long-
standing debates or pick at festering wounds here. Instead, I use the terms as my Russian actors use them—
to refer to capitalist bloc countries with the United States in the lead. 
14 Karin Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), Lorraine Daston & Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007), and 
Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating, Thomas Schlich, George Weisz, “Regulatory objectivity and the 
generation and management of evidence in medicine,” Social Science & Medicine 63 (2006):189-199. 
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 By invoking EBM, the endocrinologist was trying to disarm potential criticism of 
the impact of the monetization of benefits on access to medication, but I argue that this 
rhetorical move has an unintended consequence as well—it foregrounds what I call the 
epistemic erosion of Russian biomedicine. The condemnation of Soviet knowledge 
production and the attempt to seek legitimacy for current Russian biomedical practices in 
the ‘global’ template of evidence-based medicine entails the abandonment of a local 
epistemic culture—a culture with a distinct imagination and set of values, practices and 
power relations—for one that is more powerful.15  
 The surrender of epistemic culture and imagination is not a simple process. It 
requires not only the reformulation of rhetoric, the reconfiguration of practice and the 
redistribution of power, but also the surrender of the goals and values that underpin the 
existing epistemology and the adoption of the value system associated with the ascendant 
epistemic culture. This process is both lengthy and difficult to direct, and in Russia it is 
still in comparatively early stages, with the medical profession divided in its commitment 
to EBM (largely along generational lines). I argue that at this historical juncture, EBM is 
a surrogate epistemology for the Russian medical profession. I use the term surrogate in 
the same way that it is used in the song couplet that opens the introduction—to designate 
an artificial substitute for a complex component of an organic structure (whether that 
organic structure be a body part or a relationship). Although the surrogate may be quite 
complex in its own right, its presence impoverishes the whole structure because the 
surrogate is by definition a reductionist device. As surrogate markers in drug evaluation 
provide a way to get around the juggernaut of complex biological phenomena and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 I take the term epistemic culture from Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures. 
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subjective experience in order to make a decision about a compound’s efficacy, so 
evidence-based medicine provides its advocates with a way to skirt the seemingly 
intractable problems facing them. 
 
Methods 
 In this dissertation, I try to answer the questions that arose for me during the 
encounter with the endocrinologist—what constituted evidence in the Soviet period, how 
was such evidence produced, who got to make these decisions, and how these epistemic 
commitments and power relations changed following the collapse of the USSR? In other 
words, was there in fact something different about Soviet biomedical epistemology, or is 
the evidence-based movement in Russia just another illustration of the adage that the new 
is simply the thoroughly forgotten old?  
 I argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union has occasioned an epistemic shift in 
Russian biomedicine. The disintegration of the Soviet state, of which the system of health 
protection was an integral part, undermined not only the institutional structure within 
which biomedicine was practiced but also the epistemological foundations of biomedical 
practices—the normative structures of Soviet biomedicine fell apart along with the 
institutional ones, creating a space for the redefinition of medical science that brought 
with it a reconfiguration of professional identity.  
 I appropriate the term ‘epistemology’ from philosophy, where it refers to the 
branch of philosophical inquiry concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, and 
use it to refer to a system of norms of knowledge production that can be studied 
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empirically.16 Epistemology is a difficult object to study, not only because it does not 
lend itself easily to direct observation or precise measurement, but also because it 
inherently poses a level problem for the analyst, operating simultaneously on three 
levels—on those of institutions and organization, practices, and ideas and rhetoric. The 
temporal focus of the analysis further compounds the level problem in that it is still 
woefully understudied and poorly understood by Western and Russian scholars alike, 
necessitating a lot of background work. I begin in the period of what nameless party 
ideologues of the Brezhnev regime christened developed socialism and follow the 
downward spiral of perestroika through the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the trials and 
tribulations of the transition period through 2005.  
 In what follows, I do not try to escape the level problem by restricting my focus to 
any one aspect. Nor do I claim to resolve it by trying to collapse the gaps between the 
three levels. Instead, I take this problem as a roadmap for the analysis, and approach it 
with the methodological toolkit developed within the field of science and technology 
studies—a toolkit that encompasses qualitative sociological and historiographic methods 
that allow for an analysis of all these levels in turn, and an exploration of the connections 
and contradictions between them. The analysis is grounded in a series of case studies 
chosen for the access they provide to the various levels of the problem. 
 On the level of institutions and organizations, I look at the Soviet system of health 
protection—particularly those institutions within it that were involved in biomedical 
research and science policy. The institutions I focus on include the Ministry of Health 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 This is not a novel move within STS—a number of scholars have performed a similar operation on 
objectivity. See, for example, Daston & Galison, Objectivity and Cambrosio et. al. “Regulatory 
Objectivity.” 
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Protection (hereafter MinZdrav),17 the Academy of Medical Sciences (hereafter AMS), 
which was subordinate to MinZdrav and was charged with formulating and implementing 
biomedical research policy on a national level, and the Institute of Experimental and 
Clinical Oncology (which in 1975 became the Oncology Scientific Center)—one of the 
most prominent institutes in the AMS network and the premier oncology research and 
treatment facility in the U.S.S.R. Other institutions that play an important role in my 
analysis are the Pharmacological Committee, which was part of MinZdrav and was 
charged with approving drugs for use in the Soviet system; and the All-Union Scientific 
Research Chemico-Pharmaceutical Institute (the Russian acronym, which will be used 
henceforth, is VNIKhFI)—part of the MinZdrav network of institutes whose 
responsibilities included the development and testing of new drugs, as well as the 
synthesis for domestic use of drugs developed abroad.  
 On the level of practices, I examine Soviet drug development efforts in oncology, 
paying particular attention to clinical trial practices. Although my focus is on Soviet 
practices, I consider them in the context of Soviet-American healthcare exchanges that 
began in 1956 and grew in size and importance until, in 1972, they were formalized by an 
inter-governmental agreement signed by Brezhnev and Nixon.  
 My aim in selecting this context is not to attempt a side-by-side comparison 
between American and Soviet practices—such a comparison would not only render the 
project unmanageable but would not provide answers to the questions that are guiding the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Western experts on Soviet healthcare have commonly dubbed this entity the Ministry of Health (see 
Michael Ryan, Doctors and the State in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) and Mark 
G. Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine: An Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1967), perhaps as a 
matter of convenience. Although this formulation spares readers from having to keep track of a longer 
name, it is misleading in that it obscures the complexity of the organization’s mission. Therefore I refer to 
this body either by its full name, or by its Russian abbreviation—MinZdrav. 
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analysis. Rather, I bring the American perspective in because the reflection of Soviet 
institutions and practices in American eyes provides a useful blueprint for describing 
their structure and workings and throws into relief their unique characteristics. Finally, 
including the American scientists and their perspective in the analysis is a necessity 
because they played a major role in Soviet biomedicine both directly, through personal 
interactions in the course of cooperative projects or participation in international 
organizations, and indirectly, by serving as a benchmark against which Soviet scientists 
and planners evaluated their own efforts. 
 On the level of ideas and rhetoric I look at two attempts to revise the practices of 
producing medical knowledge and applying it in the therapeutic context. The first takes 
place in the Soviet period, and centers on the attempt to introduce the methods and 
concepts of cybernetics into medical knowledge production and practice. The second 
takes place after the fall of the Soviet Union, and centers on the attempts to integrate the 
epistemological commitments of evidence-based medicine into the Russian context. 
 The descriptions and analysis of biomedical science in the Soviet period presented 
here are based primarily on archival research. Although the challenges of conducting 
such research in Russia have certainly changed since the Soviet period, they remain 
formidable. While Soviet record keeping was usually meticulous, many records did not 
survive the political and economic crises that surrounded the collapse of the USSR. 
Those that did survive are not easy to locate, as they are often scattered throughout many 
archives in Moscow and beyond. Furthermore, many Russian archives are not exactly 
user-friendly. Structural division and date usually organize collections, with no reference 
to the content of the records. When combined with stringent restrictions on the number of 
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folders one can request and have on hand at any given time, this often makes narrowing 
down one’s search in the archives an impossible task.  
 To be able to address all three levels adequately, I consulted numerous collections 
in several archives, most of them in Moscow. Among the Moscow archives are the State 
Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), which contain the records of the Soviet 
Ministry of Health Protection, including the Ministry’s Pharmacological Committee; the 
collections of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (RAMN), which contain the 
records of the Soviet and the Russian Academies of Medical Sciences, including the 
plans and reports of the Academy institutes; the scientific archive of the Russian 
Oncology Center (RONC), which contains uncatalogued institutional records pertaining 
to the research programs and administrative activities of the Institute of Experimental and 
Clinical Oncology (IECO), the All-Union Oncological Scientific Center (VONC), and the 
All-Union Chemotherapeutic Center (VHTs); the Russian State Archive of Scientific and 
Technical Documentation (RGANTD), which contains the records of the All-Union 
Scientific Research Chemico-Pharmaceutical Institute (VNIKhFI); the archives of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, which contains the records of the Scientific Council on 
Cybernetics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences; and the Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History (RGANI), which contains the archives of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party. In addition, I consulted the collection of records documenting 
the Soviet-American exchanges in healthcare and medicine at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, MD. 
 The archival materials are supplemented by and triangulated against published 
biomedical literature from the Soviet period obtained at the Central Scientific Medical 
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Library and the Russian State Library in Moscow as well as at the Library of Congress in 
Washington DC and the National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, MD. Finally, to 
access individual perspectives I was able to conduct five oral histories from scientists and 
administrators who participated in the Soviet-American healthcare exchanges in the 
1970s.  
 The portion of the project dealing with developments in the post-Soviet period 
draws on some archival research as well, but is mostly based on a qualitative study 
conducted that uses data collected in the course of 50 semi-structured interviews with 
Russian physicians, hospital administrators, medical students, and users of the healthcare 
system (the latter were included in order to gain a better understanding of the state of the 
healthcare system). 
 Geographically, the study sample was split almost evenly between two locations: 
Moscow and Stavropol, a city in southwestern Russia that serves as the administrative 
center of Stavropol Krai. Two sites were necessary because focusing on Moscow alone 
would have yielded very skewed results. Moscow enjoys material resources and 
administrative privileges that set it far apart from other Russian cities.18 But while the 
situation in Moscow differs dramatically from the rest of the country, in a qualitative 
study it is also equally dangerous to exclude it, precisely because of its role as an 
administrative and financial center. 
 To successfully recruit participants from the medical community, a snowball 
sampling methodology was used. A few physicians within hospitals and polyclinics in 
Stavropol and Moscow were initially recruited, and they agreed to refer their friends and 
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18 Moscow held a privileged position in the Soviet period as well, but in recent years the gap between the 
center and the periphery seems to have grown exponentially. 
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colleagues for the study. This strategy resulted in a very diverse sample. Among the 
practicing physicians there are representatives of various specialties (cardiology, 
endocrinology, oncology, general practice, anesthesiology) and of different levels within 
the hospital/clinic hierarchy (from rank and file physicians to hospital directors and 
administrators). The interviews were conducted and transcribed by me in Russian and 
subsequently coded for thematic content. The interview data were supplanted with 
published sources, both from the popular press and various biomedical publications.  
 
Questions and significance 
 The question of what distinguished Soviet biomedical epistemology resonates 
with one of the central concerns of western historiography on Russia in the Soviet period, 
although in much of this work reflecting this concern is not formulated as a question. 
Much of this scholarship operates on the assumption that what was distinctive about the 
Soviet Union was the one party state and its stranglehold on power, the maintenance of 
which drove the expansion of the state apparatus into every facet of Soviet life. In this 
kind of analysis, western democracy provides the benchmark against which Russia in this 
period is compared, and the result of this comparison is that Russia is conceived of as 
being, by definition outside the norm—as pursuing an aberrant path of historical, 
political, cultural and economic development that puts it in opposition to and casts it 
outside of the developmental path of the west.19  
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19 It is tempting to characterize this portrayal of Russia as a manifestation of the notion of Russian/Soviet 
exceptionalism. Like any ism, however, this is a very loaded term that, for all its ubiquity, is much more 
likely to confuse matters than clarify them.  
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 This conception is reflected in Soviet historiography in several ways. First, in the 
questions that have dominated the field since its inception—questions about the inner 
workings of the party apparatus, the mechanisms of state terror, and the degree of popular 
support for or resistance to the regime. Although the paradigmatic answers to these 
questions have changed thanks to the acceptance of revisionist approaches that have 
repudiated the hitherto hegemonic totalitarian model and have brought more nuanced and 
complex analytical strategies to bear on the problem, the questions themselves have been 
much slower to diversify and continue to dominate the field.20 Second, it is reflected in 
the field’s empirical focus, most of which is on the period of the Russian Revolution and 
on various aspects of Stalinism and de-Stalinization.21   While this is beginning to 
change, there is still much we do not know about the period following Khrushchev’s 
removal.22 
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20 On broad trends in Soviet historiography, see Stephen Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics 
& History Since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); for a personal view on same, see Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Retrospect: a personal view,” Slavic Review 67/4(2008): 682-704. 
21 This is by no means intended as a comprehensive literature review. On the Russian revolution, see 
Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution, (New York : Viking, 1997), 
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), Sheila Fitzpatrick,The Russian 
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) or Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: 
Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2002), each of whom has 
a slightly different take. The historiography of Stalinism is too extensive to fit in a footnote. My favorite 
work on the topic tends to be social history. In particular, Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism 
as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: 
Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York : Oxford University Press, 
1999) and Tear Off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). On the history of science in the Stalinist period, see Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist 
Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), Ethan Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars 
(Princeton University Press, 2006) and Alexei Kojevnikov, Stalin's Great Science: The Times and 
Adventures of Soviet Physicists (London: Imperial College Press, 2004). See Loren Graham, Science, 
Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1987) for a 
history of Soviet science that is not constrained either temporally or analytically by the Stalinist period.  
22 Several recent conferences have showcased work in progress that considers the Brezhnev period: “What 
Was the Soviet Union? Looking Back at the Brezhnev Years,” Wesleyan University, October 20-21, 2011 
and “The End of the Soviet Union? Origins and Legacies of 1991,” Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, 
May 19-21, 2011.  On Soviet history after Stalin, there is currently a potpourri of work on a variety of 
topics, and this also is a very partial listing: Mark Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A 
Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Juliane Fürst, 
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 While the historiographic picture is changing, it is still a question for historians 
when, if at all, the Soviet Union achieved any kind of normalcy.23 This state of affairs has 
its corollary in the subfield of the history of Soviet science, where questions of the 
relationship between science and the state and the impact of Marxist ideology on 
scientific ideas have reigned supreme. There is no doubt but that the answers to these 
questions are getting increasingly sophisticated. However the paradigmatic conception of 
Soviet science as, first and foremost, Soviet—that is, as a scientific enterprise at best 
crippled and at worst corrupted by the ideological and bureaucratic control of an 
omnipotent (or at the very least, omnipresent) state—continues to hold sway. Repeated 
attempts to draw attention to the narrowness of this perspective testify to the persistence 
of the problem.24   
 The questions that have been the focus of much of the western historiographic 
literature are crucially important and productive, and there is clearly a lot more to learn 
about Soviet history in the first half of the twentieth century. Practical reasons such as the 
availability of secondary literature also play an important role in reinforcing this focus in 
the literature. But casting the history of the USSR as lying outside the norm set by 
western liberal democracy makes it all too easy to conclude that the lessons of this 
history are irrelevant outside the Russian context. 
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Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Anne E. Gorsuch, All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad 
After Stalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); John L.H. Keep, Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union 1945-
1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For an attempt to synthesize this work, see Stephen Lovell, 
The Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 
23 Lovell, The Shadow of War. 
24 See, for example, Michael D. Gordin and Karl Hall, “Introduction: Intelligentsia Science Inside and 
Outside Russia,” Osiris 23(2008):1–19. 
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 My point of departure for the analysis that follows is that the Soviet Union was 
normal—that is, that it was a society as well as a state, and that Soviet science was first 
and foremost science—that is, a collective endeavor to produce reliable knowledge about 
the natural world and to apply that knowledge to collectively defined problems. In this I 
draw heavily on the growing sociological and anthropological analysis of the Soviet and 
post-Soviet period that examines meaning-making in the Soviet and post-Soviet space 
and puts the individual experience at the center of analysis,25 and on the analytical tools 
of science and technology studies—a discipline that puts scientific practice at the core of 
its methodology.26  
 The application of this approach doesn’t silence the debate on what distinguished 
Soviet science—rather, it opens it up to additional questions and answers that take the 
analysis beyond the binary focus on science and the state. The first question that must be 
addressed in this regard is the question of the distribution of power. In the binary 
approach, the power relations between science and the state are simple—the power is 
seen to belong to the party state, and scientists are relegated to, at best, the role of state 
employees who must surrender their agency over their work and pursue the goals set for 
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25 Anthropological analysis of the Soviet period has been steadily growing since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. See, for example, Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Nancy Ries, Russian Talk: Culture and 
Conversation during Perestroika (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) and Caroline Humphrey, Marx 
Went Away—But Karl Stayed Behind (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001). 
Anthropological analysis of the post-Soviet period has exploded. Examples include Adriana Petryna, Life 
Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Douglas 
Rogers, The Old Faith and the Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2009); Elizabeth C. Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the 
Remaking of Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
26 The breadth of this literature makes a thorough review impractical. For the iconic examples of the 
application of this method, see Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the Construction of 
Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, 
Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985). 
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them by the party bosses.27 I argue that this hierarchical picture of the distribution of 
power within the Soviet system does not accurately describe the power dynamics of the 
late Soviet period. The problem with this model isn’t just that there are counter examples. 
The problem is that the model is wrong. I argue that the dynamics of power during this 
period were Foucauldian—that is, power was (unevenly) distributed throughout the 
system rather than concentrated in the hands of the party apparatus or the security organs, 
and it was vested in individuals as well as institutional structures.28   
 How then did Soviet science work, if not according to plan? Looking closely at 
the workings of the institutions of Soviet biomedicine and tracing the activity of 
individual scientists within them, one sees a collaborative and competitive collective 
enterprise of knowledge production that has much in common with science found in other 
national, political and economic contexts. But while there are many similarities, I 
demonstrate that Soviet biomedical epistemology was, in fact, distinct in that it defined 
medical science as simultaneously biological, social and humanistic—a definition that 
did not tie the reliability of medical knowledge to the elimination of the subjectivity of its 
producers, but to the cultivation and disciplining of this subjectivity. This disciplining 
centered not on the development and enforcement of a set of rules of conduct, but on the 
inculcation of a sense of duty. This definition had important practical consequences in 
that Soviet biomedical practitioners did not try to adhere to an absolute separation 
between therapeutics and clinical research when producing medical knowledge, leading 
to a set of clinical research practices that contemporary advocates of EBM argue were 
unequal to the task of producing reliable knowledge. 
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27 Alexei Kojevnikov, “The Phenomenon of Soviet Science” Osiris 23 (2008):115–135. 
28 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
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 These epistemic commitments to the primacy of the therapeutic imperative and 
the centrality of the individual contrast sharply with the normative structures of American 
biomedical research in this period, which were undergoing a process of rationalization 
which emphasized the subordination of therapeutic goals to the research protocol, the 
primacy of statistical over qualitative data and the production of objective knowledge 
through collective action. The contrast is especially clearly visible in the interactions 
between Soviet and American practitioners. What explains this difference? One 
explanation is that Soviet biomedicine was behind the curve—that it was slower to shed 
the kinds of practices that American practitioners had left behind as improved methods of 
knowledge production, such as the RCT, were developed and gained acceptance. This is 
certainly how American scientists saw their counterparts during the Soviet period, and it 
is the favored explanation of contemporary Russian EBM advocates. But this explanation 
is based on a Whiggish conception of medical progress which assumes the inevitability of 
the course of these transformations. While I do not assume that this assumption of 
inevitability is wrong, I do argue that by itself it does not constitute an explanation. 
Epistemic commitments and values, such as objectivity, have a complex, non-linear 
history and typology, as has been beautifully demonstrated by a number of scholars.29 
 The rationalization of biomedicine is a relatively new and dynamic subject of 
analysis within the social studies of medicine. But although this scholarship is not in 
imminent danger of producing a consensus, there are several underlying assumptions that 
structure the discussion. The first is that this process of rationalization is a political 
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29 Daston & Galison Objectivity; Cambrosio et. al. “Regulatory Objectivity”; Michael Lynch, “Protocols, 
practices, and the reproduction of technique in molecular biology,” British Journal of Sociology 53/2 
(2002): 203-220. 
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project. Some analysts have argued that this process of rationalization is driven by the 
desire of democratic societies to regulate medical judgment, and the faith of regulatory 
agencies that statistical methods are able to provide the objectivity that the medical 
profession lacks when left to its own devices.30 Others see it as a project of professional 
politics, with the medical profession employing rationalization to unify its ranks and 
police its boundaries as well as underwrite its legitimacy.31 For still others, rationalization 
is a neutral tool that can be employed in any number of political projects (and thus can be 
easily turned on those who deploy it).32 The second assumption that underlies this 
analysis is that this process is tied to the economic logic of global capitalism. Some 
analysts have gone so far as to suggest that we understand “political economy as an 
epistemology” since the biomedical sciences are over determined by the capitalist 
political and economic structures within which they emerge.33 Others stop short of 
collapsing the differences between these categories while documenting their 
interpenetration.34  
 Jeremy Greene, for example, demonstrates very convincingly through his case 
studies of chronic diseases in America that clinical research practices shape our 
understanding of health and disease, transforming the line between the normal and the 
pathological into a numerical abstraction. He compares the impact of the commercial 
practices of drug development on medical knowledge and practice with Max Weber’s 
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30 Matthews, Quantification. Ted Porter makes a similar argument about quantification more generally. See 
Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
31 Marks, Progress of Experiment. 
32 Stefan Timmermans and Mark Berg, The Gold Standard: the Challenge of Evidence-Based Medicine and 
Standardization in Healthcare (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003). 
33 Kaushik Sunder Rajan, Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2006), 11. 
34 Fisher, Medical Research for Hire. 
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‘iron cage’ of capitalism and concludes that contemporary American medicine 
… in many ways conforms to Weber’s vision: equal parts science, 
commercialism, and the extension of bureaucratic rationality, this 
system threatens to enclose humanity within a process of physiological 
monitoring and pharmaceutical consumption.  However, whereas 
Weber’s iron cage was built on the inflexible certainty of 
technological rationality, the structure we now inhabit is flexible, for 
its links are bound not in certainty but uncertainty: in probability, 
statistics, and calculations of risks.  Within this contemporary 
understanding of health and medicine, the concept of disease itself 
enjoys far more freedom of motion than does either doctor or patient.35  
 
In this narrative, the medical progress of which the clinical trial is both emblem and 
constitutive element becomes a dystopian phenomenon that expands the boundaries of 
the pathological at the expense of the normal, enclosing an ever-greater proportion of the 
population in the rubber cage of market rationality. 
 While the case for the connection between political economy and biomedical 
epistemology is compelling, the nature of this connection and the mechanism of this 
relationship need further analysis. Russian biomedicine is a fruitful site for considering 
these questions. First, because examining it during the Soviet period allows us to observe 
both a biomedical epistemology and a political economy distinct from those prevalent in 
the west. And second, because following this case through the Soviet collapse provides a 
unique historical opportunity to see these structures change together.  
   
Structure 
 Two organizing principles structure the following chapters. On the one hand, the 
chapters are organized around case studies. Chapters 1 and 2 deal with various aspects of 
the Soviet-American healthcare exchange, chapter 3 follows at the history of medical 
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35 Greene, Prescribing by Number, 6. 
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cybernetics, chapter 4 focuses on the problems faced by scientific planners and 
administrators in the perestroika period, and chapter 5 looks at the adoption of evidence-
based medicine rhetoric among the medical profession.  
 On the other hand, the chapters are organized around the analytical elements that 
together make epistemology visible. Thus, chapter 1, which tells the story of the 
evolution of Soviet-American healthcare exchanges and documents how the Soviets 
administered them, analytically is a chapter about institutions. It provides a functional 
portrait of some of the key institutions that constituted the system of health protection, 
and begins to make the case for reconsidering the distribution of power within the Soviet 
system. 
 Chapter 2 details Soviet clinical research methods and practices to draw out some 
of the unique features of Soviet biomedicine. It uses the American perspective to 
highlight the idiosyncratic features of Soviet drug development practices and argues that 
what American observers saw as chaos and lack of discipline was in fact the direct result 
of a distinct epistemic culture in which therapeutic concerns were prioritized over those 
of clinical research. 
 Chapter 3 continues the focus on the normative structures of Soviet biomedicine 
through a case study of medical cybernetics. It follows the failed attempt by advocates of 
medical cybernetics to simplify the definition of medical science and redistribute 
authority over medical practice—rhetorical moves employed by the practitioners of this 
new discipline to legitimize their expertise and secure for themselves a role in the 
regulation of both medical knowledge production and practice. 
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 In Chapter 4, institutions, practices and normative structures intermingle as I 
attempt to make sense of the changes in the Soviet system of health protection during the 
1980s. I argue that the Soviet biomedical establishment in this period was undergoing not 
only an institutional crisis brought on by a shortage of funds, but also through an 
epistemic erosion that undermined its normative structures and made normal scientific 
practice impossible. 
 Chapter 5 examines the adoption of evidence-based medicine rhetoric in Russian 
medical circles. It returns to the theme of authority, examining the efforts of the medical 
profession to define a new epistemic basis for professional authority necessitated by the 
destabilization of the institutional and normative structures of the system of health 
protection. 
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CHAPTER 1:  IN THE KINGDOM OF CROOKED MIRRORS 
 
We are dwarf birches. 
We have cleverly made up our poses, 
But all this is merely pretense. 
Our bends are a form of resistance. 
Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, 
 Dwarf Birches, 1966 
 
 On February 27 1956, at 3:15 pm local time, a group of Americans landed in 
Leningrad and, as Dr. Michael B. Shimkin, a participant in the American Mission on 
Microbiology and Epidemiology to the Soviet Union recalled in his report of the trip, 
“entered a different world.”36 The differences that struck Shimkin’s senses first were 
physical—the dark, oddly quiet airport with a few heavily dressed people scattered along 
the mostly empty benches and a lonely kiosk offering a “pitiful selection of toiletries.”37  
As Shimkin and his colleagues progressed on their tour of 21 medical research institutes 
throughout the USSR, however, other differences began to emerge. 
 Perhaps the most obvious of these were differences in organization. What stood 
out the most, of course, was that Soviet science was planned. That is, Soviet scientists 
were embedded in a highly complex administrative structure that coordinated their 
activities and set their research agenda in accordance with the needs and priorities of the 
state. As Shimkin observed in his report, “having no faith in any Divine plan, the Soviet 
State has elevated human plans to that level. Five-year plans are not only expressions of 
purpose; they are religious dedications.”38 Hand in hand with planning went 
centralization—and compartmentalization. The practical manifestation of this trend was 
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36 “The American Medical Mission on Microbiology and Epidemiology to the Soviet Union, February-
March 1956,” p. 6, in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 443, Box 144, Folder: 
INTL 4-1 US-USSR, 1956-1969.  It should be noted that this was not Shimkin’s first time in the Soviet 
Union—he had visited the USSR on a similar mission in 1944. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 20. 
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that “every activity in science and related technology is grouped into Institutes: 
educational ones, research ones, production ones.”39  
 The American Mission on Microbiology and Epidemiology was one of the first 
American medical delegations to the Soviet Union since the interruption in scientific 
contacts that followed the 1947 KR affair and the onset of the Cold War.40 Perhaps that is 
why in his report Shimkin refrained from evaluating the Soviet system of research, 
emphasizing instead that the delegation was of the opinion that: 
…it would be arrogant, stupid and even dangerous for the United 
States to ignore Soviet medicine and research; we agree that all 
appropriate steps should be taken to develop channels of 
communication between the medical scientists of the two countries by 
exchange of literature, materials, and personnel; we agree that we have 
something to learn from their achievements, but that understanding of 
their medicine and research is even more important than mere 
knowledge.41  
 
 This view—that an understanding the logic of the Soviet system of health 
protection was intrinsically important—seems to have been shared in American political 
and scientific circles. On January 27, 1958 the US and the USSR signed the Lacey-
Zarubin agreement—the first of a series of comprehensive, formal intergovernmental 
agreements that were to govern cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchanges 
between the two superpowers until 1972, when a more comprehensive cooperative 
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39 Ibid., 18. 
40 The KR affair is the story of two Soviet scientists who had developed a biological preparation that they 
believed had potential as a cancer treatment. The preparation attracted a lot of attention both within and 
beyond the USSR, and this attention got the scientists in trouble—they were tried before a ‘court of honor’ 
for divulging state secrets. The affair did not cost the scientists their lives (nor did it put an end to their 
careers), but it did send a signal to the Soviet scientific community that close contact with and attention 
from foreign colleagues could be dangerous.  For more on this episode, see Nikolai Krementsov, The Cure: 
A Story of Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002) and V.D. Esakov and E.S. Levina, Stalinskie ‘Sudy Chesti’: Delo ‘KR’ (Moscow: Nauka, 2005).  
41 NARA, RG 443, Box 144, Folder: INTL 4-1 US-USSR, 1956-1969. Emphasis in the original. 
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program in health and medicine was launched. 42 These agreements included exchanges 
in the health and medical field, and the number of reciprocal visits by medical specialists 
grew very rapidly during the sixties.43   
 That these exchanges contributed to an increase in knowledge—both scientific 
and cultural—on both sides is beyond doubt. But, as this chapter demonstrates, an 
understanding of Soviet medicine and research proved elusive. In this chapter, I use the 
Soviet-American exchanges in health and medicine during the 1960s and 1970s as a 
prism for teasing apart Soviet and American representations of the Soviet system of 
health protection, provide a functional institutional portrait of that system.  
 I argue that American observers involved in these exchanges misinterpreted the 
Soviet system, and that the origins of this misinterpretation are to be found in the Cold 
War interactions between the two superpowers. The Cold War was more than a structural 
constraint in these interactions. It wasn’t just that political tensions between the 
superpowers interfered in the process of scientific cooperation, or that the geopolitics of 
the period inflected science with political significance. Rather, I demonstrate that the 
Cold War was an important analytical framework that exchange participants employed in 
their interpretations of and responses to interactions with their foreign colleagues, and 
that the adoption of this framework by the exchange participants posed a barrier to 
achieving mutual understanding not only of the other side’s motives or intentions, but of 
the science itself.   
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42 “A Summary Report on the United States Exchanges Program with the Soviet Union.” NARA, RG 514, 
Box 6, Folder: 1964 Agreement: Press Releases and Memo.  
43 It is worth noting that the exchanges preceding this agreement, as well as those that followed in the first 
couple of years after its signing, were apparently funded not by the US government but by grants from 
pharmaceutical companies and private foundations.  Only in 1962 did the NIH step in to provide the 
program with a firmer financial basis. Verne G Robinson, “Historical Notes for Dr. King”, September 18 
1972.  NARA, RG 514, Box 7, Folder: OIH Reports & Notes re US-Soviet Health Exchange. 
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 Although the distortions were equally prevalent on both sides, my focus here is on 
the representations of Soviet science. Articulating and confronting the misinterpretations 
of Soviet institutions is important because in many ways they continue to structure 
contemporary perceptions of the Soviet system of biomedical44 research both in the west 
and now in Russia as well. At present, Soviet medicine remains woefully understudied 
and poorly understood, particularly in the period of developed socialism. While a number 
of contemporary analysts have provided descriptions of the organizational structure 
within which Soviet biomedical research operated, in the course of the Soviet Union’s 
existence access to information was both limited and carefully managed by Soviet 
authorities. The result is that this scholarship can tell us very little about what this 
organizational structure was like in practice. 45 In addition, much of this scholarship has 
focused on the Soviet system of healthcare provision, glossing over the biomedical 
research enterprise. Although historians are beginning to turn their attention to the subject 
of Soviet medicine, most have focused on the post-Revolutionary and Stalinist periods, 
and even here the surface has barely been scratched.46 
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44 The Russian term for this in the Soviet period was mediko-biologicheskie issledovania—that is, the order 
of the two words forming the portmanteau word is reversed.  The significance of this will become clear 
later in the chapter.   
45 Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine and Ryan, Doctors and the State. 
46 See Susan Gross Solomon, ed., Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia Between the Wars 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Krementsov, The Cure; Tricia Starks, The Body Soviet: 
Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State, (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2008).  There have also been a number of dissertations at the University of Chicago which remain 
unpublished: Christopher Burton, "Medical Welfare during late Stalinism: A Study of Doctors and the 
Soviet Health System, 1945-1953" (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1999) and Michael David, 
"The White Plague in the Red State: The Control of Tuberculosis in Russia, 1900-1941” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1999). The body of scholarship produced on the subject in Russia is also quite 
small—although the Soviet period is covered in some sweeping history of medicine texts (see M.B. 
Mirskii, Meditsina Rossii X-XX Vekov: Ocherki Istorii, (Moskva: Rosspen, 2005), there have been very few 
published historiographies dedicated to the period. 
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 While little is known about the Soviet system of health protection, much is 
assumed. In particular, there are long-standing assumptions about the inner workings of 
the system and the relationship between biomedical scientists and the Soviet state that 
were formulated by American observers in the course of these exchanges and have found 
their way into western scholarly analysis of Soviet science and medicine. The 
assumptions, which I characterize in greater detail below, are that the Soviet system of 
health protection was strictly hierarchical and subordinate to the state, that it operated 
according to plan, and that it disempowered clinicians. As I demonstrate below, these 
assumptions don’t hold up when one looks at the system in practice. I argue that, rather 
than being concentrated in the hands of the state, power was distributed (albeit unevenly) 
throughout the system; that the planning system was in fact quite flexible in practice, 
allowing individuals considerable opportunity to exercise agency over their work; and 
that therapeutics were well represented in the circles of power.47 
 Soviet-American cooperation provides a useful lens both because it circumscribes 
an otherwise unmanageable area of inquiry and because placing the issue of Soviet-
American relations at the heart of the case study allows me to address the questions of the 
relationship between biomedical scientists and the Soviet state and the place of Soviet 
biomedical science within the global biomedical enterprise while tackling the problematic 
legacy of the Cold War head on. Engaging with this legacy is important first because the 
Cold War in this period was a powerful epistemic resource.   
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47 In fact, clinicians dominated the Academy’s leadership positions, and the bulk of the Academy’s 
resources appear to have gone to the Division of Clinical Medicine (at least that is the division that boasts 
the largest number of Scientific Centers—large conglomerates of research and clinical institutes united by 
their specialty, such as VONC—N.N. Blokhin, the director of VONC, served two terms as Academy 
president, the first from 1960-1968 and the second from 1977 to 1987).
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 Although the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as 
the misunderstandings and stereotypes that accompanied them, preceded the Cold War, 
they acquired a renewed intensity in this period and became a fixture in the cultural 
landscape of both countries, becoming a kind of analytical framework that the actors of 
the period drew on to make sense of their world. In elaborating this framework, the work 
of Paul Edwards, who conceptualized the Cold War as a closed-world drama in which the 
globe was divided between rigidly separated and actively antagonistic camps, serves as a 
departure point.48 This concept of a globe firmly divided into two mutually exclusive, 
antagonistic worlds was the foundation of the Cold War analytical framework, both on 
the Soviet and the American side. The ‘Cold War’ here is not simply a historical period, 
but a term that designates a particular system of international relations and domestic 
politics that held sway in the US and the USSR for much of the twentieth century. An 
‘analytical framework’ is not a conceptual tool available only to analysts, but, as Erving 
Goffman defined it, it provides the answer to the question “what is it that is going on 
here?”49—a conceptual tool that is available to both actors and analysts.50 
 Another reason why addressing the legacy of the Cold War is important is that it 
colors much of the scholarship not only on Soviet medicine, but even Soviet science 
more generally. For example, while the question of the relationship between Soviet 
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science and the state has received considerably more attention from historians,51 the 
prevailing characterization of this relationship is incomplete and somewhat misleading.  
This characterization can be summarized as follows. Although the Soviet government had 
been very consistent in its favorable predisposition towards science, it was equally 
consistent in its drive to subordinate the scientific community to state goals and priorities.  
Achieving this subordination took time—the fledgling Soviet state was too weak to 
accomplish it immediately after the Revolution, and for a time the scientific community 
was able to wield real power not only over its own work, but also over some issues of 
national policy. But as the Bolsheviks consolidated their power, Soviet science 
essentially became a branch of the civil service, with the scientific community losing 
much of its autonomy and agency not only when it came to matters of national 
importance, but in their work as well. Although certain disciplines such as physics 
prospered in this environment, this was because their strategic importance to a certain 
extent exempted them from strict government control and provided them with privileged 
access to material and intellectual resources.52 On the other side of the spectrum were less 
fortunate disciplines such as genetics, which were mangled by political interference and 
ideological distortions. For the most part, however, the system effectively stifled 
research, condemning Soviet science to mediocrity. While scholars have begun to 
problematize this characterization of the Soviet science-state relationship, painting a 
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detailed portrait of the intricate interdependency between the two, the nuanced 
understanding they provide has yet to become dominant.53 
 Finally, the Cold War legacy needs to be addressed because it is visible not only 
among Soviet and American scientists in the course of the exchange but also, in a 
different way, among analysts of Soviet science. And, to a certain extent, it continues to 
play a role in current understandings of Russian biomedical science—both among 
analysts and among the biomedical community itself, which has picked up on Cold War 
rhetoric to discredit old approaches and erect a new foundation for legitimating 
professional authority. 
 I begin outlining the history of the Soviet-American exchanges in health and 
medicine with an exploration of the way American scientists and administrators 
understood the Soviet system of biomedical research.54 I then look at the way the Soviets 
understood their own system, and trace how the system functioned in the context of the 
exchange. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the dissolution of the exchange. 
 
The road to cooperation 
 Scientific exchange with colleagues in the US was a not-uncommon practice in 
Soviet biomedical science in the years leading up to the Cold War, but its onset brought a 
significant disruption of such contacts. This interruption in contact between Soviet and 
American biomedical scientists lasted almost a decade, ending in January 1956 when a 
Soviet medical delegation arrived in the US in search of information on the newly 
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developed polio vaccine and laboratory equipment for the new Poliomyelitis Institute in 
Moscow.55 Only days after the Soviets returned home, an American delegation 
reciprocated this visit, setting the pattern for an increasingly active exchange of personnel 
that continued into the early 1970s.   
 Both the Soviet and the American sides were guided by certain assumptions about 
each other’s intentions and about the biomedical research enterprise of the other party in 
their conduct in the exchange. A 1964 Summary Report on the United States Exchanges 
Program with the Soviet Union put together by the Soviet and Eastern European 
Exchanges Staff at the Department of State articulates the American assumptions and 
goals very clearly. 
 The report begins by noting that, “since the internal systems and external policies 
of the United States and the USSR differ radically, it is to be expected that the goals and 
methods of the two countries in a program of bilateral exchanges are considerably at 
variance.”56 One difference was that whereas Soviet society was seen as “largely closed 
and controlled,” US society was “open.”57 The other major difference was that “the 
Soviet Union was still a developing country, very successful in fields to which it gives 
top priority, far behind the West in many other fields it considers less important.”58 
 Interpreting Soviet goals for the exchanges as being to obtain scientific and 
technical information and promote a favorable image of the USSR and its policies, the 
Department of State thus concluded that the top priority of the US government in these 
exchanges was to safeguard against a one-way flow of information and to protect national 
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security. Soviet propaganda was not seen as a major concern, since the US system was 
“based on freedom of information” and thus “Americans can reasonably cope with 
propaganda.”59 
 The Department of State’s own stated goal for the exchange was to promote the 
“normal flow of information and persons between the two countries.”60 The purpose of 
this was twofold: to learn more about the “world’s second strongest power”61 and, in the 
long term, to perhaps influence it to pursue more constructive directions. Although the 
report acknowledged that the exchanges were “not a strong enough vehicle to reform the 
Soviet Union or to solve fundamental problems,”62 it was nonetheless hoped that “since 
the Soviet system operates on the basis of propaganda, providing Soviet citizens with 
factual information” would be “of great importance” and could potentially have “great 
effect.”63 
 This approach to the exchanges and conception of the Soviet research enterprise 
was the lens through which American scientists viewed at their Soviet colleagues, and it 
had a direct impact on their understanding of Soviet biomedical science.  American 
observers perceived Soviet biomedical science, like all Soviet society, as closed and 
controlled in the sense that it was isolated and planned. Soviet biomedical scientists were 
isolated both from their colleagues abroad—with the result that their science had a 
somewhat “parochial” character, remaining “outside of the channels of world medical 
developments”64—and from each other, resulting, among other things, in the apparent 
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separation between medical practice and medical science. A virologist who spent six 
months in the Soviet Union in 1962 pointed to this in his report: 
A most important factor to recognize in the Soviet medical sciences is the 
relative status of clinical versus research people.  The line is very clear and 
heavily drawn between research and clinical workers in terms of pay, 
prestige, membership in the Academy, position in medical politics and, 
above all, a sense of personal security.  For the most part, the clinician 
(defined by his training and organization, regardless of whether he is 
personally engaged in research) is the ‘low man’ in the pecking order.  
Exceptions do exist, but they are rare.  Because of his status the clinician 
has little latitude to act on his own initiative.65  
 
 The Soviet planning system was understood to envelop biomedical scientists in a 
highly complex administrative structure that coordinated their activities and set their 
research agenda in accordance with the needs and priorities of the state. The consequence 
of this was that “Soviet research is goal-oriented and highly centralized … all planning 
and thinking is centered in one man at the head of each institute.”66 The problem with this 
was that, “although he may be quite capable, there are serious difficulties in establishing 
or changing programs, clearing manuscripts, etc.”67 Furthermore, this system fostered too 
strong a respect for authority which, “in science, tends to inhibit the evolution of 
concepts.”68 
 Medical science was understood to be an area of low priority for the Soviet 
government, and consequently for the most part inferior to what was being done in the 
US. Nonetheless, American observers did not discount Soviet science completely. For 
example, the Pharmacology and Physiology of the Nervous System Medical Mission 
noted in their report that “when one reflects that the majority of Soviet research institutes 
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are postwar in origin, that their application to modern research techniques is relatively 
recent, one cannot be complacent about their potential for rapid progress in the future” 
and recommended “that research in the United States in neurophysiology and 
neuropharmacology be supported even more generously than it has been, otherwise we 
shall be overtaken.”69 Some Soviet research programs were even considered potentially 
valuable. The Second Cardiovascular Mission to the Soviet Union granted that “in one or 
two fields of cardiovascular research Soviet science is possibly making unique 
contributions.”70 In any case, exchanges with the Soviets were deemed to be of value 
because “Soviet problems in cardiovascular disease are very similar to the American, 
their approaches are identifiably ours, and we work on completely common ground.”71 
Individual researchers and institutes even garnered admiration. 
 American scientific planners also thought the information gathered in the course 
of the exchange potentially valuable. The lessons in organization that could be derived 
from a close study of the Soviet system were deemed particularly important. In a memo 
to the Director of the NIH and the Chief of the Office of Program Planning, OD, an 
official with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare suggested that “it would 
be useful to consider an exchange mission centered upon the examination and review of 
the structure, organization and administration of the medical research activities.”72 
Information gathered by such a mission would be useful given that 
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… we have long wondered about the institutional form in which the 
further expansion of medical research in this country should take 
place.  We have contemplated the development of ‘institute’ 
mechanisms either as a part of or separate from the academic scene.  
The great diversity in the use of this institutional form in the USSR 
may provide information contributory to our further study of such 
mechanisms.73 
 
 On the part of most American medical researchers who traveled to the USSR 
under the auspices of these exchanges, however, increasing familiarity bred contempt.  
While the American reports from the 1960s seldom contain harsh assessments of 
individual Soviet scientists, tending to absolve them of personal responsibility for the 
state of their work, they frequently note the relative poverty of Soviet laboratories and 
convey a sense of disappointment with and sometimes contempt for the research.  
Assessments range from cautiously critical, such as the report of Dr. David Ashler, a 
virologist who spent over a year in the Soviet Union beginning in 1969 and noted that 
although “most of the Soviets with whom I worked were sincere and enthusiastic 
researchers …their laboratories did not seem to be as productive as comparable 
laboratories in the USA.;”74 to dismissive, as in the report of the 1959 Radiobiology 
Mission which concluded that “some of the work seems very good, some very bad, and 
most of it quite pedestrian;”75 to downright contemptuous, as in the report of Dr. Robert 
Van Citters, who noted that the Soviets still relied on research methods that have been 
“largely discarded in this country for approximately twenty years”76 and that there was 
“nothing in their diagnostic or therapeutic facilities which could be interpreted as new or 
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exciting” and “their approach …resembled much of what goes on in this country, or 
rather what had gone on in this country five to eight years ago.”77 
 Despite the prevalence of such attitudes among American scientists returning 
from the USSR, by 1970 HEW and Department of State officials concluded that although 
the exchanges were not “necessarily producing substantive benefits to the American 
scientific community,” the reciprocal visits and the occasional joint meetings were 
sufficiently valuable to warrant an expansion of the exchange. 78 Noting that the 
“repetitive nature” of the exchange activities had reduced the visits to “stereotyped, 
almost sight-seeing expeditions with little or no meaningful long-term professional 
collaboration among the physicians and scientists participating” and that this had “taken a 
toll in interest and support for the program among the senior members of the medical 
communities of both countries,”79 HEW staff proposed “altering the structure of the 
program to make it more scientifically rewarding and productive.”80 The proposal, 
modeled on the US-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program, provided for a small 
joint medical policy committee responsible for agreeing on matters of mutual interest and 
setting the general program structure. The Joint Committee would meet annually to set a 
comprehensive agenda for cooperation. The exchange of delegations and individual 
scientists would continue, “but now would be within an organized pattern having more 
specific objectives than merely first hand, one-time observations.”81 The proposal found 
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support among US policymakers and was presented to MinZdrav officials by the Surgeon 
General, Jesse Steinfeld.   
 The obvious question, of course, is why. Why go to the trouble of negotiating 
with the Soviets and the expense of funding an expanded program if the exchange was 
thought to yield no substantive scientific benefit? One major motivating factor for this 
move towards increasing cooperation was, paradoxically, the Cold War itself. As Mark 
Field, a prominent analyst of Soviet medicine, articulated in his 1967 book Soviet 
Socialized Medicine: An introduction,  
Soviet socialized medicine must …be considered an important and 
integral component of [the Soviet] challenge…  This challenge is 
…not limited to the political, economic, or even military spheres; it is 
also part and parcel of Soviet propaganda and of its claim of having, 
among other things, pioneered and developed an advanced form of 
‘socialized’ health service unique in many of its features and possible 
only under Soviet conditions.  The Soviet regime thus seeks to evoke, 
among its own people, an attitude of gratitude toward itself as the 
fountainhead of progress and the organizer of medical care; and, by 
inference perhaps more than by direct statements, the regime tells the 
people of other countries (particularly the former colonial nations) that 
only the adoption of a Soviet or ‘socialistic’ form of government will 
make it possible for them to provide for their health needs.82  
 
That is, whatever the shortcomings of Soviet medicine, it was an important weapon in the 
Cold War.  While the U.S. may not have been afraid of the effects of Soviet propaganda 
at home, it could not dismiss the dangers of such propaganda abroad, particularly in the 
developing world to which the Soviets were offering an alternative model of 
development. 
 Thus, American scientists approached the exchanges with their Soviet 
counterparts with an analytical framework that conceptualized Soviet biomedical science 
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as fundamentally backward—constrained by utilitarian goals that limited the creativity of 
research, stifled by a rigid bureaucracy that stripped scientists of initiative and erected 
artificial barriers between biomedical science and practice, and prevented by an 
oppressive government from freely participating in global biomedical knowledge 
production. Although some quality research programs were acknowledged to exist, they 
were perceived as anomalies within an otherwise clearly inferior system. While American 
observers thought that the inferiority of Soviet science was indisputable, they could not 
deny their Soviet colleagues a role in the enterprise of global biomedical knowledge 
production. The Soviets’ place in this enterprise was guaranteed mainly by the political 
threat posed by the Soviet Union as an alternative model of development for newly 
independent nations. 
 This conception of Soviet biomedical science—as a research enterprise shackled 
by an overbearing bureaucracy and sapped of creative energy by an intrusive state that 
deprived its scientists of their agency and initiative—is, as the next section attempts to 
demonstrate, the distortion produced by the Cold War analytical frame. Although Soviet 
scientists undoubtedly struggled with bureaucratic hurdles and the state clearly did 
intrude on some aspects of the scientists’ daily activities (notably, though not exclusively, 
on the scientists’ ability to travel abroad), focusing on these constraints alone obscures 
the multifaceted nature of the Soviet biomedical research enterprise.  The next section 
offers a corrective to this interpretation.  
Searching for common ground 
 The State Department was only partly accurate in its assessment of the Soviet 
agenda for the exchanges. Obtaining useful scientific and technical information and 
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advertising the achievements of Soviet science were certainly important objectives. 83  
They were, in some sense, the traditional goals of Soviet foreign scientific and technical 
policy 84 and consequently were also the objectives that Soviet planners and scientists at 
all levels and across all disciplines placed rhetorical emphasis on in virtually every 
discussion of international contacts.85 But by the 1970s the Soviet biomedical 
establishment had developed a much broader policy agenda, which was equally informed 
by the Cold War lens and of which these objectives were only a part.  
 Active efforts to reintegrate Soviet medicine into the international biomedical 
community resumed with Stalin’s death.86 Already in 1953 the USSR joined its first 
international health organization, adding dozens of such memberships in the subsequent 
decades.87 Through the 1960s, Soviet entanglements on the international arena continued 
to expand with the establishment of numerous bilateral exchanges with both socialist and 
capitalist countries, as well as through aid programs in the developing world. The 
responsibility for these contacts rested with MinZdrav, which, through its Division of 
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Foreign Affairs, delegated a part of their administration to the Soviet Academy of 
Medical Sciences (which in turn did the same to its institutes).88   
 Beginning in 1965, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs was Dmitrii 
Dmitrievich Venediktov. A surgeon by training, Venediktov came to MinZdrav very 
early in his career—in fact, he completed his post-graduate training in surgery while 
already in MinZdrav’s employ, where from 1952 to 1962 he headed the Information 
Sector of the Department of External Affairs. Subsequently he spent three years in New 
York as the medical advisor of the USSR mission to the UN, and when his teacher and 
mentor B.V. Petrovsky (a very prominent surgeon) became the Minister of Health, he 
returned to MinZdrav—this time as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs—where he 
remained until the end of Petrovsky’s tenure as minister in 1981.   
 A proponent of systems theory, Venediktov saw medicine and healthcare as 
global entities, and argued that the development of “international healthcare” was an 
important task of national institutions, since threats to human health respected no national 
boundaries and no single national system could hope to solve them alone.89 International 
cooperation—both through bilateral agreements such as the one the Americans were 
offering (the USSR already signed several such agreements by 1970) and through 
international organizations such as the WHO—was the way to achieve this goal. 
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 In his 1977 monograph on International Health Problems,90 Venediktov lays out 
a four-pronged foreign policy for the USSR with different strategies for cooperation with 
socialist, capitalist and developing countries, as well as international bodies such as the 
World Health Organization. These areas of cooperation were based on very different 
principles. Working with socialist and developing countries was characterized in the 
monograph as ‘selfless assistance’ while the cooperation with capitalist countries was 
based on a strict tit-for-tat exchange aimed at achieving ‘mutual benefit.’   
 The principles underlining Soviet cooperation with the WHO were especially 
complex and at times contradictory. On the one hand, the WHO was perceived as a 
global stage on which superpower competition for influence over the developing world 
took place. On the other hand, it was thought to be the most promising site for developing 
an effective methodology of international cooperation, as well as the most important tool 
of this cooperation. Capitalist countries (chief among them being the US), whose 
leadership in many fields of medical science was acknowledged, were conceptualized 
both as rivals and as critical partners. 
 The most valuable contribution that the USSR had to offer in all these areas of 
international cooperation was the dissemination of the methodology of the Soviet system 
of health protection—“the most progressive and effective”91 system in the world.  
Although the system was not perfect, particularly when it came to the development of 
medical science and technology, its organizational and methodological superiority were 
beyond doubt, and it was only a matter of time for this superiority to be recognized 
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internationally. These ideas about the global scale of biomedicine and the international 
significance of Soviet system of health protection constituted the Soviet Cold War lens. 
 The move towards cooperation on the part of US biomedical community was 
interpreted as a clear sign that this time of recognition was drawing near. As Venediktov 
asserted in the monograph that highlighted the Soviet-American cooperation, the looming 
domestic health care crisis in the US and the increasing familiarity with Soviet 
achievements that came out of the reciprocal visits during the 1960s had “brought on a 
reevaluation of the assumptions about the superiority of American medicine which had 
taken root in the USA.”92 
 The fact that the Americans took initiative in proposing the exchange meant that 
they were beginning to recognize the failures of their own system. At a meeting with the 
Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Venediktov offered the following 
assessment of American motives for expanding the exchange: 
… the meaning of this agreement is clear, why Nixon assigns it such 
importance.  It’s because the crisis in the area of health protection 
right now is acute, during the campaign they almost drowned, and the 
only way out is in health protection.93  
 
 I want to dwell for a moment on the meaning of the term system of health 
protection, because this is more than just a matter of semantics—it is what set the Soviet 
system apart from healthcare and public health systems found in the West. The Soviet 
system of health protection was from its beginnings “established as a unified system 
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combining the preventive (prophylactic) and curative systems under one 
administration.”94     
 The Soviet definition of the concept of prophylaxis requires explanation as well.  
Although in daily usage the term was pretty much equivalent to the English word 
‘prevention,’ it also had certain distinctive connotations. According to Marxism-
Leninism, true prophylaxis was a function of the socialist order—the organization of 
public life in a way that maximized the health and wellbeing of the people. Accordingly, 
pursuing prophylactic goals required a planned, multi-layered system that could combine 
economic, social and public health initiatives aimed at improving working and living 
conditions, promoting a healthy lifestyle and raising public awareness and support, and 
preventing illness and injury.95 This understanding of prophylaxis was taught in medical 
schools, stressed in professional publications, and dwelled upon in numerous 
methodological seminars, which were a fixture of professional life at every level of the 
biomedical research enterprise. To what extent these Marxist-Leninist connotations were 
internalized by individual actors who comprised the system of health protection is an 
unanswerable question, but that they were a major component of the Cold War 
epistemology and as such had an impact on the organization and function of the system 
of health protection cannot be denied.  
 The system of health protection had three main goals:  
…to develop medical science in order to understand the human 
organism and its complex relationship to the environment, as well as 
the possible causes and mechanisms of disease; learning to prevent 
illness and to use for individual and public prophylaxis all available 
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knowledge, methods and tools; and finally, in case of the appearance 
of illness provide everyone with universally available and qualified 
medical help in a timely manner. 96  
 
 Of course, these goals were not fully realized in practice. This does not, however, 
diminish their practical importance in having a very direct impact on the structure and 
function of the system. As Odin Anderson, the director of the Center for Health 
Administration Studies at the University of Chicago, observed after returning from his 
trip to the USSR in 1972, “although there is a division of labor…the system appears to be 
so interlocked by preventive and curative concepts in the same personnel that it is 
difficult to differentiate between the two types of activities operationally and 
financially.”97 That is, although the development of biomedical science was an important 
goal, the primary concern of the system was the development of therapeutic medicine.  
The fact that the upper echelons of both MinZdrav and the Academy of Medical Sciences 
were dominated by clinicians (usually surgeons) supports this interpretation and 
contradicts the American perception noted earlier that therapeutic medicine was lower in 
status than basic research.  
 Thus Soviet medical science was an integral part of the larger system of health 
protection that blended curative and preventive concerns. This system, in turn, was an 
integral part of the Soviet state.98 This point requires emphasis as well, as it is one that is 
frequently lost sight of by western analysts and observers, who often conclude that 
because the system of health protection was the subject of planning, it was strictly 
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subordinate to the state and all its employees were required to do the state’s bidding.99 
This assumption does not stand up when we look closely at Soviet practices—although  
the elite planners and administrators of the health protection system clearly did not 
occupy the highest positions in the state hierarchy, they were nonetheless statesmen in 
their own right, with considerable power to set their own agenda (though, of course, they 
were not always assured of being able to carry it out successfully).   
 This picture of the Soviet healthcare system differs in important ways from the 
one that emerges out of the American Cold War analytical framework. The isolation of 
Soviet biomedicine from the rest of the world was a fairly short-lived phenomenon—
when the 1956 American delegation landed in Leningrad, the MinZdrav had already been 
actively re-activating scientific contacts and expanding its entanglements abroad for 
several years, and by the time the comprehensive exchange was proposed had a 
sophisticated foreign policy and was providing opportunities for individual Soviet 
scientists to establish contacts and build reputations abroad. The system was effectively 
unified, intertwining curative and preventive concerns, not effectively centralized.  
Although Soviet scientific planners placed a great deal of rhetorical emphasis on the 
importance of planning and centralization to the effective functioning of the system of 
health protection, in fact the system was very fragmented and the practices of planning 
and control flexible and porous, as will be demonstrated below. Finally, the practitioners 
of Soviet biomedicine were not mere cogs in the machine. And although bureaucratic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 See Field Soviet Socialized Medicine and also Mark G. Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).  Also Ryan, Doctors and the State.  This interpretation 
is also consistent with the conception of the relationship of Soviet scientists to the state found in much of 
the more general historiography of Soviet science (see Kojevnikov, “Phenomenon of Soviet Science,” for a 
summary of this conception), although new interpretations have been put forward (for example, 
Krementsov, Stalinist Science). 
!47!
hurdles that had to be negotiated on a daily basis were considerable (and some, such as 
the party organs that granted or withheld permission to travel abroad were almost 
impossible to circumvent), individual scientists had a variety of resources to draw on in 
order to exercise control over their own work. 
 The mechanism of the expansion of the Soviet-American exchange illustrates 
these points. When Steinfeld approached him with a proposal to expand the sporadic 
exchanges into a more systematic cooperative program, Venediktov readily agreed to 
personally work towards the realization of these plans. Following the initial discussions 
in Moscow, the two sides met again in Geneva in May of 1971 on neutral ground, at a 
meeting of the World Health Assembly. In order to give the cooperation a fixed form 
without entering into an actual agreement, a novel diplomatic dance was invented—the 
Soviet Minister of Health and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare would 
exchange letters expressing their readiness for mutual cooperation.100 After working out 
the text (in itself a cooperative process that took nearly a year), the letters were finally 
exchanged by Petrovskii and Secretary Richardson on February 11, 1972, and in March 
the first session of the US-USSR Joint Committee for Health Cooperation convened in 
Moscow to lay out the preliminary goals and agree on the mechanisms of the exchange.  
The exchange got the official blessing from the highest level of both the Soviet and the 
American government in May of 1972, when Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed 
the Health Cooperation Agreement in Moscow. 
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 It seems that throughout this convoluted process, the MinZdrav officials were 
acting on their own initiative. At least I have been able to find no evidence to the 
contrary. Although it was, of course, necessary to secure if not the blessing, then at least 
the non-interference of the Communist Party, as well as the cooperation of relevant state 
structures such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Ministers, this 
doesn’t seem to have posed a major problem. The only reference to the exchange I was 
able to find in the Party archives is dated late April 1972 (a month after the exchange had 
gotten under way), and consists of reports put together by Petrovsky and Venediktov 
regarding the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation, with a particular emphasis on 
oncology. The reports were put together for Kosygin,101 who forwarded them to the 
Central Committee for review. On May 3, 1972—after the exchange had already 
effectively been under way for several months—the Division of Science & Education and 
the Division of Propaganda of the Central Committee rubber-stamped the reports, adding 
only that it would be nice if the US would, as part of the exchange, supply Soviet 
biomedical institutions with equipment and reagents (either for free or on a commercial 
basis).102 
 To return to the main line of argument: what were the driving considerations for 
the Soviets in entering into this exchange? Expanding access to scientific and technical 
developments in the US was, as previously mentioned, obviously a major consideration. 
Venediktov acknowledged as much in his monograph on the exchange when he said that 
“the acquaintance with the achievements of medical science and medical industry in the 
USA, with the construction and utilization of large hospital complexes, the uses of 
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computers in medicine, etc., has shown Soviet specialists the potential of wider 
cooperation.”103 Just as important, however, was the conviction that such cooperation was 
objectively necessary given the global nature of medical problems and the increasing 
complexity and cost of medical science. As the countries with the greatest scientific 
potential, the US and USSR had both a moral obligation and a very practical incentive to 
work together. Finally, just as the State Department hoped that ensuring a normal flow of 
information between the two countries would have an impact (however small) on the 
Soviet system, the Soviets also hoped that a first-hand knowledge of their system of 
health protection would give the US a push in the right direction—a particularly 
promising prospect given the belief so often expressed by Venediktov that the US was 
starting to understand the error of its ways when it came to health and medicine. 
 Soviet biomedical scientists were enthusiastic about the exchange.  By the 1970s, 
American science had been firmly cemented as the benchmark for many Soviet 
biomedical disciplines and scientific endeavors.104 One would be hard pressed to find a 
single scientific meeting—whether at the level of a laboratory, a scientific council 
meeting of a particular institute, or the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences—where no 
reference is made to scientific practices either in the United States explicitly or ‘in the 
West’ more generally.105 The opportunity to get not only a direct glimpse of how one’s 
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science was pursued in the States, but to actually exchange materials, equipment and 
protocols with American colleagues and even pursue joint projects was tremendously 
exciting. 
 An equally important factor in generating enthusiam was the fact that the 
participation in the exchange opened the door to the possibility of securing more of the 
perpetually scarce resources needed to carry out research—equipment, funding, reagents 
and trips abroad. Although in theory Soviet planning was supposed to, as the slogan goes, 
give to each according to his needs and take from each according to his abilities, in 
practice the competition to secure the material basis necessary for one's work was as 
much a part of doing science in the Soviet Union as it was in the United States. Just how 
important the exchange was in this respect is illustrated by a meeting of the Presidium of 
the Academy of Medical Sciences with MinZdrav officials on June 21, 1972. The 
purpose of the meeting was to organize the scientific work of the exchange, and one of 
the most important points on the agenda was assessing the resources already available 
within the Academy system for the exchange and figuring out what additional resources 
would have to be provided by the government. As one of the MinZdrav officials at the 
meeting pointed out, this was crucial because “now this is getting much more attention 
then in the past [because] the Americans are actively engaged in carrying out this 
agreement… and we need to be fully armed so as not to land face first in the mud.”106  
There were rumors that Nixon had gone to Congress to request substantial funds for the 
exchange, and the Council of Ministers, not wanting to be outdone, had charged the 
MinZdrav with providing a proposal of the resources that would be needed.   
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 The promise of big spoils unleashed an argument on the Presidium’s floor.  
Representatives of research areas that did not make it into the initial agreement (which at 
the outset covered only cardiology, oncology and environmental health) argued that their 
institutes should also be allowed to participate.  Meanwhile the directors of the 
Academy’s cardiology and oncology institutes—the institutes that would be coordinating 
cooperation with Americans in these areas of research—had already put together detailed 
research plans that included orders for equipment and other materials, both for their own 
institutions and for the other Soviet institutes that would be participating in the exchange 
under their direction. This ruffled the feathers of Academy officials who took issue with 
being bypassed in this manner. V.D. Timakov, the president of the Academy, criticized 
the plans put together by institute directors on the grounds that their interests were too 
narrow and their requests too modest, and spoke in support of his colleagues whose 
specialties had been left out of the exchange, arguing that Soviet medical science would 
be better served if the exchange was not restricted only to those disciplines in which the 
Soviet Union was already strong but included weaker disciplines such as genetics.   
 This meeting illustrates not only the importance of the Soviet-American exchange 
as a resource for obtaining additional funding, but also the flexibility of the system of 
scientific planning. In proceeding with the exchange, the MinZdrav officials went 
directly to academic institutes, bypassing the Presidium of the Academy, which had 
jurisdiction over such decisions, and then pushing the Presidium to rubberstamp the 
directors’ plans. It also underscores the technocratic nature of this system, illustrating that 
the people responsible for the planning and administration of biomedical research were 
the physicians and the scientists themselves (even if sometimes, as in the case of 
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Venediktov, their scientific or medical practice ended up taking a back seat to 
administrative careers). This does not mean, of course, that all scientific and medical 
personnel enjoyed positions of power, nor does it negate the crucial role of political 
factors and the structural limitations of the bureaucratic machinery of planning and 
administration. What it does mean is that scientific and political concerns were 
inextricably intertwined in the minds and practices of Soviet scientific planners and 
scientists themselves as they made decisions about how—and whether—to work with the 
Americans. 
 The Cold War was an important resource in formulating these concerns, as 
illustrated by another meeting at the Academy of Medical Sciences at which Soviet 
scientists and administrators weighed political and scientific factors in their decisions 
about the exchange, as well as some of the misgivings they had about cooperating with 
their rivals. This was a meeting convened by Venediktov with Academy officials and 
scientists, among them Nikolai Nikolayevich Blokhin, a former President of the 
Academy, the coordinator of the Soviet-American cooperation in oncology and director 
of the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology of the Academy of Medical 
Sciences; V. Zhdanov, coordinator for the third problem area of the oncology exchange 
focused on Leukemia and Tumor Viruses of Animals and Man and director of the 
Ivanovskii Institute of Virology; and Boris Arkad’evich Lapin, the director of the 
Institute of Experimental Pathology and Therapy in Sukhumi. The subject of the meeting, 
held in the at once grand and dreary headquarters of the Academy just a few blocks from 
the Kremlin on the last day of October 1972, was a leukemia virus that had been isolated 
!53!
by Lapin’s group in Sukhumi and was believed to be the first human leukemia virus 
isolated anywhere in the world.   
 Venediktov called the meeting as a response to Lapin’s letter to discuss whether 
or not to pass samples of this virus to American collaborators and, if a decision to give 
the Americans the virus were reached, how to structure joint efforts on the virus. A group 
of American cancer virologists was expected in Moscow in November, and Nixon 
officially communicated to the Soviet Minister of Health the American interest in the 
Soviet virus and the American side’s willingness to provide the Soviets with any of the 
American viruses that Soviet scientists might be interested in, without exception.   
 The question of whether or not to pass on the virus was an important one because, 
as Venediktov noted, the virus was thought to be “one of the biggest accomplishments of 
Soviet science that we have in reserve.”107 Lapin expressed several fears about passing on 
the virus. The first was that the Americans would find a way to isolate the virus under 
another name—that is, simply steal the credit. Another fear was that, not having any 
experience of working with the virus, they would ‘lose’ it—that is, fail to replicate 
Lapin’s work, thereby discrediting it and inflicting ‘moral damage’ on Soviet science.  
Finally, given the technical superiority of American laboratories, it was possible that the 
Americans would quickly advance work on the virus, producing proof that it did indeed 
cause leukemia in humans and start work on a vaccine, leaving the Soviets in the dust. 
 Ultimately, voices in favor of transferring the virus to the Americans prevailed.  
Supporters of this decision argued that Lapin’s work was beyond reproach, and that the 
fear that his findings would not be confirmed was entirely groundless. More important, 
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given the fact that all the work done on this virus so far had already been published, it 
was difficult to find a legitimate excuse for refusal. Holding out on this virus, when the 
Americans had been so forthcoming in fulfilling Soviet requests, would compromise the 
spirit of cooperation. Even if the Americans took the research on the virus further, “this 
could only be more advantageous for science … because in the grand scheme of things 
this will still be a Soviet virus.”108 Finally as N.N. Blokhin, perhaps the loudest voice in 
support of transferring the virus, argued, “if we are going to carry on this work [of 
cooperation] we need to do it on a broad front and not give the Americans the impression 
that we want to get something from them but not give them anything.”109 
 One other thing that stands out in these meetings is their banality. Delving into the 
details of squabbles over funding and the venting of professional insecurities makes it 
possible to momentarily lose sight of the fact that one is reading an account of Soviet 
science. To be sure, the context is never far from the surface—it bubbles up in the 
confidence that American overtures are a sign of the growing global recognition of the 
system of health protection, in the self-conscious admiration of American technological 
prowess, and in the can-do attitude of the rhetoric of catching up and overtaking. But the 
important point is that the institutional structures do not figure in quotidian practices as a 
looming outside presence—the power of these institutions is vested in the individuals 
who comprise them as much if not more than in the institutional structures themselves. 
 To sum up, the Soviets took the American proposal to expand the exchange in 
stride as a clear sign that Soviet biomedical science, and the system of health protection 
of which it was a part, were finally getting the global recognition they deserved and that 
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their foreign medical policy was on the right track. At the same time they admired the 
scientific and technical achievements of American medicine, acknowledging its 
superiority in a number of areas, were acutely self-conscious about being behind and 
eager to catch up. This acknowledgement of the achievements of American scientists did 
not, however, shake their conviction that their system was ultimately superior. Soviet 
science was relatively behind only because it was starting from a position of 
disadvantage—it was a young system, and a major portion of its brief history had been 
characterized by severe hardships. This disadvantage would, however, be quickly 
overcome thanks to the inherent organizational and methodological superiority of the 
system. 
 
The unraveling of cooperation 
 Although both sides had some misgivings about the exchange and were unable to 
fully overcome a certain level of mistrust of the other, following the exchange of letters 
by Petrovskii and Richardson the cooperation got off to an active start and quickly 
gathered momentum. Joint meetings and reciprocal visits followed each other in rapid 
succession. Taking the Cooperation in Malignant Neoplasms as an example, already at 
the first session of the Joint Committee in March of 1972 a work plan targeting four 
problem areas—chemotherapy, immunotherapy, cancer virology and genetics of tumor 
cells—was agreed on by Carl Baker and N. Blokhin.110 By the end of June of the same 
year a delegation of American chemotherapists headed by Gordon Zubrod was in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Blokhin remained the Soviet coordinator for the duration of the exchange, while already by the time of 
the second meeting of the Joint Committee Frank Rauscher took over for Carl Baker.  This was a general 
trend—Soviet personnel participating in the exchange was quite stable, while on the American side there 
was a high degree of turnover. 
!56!
Moscow to hammer out a detailed work plan for their problem area, and in October N.I. 
Perevodchikova, head of the chemotherapy department of the Institute of Experimental 
and Clinical Oncology, went to the US to lay the ground-work for beginning joint clinical 
trials on compounds the two sides had agreed to exchange in June. Also in the fall of that 
year James Holland, a prominent American oncologist with extensive expertise in clinical 
trials of anti-cancer drugs arrived at the IECO for a nine month residency to facilitate the 
joint trials. The other groups kept up a similar schedule and by 1977, when the exchange 
came up for renewal, the Malignant Neoplasms group could boast numerous joint articles 
and monographs that grew out of cooperative projects. The exchange as a whole had also 
expanded to include several other areas—arthritis, infectious diseases and artificial heart 
research.111 There were other, less measurable results as well. Personal networks were 
expanded and friendships—sometimes close, life-long friendships—formed.  
 Nonetheless when the program came up for renewal in 1977, its continuation was 
far from certain. The era of détente was rapidly coming to an end, and rising tensions 
were making it harder to maintain the spirit of cooperation. American scientists were 
becoming increasingly indignant over the plight of Soviet dissidents and some, such as 
Robert Goldberger, chief of NCI’s biochemistry laboratory, even contemplated taking 
direct political action.  In a memo to the Deputy Director for Science at the NIH, dated 
April 11, 1977, Goldberger was informing NIH officials of his intent to travel to the 
USSR as a private citizen to participate in a symposium organized by Soviet 
‘refuseniks’—“mostly Jewish scientists who have been fired from their jobs because they 
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or members of their families have applied for visas to emigrate from the Soviet 
Union.”112  Such incidents created resentment and strained interpersonal relationships. 
 Despite the growing tension, American coordinators of the exchange publicly 
defended the cooperation. In January of 1977 several of them—Dr. Joseph Saunders 
(NCI), Dr. John Decker (NIMS), Dr. Paul Ehrlich (HEW) and Dr. Michael DeBakey (a 
prominent cardiac surgeon with a long history of working with the Soviets)—appeared on 
the MacNeil/Lehrer Report to face intense questioning about the value and politics of the 
exchange (I found a translated transcript of the program in the archives of one of the 
Academy Institutes). MacNeil started the program with the observation that the American 
government under Gerald Ford had become disenchanted with the policies of détente, and 
began to question the guests on what, precisely, the U.S. was gaining in the course of this 
cooperation that would have been impossible to achieve by other means and how Soviet 
science compared to American science in the areas under discussion. 
 Although the scientists could cite some examples of advances that the Soviets 
brought to the table—Joseph Saunders pointed to the Soviet anti-cancer drug Ftorafur, 
which, although analogous to an American drug, had fewer side-effects and was better 
tolerated by patients, and DeBakey discussed Soviet contributions to the engineering of 
an artificial heart—the preferred answer to this set of questions was to emphasize the 
ways in which Soviet research complemented American research programs, contributing 
to the greater store of human knowledge on which both countries could then freely draw.  
While the scientists were unanimous in their defense of the exchange, managing to 
effectively parry even the treacherous political question of whether it is possible to 
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cooperate with one’s rival, the transcript of the program conveys the sense that both the 
hosts and the guests on the program shared the perception that America was acting as a 
donor in the exchange. This is especially clear in the way Ehrlich and the others 
responded to the question of whether it wasn’t better to spend the money that was going 
to the exchange on domestic research. Every respondent emphasized the insignificance of 
the sum spent on the cooperation compared to what was being spent on domestic 
research, and only DeBakey pointed out that the money wasn’t simply being donated, but 
was yielding a return on American investment (although the return that DeBakey saw 
was the leverage the program provided American cardiologists over the Soviet research 
agenda). 
 For their part, the Soviets also continuously evaluated what they were getting out 
of the exchange. The evaluation process took place on every level of the scientific 
bureaucracy—from the Academy Institutes, which included a section on their 
international relations in every annual report to the Academy; to the Academy’s 
divisions, which compiled the data from the institutes under their supervision and 
discussed the results; to the Presidium of the Academy, which did the same for the 
Academy’s three divisions—and examined not only the Soviet-American exchange, but 
all the international collaboration undertaken by scientists employed in the Academy’s 
institutes. The question that was asked to gauge the value of international cooperation, 
however, was not ‘what did we learn from them that we didn’t know already’ but ‘what 
are we doing with the information obtained in the course of cooperation?’ Trips abroad 
were deemed ‘effective’ when scientists came back with concrete proposals (anything 
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from novel protocols to new equipment) that could be implemented both within their own 
institutes and beyond.  
 It was widely understood, however, that this was a very problematic metric (as 
were the statistical metrics of number of trips, projects, man-weeks, etc.), and that “real 
effectiveness is felt just like that, without mathematical formulas.”113 This was because 
one could bring back not only specific techniques and protocols, but also “creative 
energy” that can’t be “formatted” or “reduced to indicators in a report.”114 The value of 
these exchanges was, to a large extent, understood to be intangible, and thus “it can’t be 
said that if a person hasn’t formulated anything, that means he brought nothing back, that 
the trip didn’t reach its goal.”115   
 There was a further problem with measuring the value of international 
cooperation in this way—particularly when applied to the Soviet-American exchange.  
As one of the academicians participating in the Division of Clinical Medicine’s 
discussion of international relations in 1977 noted, in reporting the results of the 
cooperation it was important not to cast Soviet scientists as “schoolboys”: 
They often demand of us to say what the cooperation with the U.S.A. 
has given us.  I think that before we answer that question, we need to 
think it through.  Sometimes we write things that are far from the 
truth.  We are ready for particular surgeries, we know about them, we 
saw them and we know how to do them, but this isn’t a result of just 
the cooperation.  In no case.  This is a result of our extensive training 
and preparation, but we are forced to write that we did this or that 
because we worked with the USA.116 
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That is, demanding that the value of cooperation be expressed in terms of concrete 
knowledge gained and techniques learned often led to an exaggeration of the benefits of 
the exchange and a corresponding under-appreciation for the independent achievements 
of Soviet science. The picture of the cooperation produced in this way was deemed 
inaccurate, because the projects undertaken in the course of the cooperation were “not so 
much cooperative as parallel research.”117 Carrying on truly cooperative research “over 
such a distance” and “in two countries with different orders and approaches” was a 
difficult task, and the actual value of the exchange was to be found in the contacts 
between Soviet and American scientists.118 Although these contacts didn’t necessarily 
yield brand new information, they provided Soviet scientists with a broader picture of 
their field, rounding out their education.119 
 In the event, the agreement was renewed for another five years in May of 1977, 
but the wind had gone from its sails and, as superpower relations continued to worsen, 
exchange activities slowly petered out until the agreement was finally allowed to expire 
despite the active attempts on the part of both American and Soviet coordinators to keep 
it going. The expiration of the intergovernmental agreement did not mean an end to 
scientific exchange and cooperation—Soviet and American scientists in many cases 
maintained the contacts established in the course of the exchange. It only meant that 
attempts to work together were now more sporadic and less structured, and that the 
logistics of working together became more complicated.   
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 How are we to interpret the story of this attempt at cooperation by the rival 
superpowers? On the one hand, it seems like a straightforward and familiar story of 
science being thwarted by politics. But that kind of interpretation is too simplistic, 
obscuring both the extent to which science and politics were intertwined in the minds of 
the exchange participants, and the many different levels on which the Soviets and the 
Americans misunderstood each other. Urie Bronfenbrenner, a social psychologist who 
went to the USSR in 1960 as part of these exchanges, captured the essence of the 
problem in his report of the trip. Admitting that his “Soviet journey was a deeply 
disturbing experience,” Bronfenbrenner explained that “what frightened me was not so 
much the facts of Soviet reality as the discrepancy between the real and the perceived.”120 
The reason this was disturbing was that: 
…the Russian’s distorted picture of us was curiously similar to our 
view of them—a mirror image.  But of course our image was real.  Or 
could it be that our views too were distorted and irrational—a mirror 
image in a twisted glass?   
 It was—and is—a frightening prospect. For if such reciprocal 
distortion exists, it is a psychological phenomenon without parallel in 
the gravity of its consequences.121 
 
 While Bronfenbrenner’s observation of the mutual misunderstanding between the 
Soviet and American side is accurate, the phenomenon he is describing is not so much 
psychological as epistemic—that is, its origins are to be sought not in the mysteries of 
human psychological constitution but in the mundane characteristics of the epistemic 
resources the actors from the period employed in developing their understanding of the 
world around them. The Cold War, with its assumptions of mutual exclusivity and 
inherent antagonism, was a key epistemic resource employed by the exchange 
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participants in formulating their understanding of each other—the crooked mirror from 
which scientists on both sides derived their picture of the world. 
 In this chapter, I focused in the way that the crooked mirror of the Cold War 
distorted American perceptions of the institutional context of Soviet science. American 
scientists perceived Soviet biomedicine as defined by its institutional context—the 
unwieldy planning bureaucracy, the rigid hierarchy and the meddling state were 
understood to hold a monopoly on power, depriving the science of its creative energy. In 
the next chapter, I make the case that the quotidian practices of Soviet science were 
perceived no more clearly than its institutional context. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE WILD WEST IN THE COMMUNIST EAST 
 
 On November 4, 1972, an American family of seven crossed the Soviet-Finnish 
border in a newly purchased Volkswagen and set out on the long drive to Moscow 
accompanied only by a light snow and the silent pine forests that lined the mostly empty 
road. The family was that of Dr. James Holland, who along with his wife, Dr. Jimmie 
Holland and their five children, ages fifteen, thirteen, eleven, nine and seven, was on his 
way to Moscow to spend eight months at the Institute of Experimental and Clinical 
Oncology (IECO)—one of the institutes under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Academy of 
Medical Sciences and the premier cancer research and treatment facility in the USSR.122 
Dr. Holland, at the time Chief of Medicine at the Roswell Park Memorial Institute and “a 
leading authority in drug development,” was to facilitate the drug exchange program in 
malignant neoplasms, which was part of the larger Soviet-American healthcare exchange 
that had begun between the two superpowers earlier that year.123 His task was to bridge 
the gap in definitions, standards, and research techniques which made the execution of 
joint projects difficult.124   
 The journey held many surprises and new impressions, but one of the things that 
stood out the most for Holland from his first days in Moscow was a passing remark made 
by Nikolai Nikolaevich Blokhin, the director of the IECO, during Holland’s fist day at 
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sozdaniia protivoopuholevih preparatov v SSSR I SShA, Moskva: Meditsina, 1977, respectively. 
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the institute.  As Holland reported the remark in one of his progress reports back to the 
NIH, “Dr. Blokhin emphasized that the Soviet Union was at a state of development 
comparable to our ‘Wild West’ of 50 years ago.”125 The remark proved so memorable 
because, as Dr. Holland recalled in a personal interview more than thirty years later, “no 
one had ever admitted it before, that it was the Wild West.”126 
 Asked whether he did indeed find Soviet medicine of the time to be like the Wild 
West, Dr. Holland did not hesitate for a second in his response:  “Oh, worse!”127 There 
was “very little pharmaceutical industry” and consequently a chronic shortage of 
drugs.128  In his tours of cancer treatment facilities throughout the Soviet Union, Holland 
was particularly outraged to discover that  
they didn't have Dactinomycin and Vincristine, which are two important 
drugs for treating children with cancer, and I thought there was a shortage 
and people couldn't treat children with a curable cancer because they 
didn't have drugs, and I thought that was inexcusable.129 
 
 Holland was also largely unimpressed with Soviet drug development efforts.  
Although he readily acknowledged Soviet contributions to the world arsenal of 
chemotherapeutic agents, such as Larionoff’s synthesis of the peptide mustards and the 
drug ftorafur that the Soviets had passed on to the US for clinical trials as part of the 
Soviet-American exchange in oncology, he found their methods wanting.  In particular, 
he didn’t think  
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125 James Holland, “First progress report,” NARA RG 514, Box 6, Folder: Dr. James Holland, p.12. 
126 James Holland, personal interview, March 2007. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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they had done a significant realistic clinical trial before I talked to them 
about randomization and comparison.  Everything was a single arm 
recitation of what they'd encountered.130 
 
The problem with this approach was that it rendered all the Soviet results completely 
“subjective.”131 Holland was not alone in this characterization of Soviet science.  
Throughout their exchanges with Soviet colleagues during the 1960s and 1970s many 
American scientists reached for the word “subjective” when attempting to characterize 
Soviet research practices in their reports.  In characterizing Soviet research methods as 
subjective, American scientists not only cast suspicion on the reliability of the results 
produced by these methods, but also gave voice to their moral suspicions of mainstream 
Soviet science, which was thought to be corrupted by pressures from the Soviet state and 
forced to deviate from the norms that governed scientific research in democratic 
countries. 
 It is important to understand the intellectual roots of this characterization. For 
American chemotherapists at this time, the best method of clinical problem solving was 
the randomized clinical trial.132 Pioneered by Bradford Hill of the British Medical 
Research Council in 1946, this methodology was adopted at the National Cancer Institute 
in the early 1950s for the multicenter studies of leukemia.133 The approach was so well 
received that “by the late 1950s large-scale multicenter trials were perceived to be the 
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130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 The randomized clinical trial continues to be the gold standard of clinical research methodology.  
Although advocates of evidence-based medicine place it below the meta-analysis in terms of reliability, 
such analysis can only be performed on the data of multiple RCTs. 
133 Holland, along with Gordon Zubrod, championed this method at the NCI. For more on clinical trials in 
cancer see Kutcher, Contested Medicine. For more on Hill Matthews, Quantification. For more on the rise 
of clinical trials in American medicine more generally see Marks, Progress of Experiment. 
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only reliable means of answering clinical questions in cancer therapy.”134 What endowed 
clinical trials with reliability was their high degree of regimentation as well as “size and 
randomized structure, which provided the capability of producing unbiased and 
statistically significant differences between the various treatment options on offer and, 
thus, answering important clinical questions.”135  
 The word ‘unbiased’ is crucial here. Clinical trials provide access to objective 
knowledge by taking drug testing out of the realm of therapeutic medicine and 
transforming doctors and patients into investigators and research subjects, as well as by 
distancing the producers of medical knowledge from the knowledge produced.136 
Cambrosio et al. have argued that clinical trials have provided a vehicle for the 
emergence of a new form of objectivity which is specific to western biomedicine—
regulatory objectivity. What distinguishes regulatory objectivity from other forms of 
objectivity is its reliance on collective action. As the authors argue, under the regime of 
regulatory objectivity “what counts … is not whether or not the results produced by a 
particular laboratory are true, in some absolute sense, but whether or not they are 
compatible … with results produced by other laboratories.”137  
 In western biomedical discourse of the time, clinical trials were incorporated into 
a narrative of progress and taken to be both the result and evidence of scientific advance 
in medicine.138 Clinical trials occupy this position in western biomedical discourse to this 
day, although they have been displaced from the apex of the evidence pyramid by the 
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134 Kutcher, Contested Medicine, 2. 
135 Ibid., 24. 
136 At least this is the promise of clinical trials.  In practice, the process of answering clinical questions via 
the conduct of RCTs is fraught and complex.  See Epstein, Impure Science and Fisher, Medical Research 
for Hire. 
137 Cambrosio et. al., “Regulatory objectivity”; 192. 
138 Marks, Progress of Experiment. 
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meta-analysis.139 Thus for Holland, the failure of his Soviet colleagues to adopt this 
methodology was a sign of the backwardness of Soviet medicine, and Blokhin’s Wild 
West remark a starkly frank admission to backwardness.140 In this chapter, I take 
Holland’s characterization of Soviet science as subjective as the starting point of an 
exploration of Soviet biomedical epistemology as it was instantiated in drug development 
practices. I argue that this epistemology had several distinct features that were reflected 
in the organization and methodology of drug development. 
 At the root of this epistemology was a conception of medicine as a hybrid 
science—a science in equal parts biological, humanistic and social. The hybrid nature of 
medical science created room for a plethora of methodological approaches that belonged 
to one of two distinct realms—the experimental or the clinical. Soviet epistemic 
commitments were unlike the western notion of objectivity, which presumed a hierarchy 
of medical evidence in which evidence produced in the clinical setting was more 
vulnerable to corruption by the biases of clinicians and patients alike and therefore 
occupied a lower rung than evidence produced in experimental settings, where the 
application of the scientific method ensured the reliability of the knowledge produced, 
and where the randomized clinical trial was supposed to erase this disparity by making it 
possible to apply the same scientific method found in experimental settings in the clinic. 
Rather the Soviets did not conceptualize either the bench/bedside divide or the variability 
of the individual as an obstacle to objective knowledge.   
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139 In some sense, the RCT can be described as a precursor to EBM—as an earlier phase of the progressive 
rationalization of medicine. 
140 While the Wild West is a symbol of lawlessness rather than backwardness in American culture, in 
Russian the term evokes the absence of civilization rather than law. 
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 I argue that, while Soviet biomedical scientists were also in pursuit of objective 
medical knowledge, for them the path to such knowledge lay not in striving to collapse 
the differences between the experiment and the clinic, but through the cultivation of a 
proper dialectic between the therapeutic and the experimental realms. Producing 
objective knowledge thus did not entail the creation of distance between the producers of 
knowledge and the knowledge produced, nor in abstracting individual variation out of 
clinical trial results. On the contrary, clinical research was understood to properly belong 
in the realm of therapeutic medicine, and the individual—both the researcher and the 
patient—had an important role to play in the processes of knowledge production. 
 In making this argument, I examine Soviet biomedical epistemology on its own 
terms, analyzing it within the context of the Soviet system of health protection. This 
analytical move is necessary to break free from the ‘Wild West’ conception of Soviet 
biomedicine, and to shed light on facets of the system that have thus far largely escaped 
analytical scrutiny. I locate this argument in a detailed examination of Soviet drug 
development practices in oncology. This examination begins with an analysis of idealized 
depictions of Soviet drug development practices, reading them against their American 
counterpart. I then look at the material and rhetorical practices of Soviet clinical trials and 
the rhetoric employed in keeping the clinical and experimental realms separate, and 
conclude with an examination of what the Soviets thought were the shortcomings of their 
system. 
 
Idealized depictions of drug development 
!69!
 In his forward to the joint USA-USSR monograph on Methods of Development of 
New Anticancer Drugs,  Dr. Frank Rauscher Jr. acknowledged that at the time the 
exchange in malignant neoplasms began,141  
...there was a major effort in both countries toward the discovery 
and development of antineoplastic drugs.  ... Years of experience 
existed in both nations in the synthesis of new chemical structures 
and their evaluation for anticancer activity in a wide range of 
experimental systems.  Extensive pharmacologic and toxicologic 
testing procedures had been developed in both countries, and there 
was evidence of a long history of interaction with the regulatory 
agencies of each nation for ultimate approval of new drugs for 
clinical trials.  Each nation had worked extensively on clinical trial 
methodology, and both accrued data on a wide variety of 
compounds that had gone through the entire evaluation system and, 
subsequently, had demonstrated their clinical value in the cancer 
patient.142 
  
 But while there are numerous first hand, scholarly and popular accounts of 
American efforts in this area, we know very little about Soviet research programs.143 
Early Soviet efforts at anti-cancer drug development date back to the 1920s, when there 
were attempts made to use the most promising approaches from experimental biology and 
experimental medicine to uncover compounds that could inhibit tumor growth. The most 
famous (and infamous) of these efforts was the work of Gregory Ruskin and Nina 
Kliueva, a husband and wife team of microbiologists who developed a biological 
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141 Malignant neoplasm is the medical term for cancer. 
142 Frank J. Rauscher Jr, 1977. “Forward,” Methods of Development of New Anticancer Drugs: USA-USSR 
Monograph, DHEW publication No. (NIH) 76-1037, 1. 
143 On American efforts to fight cancer, see David Cantor “Radium and the Origins of the National Cancer 
Institute,” in Caroline Hannaway (ed.), Biomedicine in the Twentieth Century: Practices, Policies, and 
Politics (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 95-146; David Cantor, “Cancer Control and Prevention in the 
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Nature and Politics in the Pursuit of an Anti-Cancer Drug (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 
2001).  Krementsov provides some background on the Soviet programs, but his focus is really elsewhere 
(see Nikolai Krementsov, The Cure). 
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preparation they termed KR.144 The preparation showed great promise during animal 
testing, and made headlines around the world shortly after World War II, when it was 
touted as a potential breakthrough in cancer therapy. While the preparation was 
ultimately deemed ineffective during clinical trials, what secured KR's place in history 
was the political turmoil that engulfed the scientists connected to the project when they 
were tried before a 'court of honour' for divulging state secrets after sharing this work 
with American colleagues. But the story of KR, as Nikolai Krementsov rightly points out 
in his account of the episode, is not just another example of the perversities of Stalinist 
science.145 Rather it is a window on the early attempts in cancer chemotherapy to 
reconcile laboratory research with clinical practice, and to make room within the field of 
oncology—which in the USSR at the time (and in Russia arguably to this day) was 
heavily dominated by surgeons—for another professional subspecialty, chemotherapy.146  
 The political turmoil around KR did not dampen growing enthusiasm for further 
research on cancer therapeutics either within administrative circles or the research 
community. For example, in 1946 the All-Union Scientific Research Chemico-
Pharmaceutical Institute (the Russian acronym, which will be used henceforth, is  
VNIKHFI) received an official mandate to concentrate its drug development in eight 
areas, one of which was oncology—a surprising level of priority given the post-war 
medical and economic challenges facing the country.147 And in 1951 the USSR Academy 
of Medical Sciences expanded Kliueva and Roskin's laboratory into the Scientific 
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146 For a treatment of these tensions in the western context, see Löwy, Between Bench and Bedside. 
147 Mary Schaeffer Conroy, “The Soviet Pharmaceutical Industry and Dispensing: 1945-1953,” Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7 (Nov., 2004), pp. 963-991.  The mandate probably came from MinZdrav, 
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Research Institute of Experimental Pathology and Therapy of Cancer.148 One of the main 
goals of the Institute was the development of cancer chemotherapeutics, and it was fairly 
successful, creating two notable drugs within its first three years in operation—sarcolizin 
and dopan.149 
 Beginning in March 1952, this Institute was under the directorship of N.N. 
Blokhin—a skilled surgeon and an extremely energetic and ambitious administrator.150  
Blokhin oversaw the Institute’s growth and its transformations—first into the Institute of 
Experimental and Clinical Oncology (IECO) in 1959 and then, in 1975, into the All-
Union Oncology Scientific Center (VONTs). During Blokhin’s thirty-five years as 
director (he was forced to retire at the end of 1987), this institution became the leading 
cancer research and treatment facility of the USSR and built up a solid reputation with 
colleagues abroad. The discovery and development of new chemotherapeutic agents were 
a research problem to which Blokhin assigned a high level of priority from his earliest 
days as director.151 
 In the first days of the US-USSR cooperation, however, the presence of these 
well-established institutions and research programs hindered, not eased, the process of 
working together. As the Joint Committee for Health Cooperation observed in the 
introduction to the report on its second meeting in March of 1973,  
Scientific definitions, standards, research techniques and laboratory 
equipment are markedly different in the US and USSR, and before 
meaningful joint projects can be started, even before our established 
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149 AMS F 9120 Op 2 D 6270, Dolgosrochniye prognozy na 15-20 let razvitiia vazhneishyh napravlenii 
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dedicated to the synthesis of new cancer drugs (Blokhina 2001). 
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data can be meaningfully compared, it is essential to work together 
systematically to establish a sound scientific common ground.152   
 
The problems posed by these differences were not the usual difficulties that arise as a 
result of the absence of the tacit knowledge necessary to make an experiment work at a 
different site.153 It was a more daunting problem of a lack of agreement as to what 
constitutes a proper experiment in the first place. The Committee therefore insisted that 
…our scientists first develop the proper methodology before 
embarking on lengthy and costly joint projects whose results may be 
worthless because of diverging standards of measurement, differing 
evaluations of clinical responses, different diagnostic criteria, and so 
on.154 
 
 The monograph on methods, which was one of the first cooperative projects of the 
Soviet-American healthcare exchange, was the result of this effort to establish a common 
methodological basis for joint projects. The way its authors went about this was not to 
write up an agreed-upon common methodology (although by 1977, when the monograph 
came out, there were numerous joint protocols in place), but to provide a detailed 
description of the methods used in each country, with a separate section for the Soviet 
and American side. Besides providing a forum for a detailed discussion of the 
methodology of each side, it was hoped that by presenting Soviet and American methods 
side by side, the monograph would serve as a reference for chemotherapists who worked 
outside the borders of the US and USSR, offering them a detailed portrait of the drug 
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153 For the classic exposition of the problems posed by tacit knowledge in scientific research, see Harry 
Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice,(Chicago: University of Chicago 
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development programs pursued and the methodologies employed by the two 
superpowers.155 
 One doesn’t need to delve deeply into the text to see striking differences between 
the idealized depictions of Soviet and American approaches—they jump out in the table 
of contents. The American section of the table of contents reads like a logically ordered 
flow chart. After a historical note on the NCI’s drug development efforts and a brief 
description of the organizing principle behind these efforts, the linear array, there is a 
succession of eight articles detailing the separate phases of the array, logically arranged.  
The series begins with an article on selecting agents for screening, follows with a piece 
on screening methods, and so on all the way through phase III of clinical trials. The 
section concludes with a brief note on current drugs of interest to the NCI’s 
chemotherapy program and a series of appendices of charts and protocols. The Soviet 
section of the monograph is far less systematic and jumps back and forth not only 
between the various phases of drug development (with an article on the experimental 
selection of antitumor compounds of synthetic and plant origin following the article on 
clinical trial methods), but also between articles on methodology and papers on the 
chemical properties and mechanisms of action of various classes of antitumor 
compounds. 
 This contrast in the organization of the table of contents is a reflection of the 
contrasting organizational approaches to cancer drug development. The Americans were 
describing a program that operated through a mechanistic planning and control technique 
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manifested in the linear array. This technique required that “the flow of operations within 
a research program be pictured logically” and differed from Soviet control methods in 
that its operation wasn’t centered on the coordination of distinct units but on the 
application of standardized methodologies that enabled the flow of compounds through 
the process.156 The mechanism ‘flowed’ thanks to the fact that “the separate phases are 
logically dependent; that is, they give rise to information or materials required by 
succeeding phases.”157 By contrast what the Soviets were describing was a collective 
attempt to solve a problem. In this effort, a diverse collection of interdisciplinary methods 
was applied to the problem by largely independent collectives of investigators. The 
complexity of the problem required that the efforts of these semi-autonomous collectives 
be coordinated.   
 It needs to be emphasized that the problem the Soviet biomedical bureaucracy 
was trying to solve was not only that of anti-cancer drug development, but of cancer as a 
whole. The top echelons of the state bureaucracy designated cancer as a problem of all-
union significance. The lower echelons of the state bureaucracy that were charged with 
finding the solution—the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences--broke this 
umbrella problem down into a number of smaller ones such as “Biochemistry of tumors 
and the biology of tumor cells,” “Diagnosing malignant neoplasms,” “The clinic, surgical 
and complex treatment of malignant neoplasms,” and “Organization of the anti-cancer 
struggle and prophylaxis of malignant neoplasms.”158 New anti-cancer drug development 
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was a large component of the problem titled “Chemotherapy of malignant neoplasms.”159   
Each of these problems was coordinated by a group of experts that constituted the 
‘problem commission.’ The experts came from the network of biomedical research 
institutes overseen by the Academy of Medical Sciences and MinZdrav, and it seems to 
have not been unusual for someone to be part of several commissions. 
 It also needs to be emphasized that for the Soviets, the solution of the cancer 
problem was to be simultaneously sought in two separate domains—the laboratory and 
the clinic. To be sure, there were substantive differences between the two domains in the 
West as well, but there was an ambition to reconcile them by freeing the clinical testing 
process from the constraints of therapeutic medicine and giving it the same kind of 
scientific basis as laboratory experiments.160 This ambition is reflected in the 
incorporation of the various phases of clinical trials as just another step in the linear 
array, logically integrated with and qualitatively no different from the other steps in the 
process of drug development. As I will demonstrate in the sections that focus on Soviet 
drug development practices, while there was a lot of emphasis placed on strengthening 
the relationship between the experiment and the clinic, this relationship was not 
conceptualized as a harmonization of methods of knowledge production but as a dialogue 
in which knowledge produced in laboratory settings would inform the work of the clinic 
and the needs of the clinic would be reflected in the research problems pursued in the 
laboratory. 
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 Approaches to organization (both of the text and the drug development program 
itself) were not the only difference. There were substantive methodological differences as 
well. One example is in the approaches to the search for new potential drugs. Both the 
Soviets and Americans agreed that there were two ways to go about this. One way to go 
about searching for new drugs was to screen as many compounds as possible, whether of 
synthetic or natural origins, which somehow entered the field of vision of researchers—
an approach the Soviets labeled 'empirical.' Another was to rationally design compounds 
based on available understanding of pharmacodynamics. Although both American and 
Soviet programs employed both methods to some extent, the Americans relied very 
heavily on the former and the Soviets on the latter—whereas NCI screened 21,295 
compounds in 1975 alone, Soviet annual totals fluctuated between 800-1000, with the 
majority of the research effort being directed at rational synthesis of new compounds.161  
 The American rationale for favoring the empirical approach was that 
Random input ... provides the greatest variety of new chemical classes or 
structures.  Materials developed by rational approaches are generally 
extensions of existing active agents or analogues.  The percentage of active 
materials developed by the rational approach will be much higher.  Whereas 
the rational method is preferred, the exploratory approach may serve a useful 
purpose in providing new structural classes of compounds for testing.  
Unfortunately, the state of the art has not reached the degree of sophistication 
that allows for a completely rational approach to drug testing.162 
 
Although Soviet scientists agreed that rational drug design was still at a rudimentary level 
of development, they nonetheless saw this as a more reasonable approach because 
massive screening was deemed to be wasteful and because it was seen as a distraction 
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from developing the rational approach, which was thought to be more promising in the 
long run.163  
 This difference in approaches to the search for potentially active compounds led 
to other methodological differences. Since the NCI screening program was fairly 
centralized, with compounds from a variety of sources coming in for screening, and the 
number of compounds screened by the NCI was extremely large, screening systems had 
to “be sufficiently quantitative so that an initial observation of activity is readily 
reproducible.”164 The articles describing these screening systems read almost like a 
protocol, stressing standardized steps and quality control measures and trying to 
incorporate as many practical details as possible. For example, we are not simply told that 
it is “necessary to ascertain that tumors do not harbor bacterial contaminants” and that 
tests are “conducted for each tumor used to maintain the stock tumor line as well as those 
for the preparation of inocula drug testing.”165 It is specified that these tests are usually 
conducted in quadruplicate, and that if bacterial growth is found in two or more vials, all 
the animals implanted with that tumor fragment are discarded. These detailed accounts 
are further fortified with actual protocols reproduced in the appendix, complete with 
reporting forms.   
 By contrast, Soviet efforts at rational synthesis were carried out in over twenty 
laboratories scattered throughout the country, with many labs doing their own screening 
of synthesized compounds. This meant that the number of drugs to be screened would 
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stay relatively small, and that as a consequence researchers had no need to develop a 
single model or a system of models sensitive to compounds with diverse chemical 
structures and mechanisms of action and could limit themselves to experimental models 
sensitive to the particular class of compounds they were focused on. It also meant that the 
compounds under study had to be compared to each other and to already developed 
compounds of the same class. While the idea of developing a unified screening 
methodology was periodically discussed, the advantages of this differentiated system 
always appeared to outweigh the shortcomings, and each institute continued to refine its 
own methodology as needed. 
 This does not mean that the screening methods of each lab were completely 
homegrown or that they differed radically from each other or the methods used at the 
NCI (for example, both the NCI and the IECO screened all new compounds against 
mouse leukemia L1210). Rather what it meant was that each lab could pick and choose 
from the available tools of oncology screening, modifying the combination of animal 
tumor strains to accommodate their research agendas. It also meant that labs could adjust 
the criteria of activity applied in the evaluation of new compounds. These were revised 
upward as new, more effective drugs were developed. For example at first the IECO 
would pass a new alkylating agent for clinical testing if it slowed the growth of sarcoma 
298, a tumor very sensitive to such compounds, by 75%. Subsequently a drug had to 
result in the regression of a certain percentage of tumors. Finally sarcoma 298 was 
completely abandoned as a screening tool, and activity came to be evaluated on tumors 
which showed only moderate sensitivity to alkylating agents, with survival times of the 
animals serving as criteria of efficacy.  
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 Not surprisingly, there is no appendix with Soviet protocols, and most of the 
articles outline general trends and report significant results rather than conduct detailed 
discussions of methodology. Some of the articles don’t discuss methodology at all.  
Somewhat surprisingly, given the consistent complaints of American scientists that the 
Soviet methods of clinical testing were primitive, perhaps the most extensive discussion 
of methods is to be found in the article on clinical trial methodologies. Although the 
Soviets distinguished four phases of clinical trials to the American three, in reading the 
description of the different methodologies one is struck more by their similarities than the 
differences. As in American trials, the objectives of the first phase were to determine the 
maximum tolerated dose of the drug under several dose schedules (although some details 
differed—for example, American investigators calculated doses by correlating milligrams 
to square meter of body surface, whereas the Soviets used kilogram of body weight). The 
first of these was a long course of continuous treatment (that is, the drug was 
administered daily for 30-35 days), the others were short and interrupted schedules.   
 Phase II tested the long dose schedule of the drug developed during phase I for 
efficacy in a number of ‘signal tumors.’ If the results were positive, the other dose 
schedules were also tested against the signal tumors. The drug was tested against an 
additional spectrum of tumors and underwent detailed clinical pharmacology study. This 
meant that, as in the U.S., there were in fact multiple phase II studies.  If the drug showed 
efficacy during these studies, it would go on to phase III, which was oriented to carving 
out a space for the drug in general medical practice. In this phase, the drug was compared 
to existing treatments through randomization, as well as testing in various combinations 
with available compounds.   
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 Phase III concluded with a decision about whether or not to allow the drug in 
general medical practice. A drug would be allowed into practice if it met one of the 
following criteria: it was effective in no fewer than 20% of patients with tumors that were 
unresponsive to existing modes of chemotherapy; it demonstrated significant advantages 
over existing drugs (either being significantly more effective or less toxic than, but 
equally effective as, existing preparations); or it was a compound of a new class with 
efficacy comparable to that of existing preparations. Phase IV was essentially a 
continuation of phase III that went on after the drug was permitted to enter general 
practice. 
 This extensive discussion of clinical trial methods creates the impression that this 
phase of drug development was characterized by very concrete ideas of what constituted 
proper methodology and a strict adherence to procedure and protocol that is in many 
ways akin to American trials. But as the next section of the chapter will show, in practice 
the story was quite different. Soviet clinical trials (like the pre-clinical phases of drug 
development) were characterized by a remarkable level of procedural flexibility that grew 
out of a conviction that clinicians had both a right and an obligation to exercise their 
discretion in the course of clinical drug testing. Although a discrepancy between protocol 
and actual research procedure is by no means unique to the Soviet context, what sets this 
context apart is that clinical trial protocols seem to have no force as a normative 
guideline.166 That is, in practice there is no expectation that they will be followed to the 
letter, and researchers alter and even directly violate their provisions in order to achieve 
the best possible outcome for the patients enrolled in the trial. This flexibility of 
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procedure was necessary because clinical trials in the Soviet Union remained in the 
domain of therapeutic medicine. It meant, however, that standards could not be relied 
upon to guarantee the production of reliable knowledge—their lack of normative force 
meant that they could not endow the science with legitimacy. 
 The distinctions described here between Soviet and American approaches to 
cancer drug development are not absolute. Both the Soviet and American cancer efforts 
were examples of big science. Both were highly complicated endeavors involving motley 
interdisciplinary networks of professionals scattered across distinct institutions and 
governed by a group of elite experts through a combination of peer review and 
bureaucratic mechanisms of control. But it is precisely because of these structural 
similarities that the differences in the systems of knowledge production are so important.  
 
Material practices of Soviet clinical drug testing 
 In this section, I turn to the practices of Soviet drug development—in particular, 
clinical trials.  Before turning to specific examples, however, a few words need to be said 
about Soviet drug regulation. Every drug in the Soviet Union, whether developed 
domestically, imported from abroad or copied from an established foreign drug, had to be 
approved by MinZdrav’s Pharmacological Committee.167 Gaining approval for a drug to 
enter medical practice entailed multiple reviews by the Committee—its authorization was 
required for initiating clinical trials, passing from one phase of clinical testing to the next 
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167 The structure of MinZdrav was reshuffled fairly frequently, and the Committee’s position in the 
organizational chart changed accordingly. In the 1960s, for example, it reported to the Scientific Medical 
Council of the Ministry, and in the 1970s to the Directorate for the Implementation of New Drugs and 
Medical Technology.  What effect if any these changes had on the work of the Committee is beyond the 
scope of this project. 
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as well as for implementing the drug into medical practice.168 In brief, every drug, 
whether foreign or domestic, had to undergo clinical testing in the Soviet Union before it 
could be approved for use in its healthcare system. 
 The Pharmacological Committee was composed of medical experts drawn from 
the network of research institutes subordinate to MinZdrav and the Academy of Medical 
Sciences, and as a result was deeply integrated into the biomedical community in two 
ways. First, the integration proceeded through overlapping membership of staff with 
other committees and organizations. To illustrate this point, it is enough to consider the 
example of Vladimir Aleksandrovich Chernov, who occupied the position of deputy chair 
of the Committee in the late 1970s. In addition to that position, Chernov headed a sub-
commission within the committee, was the deputy chair of the Academy of Medical 
Sciences commission on cancer chemotherapy that operated out of the All-Union 
Oncology Center, and at the same time directed an important laboratory dedicated to anti-
cancer drug development within VNIKhFI. Other members of the committee similarly 
combined research or clinical work in one of the Academy or MinZdrav institutes with 
multiple regulatory and administrative duties.169 The Committee was also integrated as a 
direct result of its regulatory functions. The Committee worked very closely with 
VNIKhFI, whose clinical group coordinated the clinical trials of most drugs, and starting 
in 1967 with the All-Union Chemotherapy Center, which was based at the Institute of 
Experimental and Clinical Oncology and took over coordination of the testing of anti-
cancer drugs (the Russian acronym is VNHC). It was VNIKhFI’s and VNHC’s 
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168 The Committee was responsible for chemical preparation. Biological preparations such as vaccines were 
regulated by the Committee on Vaccines and Serums. 
169 RONC, uncatalogued records. Protocol !22 of the meeting of the Scientific Council of the All Union 
Oncology Center of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, 29 December 1979.  
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responsibility to recruit sites for the trials, supply these sites with the experimental drugs 
and trial protocols (the protocols were reviewed and approved by the Pharmacological 
Committee before permission to carry out the trial was granted), and then collect and 
analyze the data in order to recommend a course of action to the Pharmacological 
Committee, which reviewed their reports and rendered the final verdict.   
 In other words, drug development was essentially regulated through peer review. 
Although this system of peer review was embedded in the bureaucratic structures of 
planning and control, it did not operate through the bureaucratic procedures of these 
structures. This is because, as I will demonstrate later in the chapter, the bureaucratic 
structures did not work and getting things done strictly through the bureaucratic channels 
was effectively impossible. Instead, individual researchers and teams pursued their own 
practical agendas through whatever means available to them, and then retrospectively 
rendered their actions compatible with the bureaucratic methods of planning and control 
to the extent possible. To illustrate this point, I take a closer look at how VNHC and 
VNIKhFI shepherded drugs through clinical trials. 
 It should be noted that I was not able to pursue a systematic examination of this 
process.  The state of the archival record makes a systematic approach impossible. The 
vast majority of the VNHC records appear not to have been preserved. And although 
more VNIKhFI records are available, limitations in the way the records are organized and 
in researchers’ access to them is limited, made a systematic examination impractical. 
Therefore in what follows I rely on the case study method, describing the practices of the 
VNHC by tracing the progression of the drug gossipol through clinical trials, and 
VNIKhFI practices in the clinical testing of 5-fluorouracil. 
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 Gossipol had been developed at the Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and 
Technology of Cotton Cellulose—an institute of the Ministry of Chemical Industry 
located in the republic of Uzbekistan.170 The institute housed a laboratory of 
physiologically active compounds charged with conducting extensive testing of every 
compound isolated in the course of cotton production—the primary crop of several of the 
Central Asian republics—including by-products of manufacturing processes. By 1970, 
the laboratory had isolated and studied nearly 120 organic compounds, some of which 
found practical applications. One of these compounds, a substance named gossipol (and 
some of its derivatives), showed promise as an antitumor agent, an anti-viral substance 
and a relatively non-toxic immunosuppressant.  
 The substance was passed for pre-clinical evaluation to the All-Union Institute of 
Medicinal Plants (VILR), the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the Academy of 
Sciences, USSR, and the Uzbek Scientific Research Institute of Oncology and Radiology 
and on the basis of these tests recommended by MinZdrav’s Pharmacological Committee 
for clinical trials in cancer patients in June of 1959. The results from the trials, which 
were at first carried out in only four clinical institutes (three of them in Moscow, one in 
Tashkent) were sufficiently encouraging that the Pharmacological Committee passed a 
resolution to expand testing, passing the responsibility for coordinating further trials to 
the newly created All-Union Chemotherapy Center. The Center was asked to coordinate 
the clinical trials of this substance in 1967. 
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170 RONC, uncatalogued institutional records. Folder “Gossipol, correspondence.” “Justification for 
conducting additional research by the laboratory of Physiologically Active Compounds of the Scientific 
Research Institute of Chemistry and Technology of Cotton Cellulose, Ministry of Chemical Industry USSR 
for 1972.”  
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 The trials entrusted to the Center were to be conducted at ten clinical research 
institutions scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Although supplies of the drug were 
more than adequate (thanks in part to the fact that the raw materials for its production 
were so plentiful and in part to the fact that Uzbek authorities were clearly making 
gossipol development a priority, going so far as to develop new more efficient and less 
costly methods of manufacturing of the drug even before its efficacy was established), 
only five institutions actively took part in the trials. Three others were apparently doing 
nothing with their supply of the trial drug and another two simply didn’t report their 
activities. Attempts by the Minister of Health of Uzbekistan and the President of the 
Uzbek Academy of Sciences to exert pressure on the Center through the Government 
Committee on Science and Technology (a division of the Soviet Council of Ministers) to 
speed up the trials yielded no results, although the GCST was apparently sympathetic to 
their request and drafted a resolution in support of it.   
 The institutions that were taking an active part in the trial were doing so very 
much on their own terms. By the time the All-Union Chemotherapy Center got involved 
in coordinating clinical trials of gossipol, the drug had already been evaluated against a 
variety of tumors, showing highest activity against adenocarcinoma of the stomach. Thus 
the protocol designed by the Center was intended to test the efficacy of the drug as a 
prophylactic of this type of cancer following radical surgery. 
 The protocol designed by the Center was a three page document which began 
with a brief description of the drug—its chemical structure and origins, as well as the 
preliminary results of earlier studies which, although very promising (70% of 
!86!
adenocarcinoma patients given the drug were alive without metastasis or recurrence four 
years later), had involved too few observations to be conclusive.  
 The trial was to enroll patients with operable forms of stomach cancer in stages 1, 
II, and III, who met a fairly long list of criteria (the tumor could not be a recurrence, they 
had to be under 75 years of age, had to be free of a variety of complications, and had to 
live within an easy distance of the institution conducting the trial, but could not be 
affiliated with that institution). Enrolled patients were to be divided into two groups by 
birth year. Those with an even number birth year would get gossipol after surgery, those 
with an odd number birth year would not. In all cases, the institution conducting the trial 
was to send the Center a sample of the tumor along with a standardized form that was to 
be carefully completed upon the discharging of a patient after surgery.  
 The drug was to be administered starting 15 days after the surgery and continuing 
for three years, with the patient under regular observation for the duration of the trial. It 
was to be administered in tablet form, three times a day at 10mg doses in 15 day intervals 
The intervals were intended to reduce nausea which resulted from the build-up of the 
drug in the body. All patients enrolled in the trial were to be examined at six month 
intervals throughout the duration of the trial, the results of the examinations were to be 
carefully recorded on standardized forms and copies of the documentation were to be 
forwarded to the Center, which would compile the results and share the findings with the 
participating institutions.  
 Neither the protocol nor the standard reporting forms, however, were strictly 
adhered to by the participating clinicians who conducted the trial. Some participating 
institutions simply didn't do the trial. Others sent one page perfunctory reports that listed 
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only the number of patients under observation. Still others took up the testing with 
enthusiasm, modifying the protocols as they saw fit. The Moscow Regional Oncology 
Dispensary, for example, had enrolled 65 post-operative patients in the trial in its first 
year. Reasoning that separating out a control group would double the time needed for the 
trial, the investigators at the dispensary decided to draw on their institutional resources 
and use historical controls instead. To this end, they analyzed the case histories of 533 
patients who had been operated upon at the Dispensary between 1948 and 1957, and 
calculated survival times for the control and the test groups. Although survival times in 
the test group were slightly higher than the historical control, the investigators concluded 
that the difference was not statistically significant. Still, the investigators recommended 
that the trial be continued because it was too early to draw any definitive conclusions.  
 The Center's attempts to enforce adherence to their protocols through written 
warnings and site visits appear to have been largely ignored by the participating 
institutions. Still, after three years of testing, the Center wrote to the Scientific Research 
Institute of Chemistry and Technology of Cotton Cellulose, informing the creators of the 
drug that “in our opinion, there is currently no valid basis to consider gossipol an anti-
tumor therapy.”171 What is interesting is that the center's staff claimed to be basing this 
conclusion largely on the results of their own clinical trials, dismissing much of what was 
done at external sites—including at the Moscow Regional Oncology Dispensary—as 
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Institute of Chemistry and Technology of Cotton Cellulose, laboratory of Chemistry of Physiologically 
Active Compounds, September 2, 1970.  Folder “Gossipol, correspondence.” 
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insufficiently rigorous methodologically because of a failure to follow the issued 
protocol.172  
 This is interesting for three reasons. First, the detailed trial protocol and the 
rejection of results from most external testing sites shows that researchers at the Center 
had very concrete ideas about appropriate methodology for producing clinical evidence 
of gossipol's efficacy. Second, it shows that these ideas included randomized clinical 
trials (at least five years before this methodology was supposedly introduced by 
Americans in the course of the exchange). Finally, it is interesting because the Center's 
dismissal of the trials done at other sites is so unusual. VNHC was able to do this because 
its affiliation with the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology provided it with a 
clinical base on which to conduct its own trials and because the affiliation gave it access 
to the considerable authority of the Institute within the field of cancer chemotherapy.  
  VNIKhFI, which specialized in drug development generally and had neither a 
clinical base of its own nor an authoritative reputation in any medical discipline, did not 
have the luxury of relying on its own trials. As a result it accepted very heterogeneous 
reports from its various clinical sites and used them for formulating its recommendations 
to the pharmacological committee. This becomes clear when looking at the trials of the 
anti-cancer drug 5-fluorouracil, which VNIKhFI coordinated between 1963 and 1966, 
before VNHC assumed oversight of clinical trials for anti-cancer drugs.173  
 On June 28, 1963 Professor G.N. Pershin, the deputy director of VNIKhFI wrote 
to the Pharmacological Committee that VNIKhFI had developed a method for producing 
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172 This despite the fact that ultimately all the trial reports, whether they followed the issued protocol or not 
essentially agreed in their findings—that the results were inconclusive. 
173 RGANTD, F P-186, Op. 1, D. 1841. 
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the drug 5-"luorouracil, an antimetabolite developed in the late 1950s by Hoffman-La 
Roche, and asked the Committee's permission to carry out clinical trials of the drug at ten 
institutions.174 Pershin's request was granted fully at a meeting of the Pharmacological 
Committee on the same day. The speedy review of the request no doubt facilitated by the 
fact that, in addition to being the deputy director of VNIKhFI, Pershin was also the chair 
of the Pharmacological Committee.  
 The clinical trial protocol developed by VNIKhFI was approved by the 
Committee in September of the same year. It is interesting to contrast the trial protocol 
developed by VNIKhFI for 5-"luorouracil with the gossipol protocol. It too started with a 
brief description of the drug's chemistry and pharmacological properties, and referred to 
results of previous trials (in this case, those carried out abroad) by specifying that the 
drug had been found to be effective in cancers of the stomach, intestines and breast 
cancer. But unlike the gossipol protocol, it provided no list of inclusion criteria and made 
no provisions for randomization, leaving these decisions entirely to the discretion of the 
investigators. It only asked that investigators test two intravenous treatment regimens—
one that administered the drug slowly through a drip, and another that consisted of a 
simple injection daily for twelve days. In both cases, the dose to be tested was specified 
as 10-15 mg/kg of body weight, although for the simple injection method, which was 
thought to be less well tolerated, investigators were free to reduce the dosage or skip 
injections once patients began to feel unpleasant side effects. Investigators were asked to 
keep a close watch on the patients 'blood picture' (levels of white blood cells and 
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174 The institutions included the IECO and the Leningrad Oncology Institute, which were under the 
jurisdiction of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences; the Gertzen Oncology Institute, which was under 
the jurisdiction of MinZdrav; several oncology hospitals in Moscow and Riga; and institutes belonging to 
the Latvian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Republic MinZdrav. 
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platelets). For patients that tolerated the drug well, it was recommended that treatment be 
repeated in 4-6 weeks after the first course. 
 The protocol concluded with a list of possible side effects (which included 
nausea, leucopenia and thrombocytosis, ulcers and intestinal bleeding—in the case of the 
latter, treatment was to be discontinued immediately) and contra-indications which 
recommended that weak patients, as well as patients who have recently undergone major 
surgery, chemotherapy with alkylating agents or radiotherapy should not be included in 
the trial. No standard reporting forms, or indeed reporting instructions of any kind, 
accompanied the protocol. In fact, the protocol was less like a strict methodological 
instruction than a manufacturer’s drug insert (on which it seems to have been closely 
based).  
 Although the protocol made few procedural requirements of researchers, even its 
loose recommendations were regularly violated. For example in their initial report on the 
progress of the trial, filed in December of 1963, doctors from Moscow City Clinical 
Hospital #1 reported that they had administered the drug to a total of 7 patients, only four 
of whom had stomach cancer (the others suffered from cancers not specified in the 
protocol, including one patient with lung cancer). The report did not go into much detail 
on what had been done and only offered a vague description of some of the side effects 
observed (for example, “short term (2-3 days) leucopenia to 1800-3000 ml”). Still, the 
physicians shared their “impression that side effects appeared only with the rapid 
administration of the drug” and that all patients demonstrated a positive therapeutic effect 
(including the lung cancer patient, whose tumors shrank). The report concluded that trials 
should be continued, and requested more of the drug so that treatment could be repeated 
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for the patients already enrolled and doses given to others who would be added to the 
trial. 
 In 1965, N.I. Perevodchikova, the head of the chemotherapy department at the 
IECO, presented the final results of the trial to the Pharmacological Committee. Although 
the final report was not preserved, it seems safe to assume that it was consistent with the 
initial reports that found the drug to be effective—5-"luorouracil was recommended for 
approval, a request was sent to the relevant authorities to organize production of the drug 
as soon as possible, and the IECO was charged with putting together instructions for use 
that could be disseminated throughout the healthcare system (these instructions, which 
looked much like the original manufacturer’s brochure that informed the protocols, were 
approved by the Pharmacological Committee in 1966). 
 What do these case studies tell us about Soviet drug development? How are we to 
interpret the apparently almost total procedural flexibility that characterized clinical 
knowledge production? When one adopts the point of view of the western observer, the 
answer is clear—this is an illustration of the dysfunction of the Soviet system and the 
backwardness of Soviet medical science. It does, in fact, look very much like the Wild 
West: lawless and chaotic, with every man for himself. The conclusion is especially easy 
to accept given how little is known about biomedical sciences in the Soviet Union, 
particularly in the period under consideration.  
 The Wild West argument, although easy to make, obscures more than it reveals. 
Although there is no doubt that the Soviet biomedical system did not work as described 
on many levels, it was in fact (at least for a time) surprisingly effective when it came to 
developing new anti-cancer drugs.  
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 In a report on the long-term prognosis for the development of chemotherapy 
prepared for the Science Coordination Department of the Academy of Medical Sciences 
in 1970, L.F. Larionoff reported that the Soviet Union was second only to the United 
States in terms of its successfil record in developing new anti-cancer drugs, with a total of 
11 novel original preparations to the USA's 19 (slight variations on existing drugs and 
copies of drugs developed abroad were not counted). Although the US not only had more 
drugs, but also a greater variety of drugs—with five of its drugs being alkylating agents, 
four antimetabolites, two plant extracts, three antibiotics and four hormone preparations, 
whereas the majority of the Soviet drugs (nine out of eleven preparations) were alkylating 
agents—Larionoff was not particularly impressed or threatened by American 
achievements in chemotherapy. In the report he notes that 
The leading role currently occupied by the U.S.A in the development of 
various types of antitumor preparations is determined, first of all, by the 
fact that in the U.S. this work started five years earlier than in the USSR, 
during World War II. Second, in the U.S. the potential of chemotherapy 
was understood early on, and in 1955 huge sums were allocated to its 
development, a special chemotherapeutic center and two journals were 
organized: one—for the rapid dissemination of research results …, the 
other—a review journal that covers all world literature. But the effect of 
the invested sums could have been greater had the US not adopted the 
untenable approach of a massive search for preparations among practically 
all synthesized compounds.175  
 
And, although Larionoff emphasized that there were plenty of systemic problems that 
were hampering drug development efforts, such as insufficient number and capacity 
of existing laboratories of chemotherapy, the unsatisfactory state of biochemical 
research and the inadequate supply of laboratory animals and drugs among them—he 
still expressed confidence that in the Soviet Union “clinical chemotherapy of cancer is 
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developing quickly… and is almost first in the world.”176 He added that the creation 
of the Oncology Center (which at the time of the report was already in progress, and 
which was slated to become the largest facility of its kind in the world) would ensure 
its continued uniform development.177 Given that new drugs had been developed at 
the rate of 5-10 new preparations in the course of five years, Larionoff expected to see 
steady growth in the number of new domestically developed drugs available to Soviet 
oncologists. 
 How do we account for this confidence and level of productivity in the face of 
such obvious and persistent systemic problems? This phenomenon must remain a 
paradox unless we step out of the ‘Wild West’ analytical frame and attempt to 
understand the system on its own terms. I argue that these cases are better understood 
as illustrations of a different assemblage of epistemic commitments—an alternative 
system of material and discursive practices of knowledge production in which the 
clinical phases of drug development were integrated into therapeutic medicine and 
subordinated to the priorities of patient care.  
 To illustrate this point, I will now examine closely the methodological discourse 
relating to clinical research in one of the settings in which the peer review of knowledge 
production took place: the Scientific Council of the Institute for Experimental and 
Clinical Oncology. 
 
The experiment and the clinic  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., 55. 
!94!
 The Scientific Council of the Institute was a hybrid institution. On the one hand, it 
was another link in the bureaucratic chain of planning and control, intended to direct and 
coordinate the research (both clinical and experimental) of the institute. As such, it was 
charged with periodic performance reviews of various departments and laboratories, the 
election (and re-election) of department and laboratory directors, and review of work 
plans and reports for the institute as a whole. On the other hand, it was a site of a 
uniquely multi-disciplinary form of peer review. Service on the Council was not 
compensated and was carried out on top of the scope of official job descriptions. It was a 
place where the Institute’s scientists and clinicians with diverse disciplinary backgrounds 
met on a regular basis to discuss their work with their colleagues, review the progress of 
junior scientists, and occasionally hold seminar-like talks on various subjects of interest.  
 Various methodological questions were a subject of continuous interest, so much 
so that Scientific Council sessions were regularly dedicated to sessions of the Institute’s 
‘methodological seminar.’ Such seminars were universal within the AMS and were part 
of the ideological training of Academy workers. However despite this official function, 
questions of Marxist philosophy occupied only a fraction of their agenda. Even those 
lectures that engaged directly with the ideological canon seem to have been doing so not 
for the sake of the canon itself, but in order to garner legitimacy for their proposals. For 
example, V.V. Dvoirin, a leading biostatistician at the Center, titled his appeal for the 
reorganization of the VONC Center of Calculation “The Methodological Basis of 
Statistical Analysis in the works of V.I. Lenin.”178 Although the title of the talk made a 
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reference to Lenin’s teaching and one of the major arguments highlighted in the abstract 
was that the proposal to decentralize biostatistics and embed biostatisticians in every 
research unit of the Center was consistent with Lenin’s teaching that statistics are only 
meaningful when the statistician understands the nature of the problem, the discussion 
that ensued after the talk made no reference to any Marxist tenets, and the proposal was 
summarily rejected.179 Most seminar sessions made no mention of ideology at all, and 
were devoted to mundane topics such as “Contemporary state of the chemotherapy of 
cancer and major trends in the development of new anti-cancer drugs.”180  
 On September 12, 1977, the Scientific Council and the methodological seminar 
convened to hear a controversial talk by professor S.P. Yarmonenko on the 
“Methodological Principles of the Clinical Experiment.”181 Taking a clinical study of a 
new radiation therapy protocol as his case, Yarmonenko advanced an argument that 
therapeutic progress was founded on what he termed the clinical experiment. The clinical 
experiment enabled therapeutic progress by bringing deductive reasoning to bear on the 
therapeutic problem (as opposed to inductive reasoning, which was more characteristic of 
clinicians), and also helped overcome the ‘conservatism’ that Yarmanenko claimed 
characterized the thinking of practicing clinicians. This argument, though not particularly 
well developed by Yarmonenko, is still very revealing of Soviet ideas about what 
constitutes medical science. At first glance, it appears to resonate closely with the 
narrative of medical progress through the application scientific methodology which 
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179 This is consistent with the growing consensus among historians of the period that over the course of the 
Brezhnev period, ideology became increasingly less important. 
180 RONC, uncatalogued records. 
181 Protocol !14 of the meeting of the Scientific Council of the All Union Oncology Center of the 
Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, 12 September, 1977. RONC, uncatalogued records.  
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characterized American oncology, but there are substantial differences as well. 
Yarmonenko’s clinical experiment, like the randomized clinical trial in the West, 
promised to erase the divide between experimental and clinical medicine, placing both on 
the same kind of scientific foundation. But the clinical experiment promised to do this not 
by harmonizing procedure—Yarmonenko was not offering methodological prescriptions 
for the clinical experiment—but by giving clinicians access to the same modes of 
reasoning as those employed by experimenters. Thus, Yarmonenko’s clinical experiment 
intervened in medical knowledge production not on the level of the collective (through 
the imposition of methodological standards), but on the level of the individual.  
 The reactions that Yarmonenko’s presentation provoked from the Scientific 
Council members is even more interesting then the argument itself. Several members of 
the scientific council challenged the premise that there was a difference in the modes of 
reasoning of experimenters and clinicians. As M.O. Raushenbach argued,  
The concepts of inductive and deductive—these are concepts of purely 
formal logic. We use the methods of dialectical logic, into which 
formal logic enters as a part. It is dialectical logic that has overcome 
the split between induction and deduction. In dialectical reasoning 
they are inseparable.182 
 
Along with rejecting the premise that there was any substantial difference between the 
modes of reasoning employed by experimenters and clinicians when producing 
biomedical knowledge, members of the council also rejected the argument that medical 
progress ought to be pursued through the methodological equivalency of the lab and 
clinic. As G. V. Guliaev, another seminar participant emphatically argued,  
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I think that there is no such thing as a clinical experiment nor can there 
be. The clinic is based on good experiment, but in the clinic it is no 
longer an experiment—it’s an observation.183 
 
The majority of the participants agreed that an experiment had no place in the clinic, but 
their rejection wasn’t premised on the idea that the clinical investigator relied on a 
different form of logic than the experimenter. It was premised on the idea that the clinical 
investigator occupied a moral position fundamentally distinct from that of the 
experimenter because he was first and foremost responsible for the wellbeing of the 
patient—a constraint not present in the experimental set up.  
 Participants argued that the responsibility of the clinical investigator for the 
patient meant that the criteria employed in the evaluation of a new therapy would of 
necessity differ significantly between the lab and the clinic. But this wasn’t because 
clinicians were, as Yarmonenko claimed, more conservative in their thinking. As A.I. 
Ruderman, another council member, objected, “when a patient dies the doctor 
experiences a deep spiritual trauma. That’s why we are not talking about ‘conservatism,’ 
but about clinical responsibility.”184 N.N. Blokhin concurred with this assessment:  
It is true, the psychology of the physician differs from the psychology 
of the experimenter, but this is determined by the responsibility for the 
fate of a human being. This isn’t conservatism, this is a certain 
relationship to the patient.185 
 
 This emphasis on the relationship to the patient, the responsibility for the fate of 
human beings indicates that in the Soviet biomedical establishment, clinical research 
properly belonged in therapeutic medicine. This ensured individuals (both researchers 
and patients) an important role at the center of knowledge production, and enabled the 
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procedural flexibility that was so characteristic of the Soviet clinical trials examined 
earlier. The clinicians from the Moscow Regional Oncology Dispensary who decided to 
forego randomization in favor of historical controls and those from the Moscow City 
Clinical Hospital #1 who administered an experimental drug intended for stomach cancer 
patients to a patient suffering from lung cancer were not violating norms of collective 
knowledge production. They were exercising their explicit right as physicians to modify 
clinical trial protocols so as to provide their patients with the best care they could offer.  
  
Where was the 'Wild West' in Soviet biomedicine? 
 
 One thing still needs explaining, however—if the Soviets saw their methods of 
knowledge production as valid, what did Blokhin mean when he compared Soviet 
medicine to the Wild West? In this section, I explore what Soviet biomedical researchers 
thought were the problems impeding their work in anti-cancer drug development, and 
argue that what troubled them the most were not methodological but organizational and 
structural problems.  
 As has already been mentioned, encouraging anti-cancer drug development was a 
long-standing administrative priority as the Soviet economy recovered from World War 
II, but there were significant impediments to the effort. In April 1965 MinZdrav formed 
an eight-person commission that was charged with assessing the “condition of scientific 
research aimed at finding and implementing chemotherapeutic agents in the fight against 
malignant neoplasms” in the country.186 The commission was composed of two chemists, 
two experimental and two clinical chemotherapists and a pharmacologist, and it delivered 
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its report to MinZdrav’s Scientific Medical Council in 1966.187 The commission's report 
divided the process of drug development into three stages: the synthesis or isolation of 
new compounds, the evaluation of their anti-tumor activity and mechanisms of action, 
and “the most important stage” of the process—clinical trials to “select those preparations 
which are good, effective, and least toxic for implementation into practice.”188  
 Although professor Chernuh, who read the commission's report at the council 
meeting, prefaced its assessment with the optimitistic observation that in all three stages 
the Soviet Union had seen a “significant movement in terms of an improvement of work” 
in recent years, the report outlined a litany of daunting problems plaguing anti-cancer 
drug development.  
 At the first stage, there was still a significant lag in the development of expertise 
in biochemistry and molecular biology at many research institutions, which inhibited the 
detailed understanding of cancer etiology. The negative impact of this lack of expertise 
was further exacerbated by a shortage of equipment, which wasted on scientifically 
unproductive work the time of the few qualified personnel who were available. There was 
a shortage of institutions, equipment, and animals for initial screening of compounds. 
And although a number of well known scientists were working on resolving this problem, 
it was still the case that “drugs are being synthesized and there is nowhere to put them 
through an initial evaluation. “189  
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 As for clinical trials, they were being “delayed by many years.”190 The 
commission based this conclusion on an examination of the activity of MinZdrav's 
Pharmacological Committee—the regulatory body responsible for reviewing pre-clinical 
testing data on new compounds before permitting clinical trials of the drug, and for the 
final review of clinical trial data before either permitting or forbidding the use of the drug 
in Soviet medical practice. The report observed that in the past ten years, the 
Pharmacological Committee approved seventy-five anti-cancer preparations for clinical 
trials. Of these, fifteen passed through clinical evaluation to enter medical practice. The 
trials on eleven others were halted.191 Testing of the rest had been delayed. That is, of the 
seventy-five drugs that needed to be clinically evaluated, only one third were able to 
complete the testing process, with the testing of the rest chronically delayed. The 
commission report blamed these delays on a whole slew of factors many of which 
resulted from “the insufficient number of clinical institutions“ qualified to conduct such 
trials.192  
 The lack of qualified clinical institutions was not the only problem, however. The 
supply of experimental (and even approved) drugs was another major obstacle to 
completing clinical trials in a timely manner. For example when the commission tried to 
determine the need for anti-cancer drugs nationwide, it found that  
...a whole number of preparations, such as cyclophosphamide, 
instead of the 400 kg needed was produced in the amount of 40 kg, 
and a preparation such as fluorouracil wasn't produced at all, 
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191 The report does not specify the reasons for the cessation of testing, but from looking at records of the 
Committee’s proceedings it seems that tests were usually halted because the drug appeared to be too toxic, 
too difficult to administer, or insufficiently effective when compared to existing preparations.  It was not 
common practice to abandon trials because of problems with drug supply or a shortage of appropriate test 
subjects.  
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despite the fact that there was an order of the Council of Ministers 
on this subject …published in 1962.193 
 
That is, drugs were being manufactured in amounts that fell far short of the needs of 
researchers conducting clinical trials (and sometimes, drugs needed for testing were not 
being manufactured at all).194 Even worse, the problem appeared to have no solution—
not even direct orders from the highest levels of government could get the pharmaceutical 
factories to produce the necessary preparations.195 
 One might expect that the commission would attribute many of these problems to 
a lack of funding and ask for more resources. But while the report did not shy away from 
pointing out the ways in which lack of resources hampered cancer drug development 
efforts and asking for additional financial support, it located the core of the problem 
elsewhere. What the commission perceived to be the major problem confronting the 
successful development of cancer chemotherapy at all stages was the “poor coordination 
and insufficient integration196 of this problem.”197 In particular, what was missing was a 
single interdepartmental center, such as the Cancer Chemotherapy National Service 
Center in the US, which could take on the functions of coordination. As things stood, “the 
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194 This was equally true of drugs already approved for use in Soviet medical practice. 
195 While a detailed analysis of the workings and malfunctions of the Soviet pharmaceutical industry are 
beyond the scope of this project, the fact that MinZdrav did not exercise continuous direct control over the 
manufacture of medical supplies was surely a contributing factor to the chronic shortages. To get some idea 
of the industry, see Mary Schaeffer Conroy, The Soviet Pharmaceutical Business During its First Two 
Decades (1917-1937), (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); Mary Schaeffer Conroy, Medicines for the Soviet 
Masses During World War II (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003) and Mary Schaeffer Conroy, In 
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196 The Russian word for designating this quality is "#$%&'"()#(*+ (kompleksnost').  There is no direct 
translation, but the word denotes the quality of encompassing a whole group of objects, phenomena or 
processes.  In the archival records of MinZdrav and the Academy of Medical Sciences, the word usually 
denotes an integrated mutli-disciplinary approach to the solution of a particular medical problem.  I 
translate kompleksnost’ as integration, since this seems to me to be the word that most accurately conveys 
the meaning of the term. 
197 Ibid. 
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large number of institutes of chemical, experimental and clinical profile work essentially 
without contact and without coordinating day-to-day operations.”198 This was because the 
way the problem was being coordinated at the time—through a commission that met once 
or twice a year to review plans and reports—made it impossible to “guarantee operative 
coordination and leadership of the many institutions that are working on this.”199 The 
commission proposed creating such a center to be based at one of the larger oncology 
institutes—namely, the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology, which in many 
ways was the only obvious choice.200  
 The report and the proposal sparked a lively discussion during which the members 
of MinZdrav’s Scientific Medical Council shared practical problems that confronted their 
research on drug development which the commission’s report neglected to bring up, 
while focusing on large-scale organizational shortcomings. One of these concerned the 
sharing of information. As Larionoff pointed out, “without good information effective 
coordination in chemotherapy is impossible.”201 What interfered with the availability of 
good information was a law that stipulated that results of experimental drug evaluations 
could not be published until they were confirmed through clinical evaluation. 
 The clinical evaluation of anticancer drugs, for its part, was a process hampered 
not only by the shortage of drugs and qualified institutions to carry out the trials that were 
discussed in the commission’s report, but also by organizational shortcomings at the 
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200 Not only did the IECO enjoy the reputation of the best clinical oncology facility in the USSR, it also had 
the most active research program in cancer chemotherapy staffed by some of the best-known researchers in 
the field.  Finally, it was located in the capital, which meant that its director and staff were in a much 
stronger position when it came to forming networks and securing all kinds of resources than its nearest 
rival—the Petrovskii Institute in Leningrad. 
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available institutions. The trials that managed to actually get underway were often being 
conducted badly because, as Professor Berlin, one of the meeting participants 
emphasized,  
…they are being conducted on a voluntary basis. This needs to be 
emphasized and included in the transcript. In an oncology hospital, where 
you have the sickest patients, trials are conducted on a voluntary basis. 
There are twenty-five patients to a physician. What do you want? You 
want him [the physician] to conduct trials of drugs. He conducts them 
badly, this is good for nothing and this data is invalid.202  
 
That is, the problem was that clinical research was an activity that was assigned to 
overworked physicians, who were supposed to take on research tasks in their non-existent 
spare time. What was needed to rectify this situation, according to Berlin, were dedicated 
personnel—full time positions allocated to the hospitals and clinics engaged in drug 
testing throughout the country whose sole responsibility would be conducting trials.  
 While members of the Scientific Council held a variety of opinions on how to 
prioritize the problems facing cancer drug development, the proposal to create an 
interdepartmental center dedicated to the coordination of clinical trials was in principle 
supported by all (although details of the logistics of organizing such a center—in 
particular, the suggestion that it be based in the Institute of Experimental and Clinical 
Oncology—elicited some vehement opposition). And MinZdrav wasted no time in 
implementing this recommendation. By 1967 the All-Union Chemotherapy Center 
(VHTs), located in the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology and headed by 
August Mikhailovich Garin, a well-regarded chemotherapist and a long-time employee of 
the IECO, was already operational.203 
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 When reading the transcript of the meeting, what is striking is how profoundly 
disorganized the bureaucratic structure was on just about every level. And what is equally 
striking is that in detailing these problems, the Scientific Council did not seem to falter in 
its conviction that the solution was not more resources, better training or stricter 
methodological standards—it was more (and more effective) planning and control. 
Another level of bureaucracy was needed to create the conditions of practice within 
which biomedical scientists could pursue their projects effectively. The Wild West was 
not in the absence of standard methodological approaches and collective discipline—it 
was in the lack of mice and reagents, the shortage of time, and the absence of facilities 
for producing experimental drugs—in short, in the failure of the system to live up to its 
promises and to create a context of practice in which individual practitioners could 
realize their professional agendas. 
 In this context, where the bureaucratic machinery frequently broke down, the 
individual had an extremely important role to play. It was the responsibility of individual 
clinicians to produce reliable scientific knowledge while pursuing the best possible 
outcome for their patients despite the extremely limited resources the system of health 
protection provided. This dual mission meant that clinical testing remained squarely in 
the realm of therapeutic rather than experimental medicine, and that research protocols 
had no normative force—clinicians felt free to violate their provisions whenever doing so 
was thought to result in better patient care. In fact, individual clinicians often had to 
violate protocol provisions, as well as other bureaucratic provisions, to overcome the 
limitations of the context of practice. But they had to be the right kind of individuals. 
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CHAPTER 3: CYBERNETICS WITHOUT COMPUTERS AND OTHER 
PARADOXES OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM 
 
…and the princess in rage hung herself with her 
own braid.  Because she calculated exactly how 
many grains in the bag, drops in the sea and stars in 
the skies.  So let’s drink to cybernetics. 
Kidnapping, Caucasian Style (1967) 
   
 In January 1969 Literaturnai'a Gazeta—the newspaper of choice among the 
Soviet intelligentsia thanks to the fact that despite its title and its affiliation with the 
Union of Writers, its coverage went beyond literature and poetry to include analytical 
pieces on world affairs, social issues, and a potpouri of topics in science and 
technology—posed an interesting question in its section “On Different Themes.” The 
question was, Will a computer be able to treat patients? It served as the headline for a 
lengthy editorial piece by Joseph Abramovitch Kassirskii, a full member of the Soviet 
Academy of Medical Sciences with an extensive and diverse publication record and a 
well regarded clinician, on the proper role of cybernetics in medicine. 
 Kassirski began his editorial with a definition of doctoring as both an art and a 
science: 
When a doctor is at a patient's bedside or in the lab studying the 
patient, he is a scientist; but when he is determining an individual 
diagnosis or individual therapy, he must display his medical art, his 
intuition.204 
 
Kassirski then mounted a defense of intuition against “some proponents of cybernetics” 
who “recommend making medicine quantitative” and mechanized.205 While he accorded 
cybernetics an important role in medicine—for him, “the question of the value of its 
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application ...already ceased to be a subject of debate.” He wanted that role clearly 
circumscribed.206   
 In Kassirski's view, cybernetics could be a big help to physicians in processing 
straightforward test results, and it had potential to help reduce mistakes on the part of 
overworked and sometimes poorly trained physicians. But while relieving some of the 
cognitive burdens carried by physicians, cybernetics posed a danger to the medical 
profession. It could lead to the “functional atrophy of medical thinking”—an 
unacceptable outcome because “a physician must always be a thinker, ” and must spend 
his life enhancing his cognitive abilities, “developing intricate observation skills and the 
art of diagnostic synthesis.”207 
 The publication of Kassirski's editorial was intended to publicize the forthcoming 
All Union Conference on the Problems of Medical Deontology, to be held in Moscow at 
the end of the month, and to draw attention to one of the main issues of the meeting—
what should be the relationship between science, technology, and art in medicine?  But 
despite its link to the event, the appearance of Kassirski's editorial was not an isolated 
occurence—in 1969 the pages of the Soviet press saw many articles on medical 
cybernetics. Major newspapers such as Pravda, Moskovskaia Pravda and Literaturnaia 
Gazeta, as well as trade publications with more limited circulations such as Meditisnskii 
Rabotnik, carried editorials on the subject by well known, authoritative scientists and 
clinicians. Some, like Kassirskii, warned of the dangers of cybernetics. Others extolled its 
achievements and promises.   
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 In a piece that appeared under the headline “The Machine Gives a Diagnosis,” 
another academician and clinician Aleksandr Vasil'evich Vishnevskii enthused that the 
application of cybernetics in medicine had made it possible “to take into account a large 
quantity of small symptoms, the meaning of which it is extremely difficult for a physician 
to evaluate.”208 Vishnevskii saw computers209 as the way out of the paradox of modern 
medicine, which routinely generated much more data about patient bodies than 
physicians could take into account when trying to evaluate their condition. Because a 
physician was called upon to essentially solve a problem of differential diagnosis, “that 
is, to determine if the patient has one illness or another—'yes' or 'no',” mathematical 
formulas to aid the task could be developed and computers enlisted to accurately and 
quickly weigh every relevant test result and produce a diagnosis.210 Several such 
formulas were already being clinically tested in a number of institutes,  including 
Vishnevskii's own Institute of Surgery, with promising results—the differential diagnosis 
system developed by the cybernetics laboratory for targeting congenital heart defects 
there claimed an accuracy rate of 90-92 percent. 
 The potential utility of computers in medicine did not end with the determination 
of the diagnosis. Vishnevskii was confident that the “union of mathematics, cybernetics 
and medicine opens a wide range of appealing options” in practical aspects of patient 
treatment as well. For example, he was sure that it would one day become possible to 
develop an automated system that would monitor a patient's condition during surgery and 
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“within seconds combine and sum up data from numerous monitoring devices ... 
suggesting to the surgeon or the anasthesiologist the correct solution.”211 Finally, 
cybernetics could be employed in assembling an electronic medical archive (either within 
the confines of an individual institution or potentially even at the national and global 
levels) that would put the collective experience of the medical profession at the fingertips 
of individual practitioners. 
 The editorials for and against cybernetics amounted to a debate on the proper 
place of quantitative techniques and computing technologies within medical research and 
practice. Practitioners of cybernetics followed the debate closely and responded to it 
vigorously. K.N. Gurarii, a member of the Laboratory of Cybernetics of the Institute of 
Experimental and Clinical Oncology,212 wrote a blistering response to Kassirskii, labeling 
his remarks “a crude violation of the duty and ethics of modern physicians.”213 Gurarii 
believed such an accusation to be justified because Kassirskii’s remarks “objectively 
cause major harm to the efficacy of patient treatment.”214 As Gurarii saw it, the ethical 
obligation of the modern physician was to be ‘optimally professional’—to use all the 
tools placed at his disposal by science and technology in the treatment of patients.  
Cybernetics was an absolutely crucial tool for meeting this obligation. If physicians 
persisted in emphasizing intuitive evaluations of patients, they would never improve their 
results, and not because they did not want to or because they lacked knowledge or the 
ability to think logically. Instead he emphasized that it was because “the most amazing 
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intuition is fundamentally limited by the capacity of the human brain” which cannot 
adequately weigh and process all the information that needs to be carefully considered 
when coming up with a diagnosis and course of treatment.215 As Gurarii saw it, the 
purpose of a computer was to act as an amplifier of the brain—to multiply its information 
processing capacity, not to replace the physician’s reasoning. 
 There are several ways in which one could analyze this debate. The first is on the 
level of professional politics. The attempt to secure a place for cybernetics in medical 
science and practice involved an impassioned professional turf battle—proponents of 
cybernetics tried to gain a foothold in medicine by offering its practitioners a kind of 
standardizing discourse and thereby sought to ensure for themselves a place in medical 
science and the regulation of medical practice, while biomedical scientists and medical 
practitioners resisted this encroachment on their professional authority.  In this sense, the 
history of medical cybernetics in the Soviet Union falls in line with the history of 
quantification as a technology of mediation in other scientific pursuits.216 The second is 
on the level of scientific institutions and organizational structures.  One can read the story 
of medical cybernetics as yet another example of how the Soviet scientific bureaucracy 
was broken—although medical cybernetics enjoyed the support of the Soviet state, as it 
acquired its own institutional base it became ensconced in Centers of Calculation that 
were separate from the daily work of medical research and clinial units and thus 
effectively isolated from the biomedical community, losing relevance and momentum.   
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 Both of these interpretations have a place in the history of medical cybernetics in 
the Soviet Union. But my interest in medical cybernetics in this chapter is not intrinsic, it 
is practical and methodological. That is, I am interested in the history of medical 
cybernetics not for its own sake, but because the debate over the discipline's place within 
medical research and practice can help access the epistemic commitments of Soviet 
medicine—ideas about what constituted reliable knowledge, how this knowledge was to 
be produced, and how these decisions were to be made, both collectively and 
individually. These ideas were central to the debate on the proper role of medical 
cybernetics in the production and application of biomedical knowledge, as the 
impassioned nature of the debate attests. 
 In this chapter, I analyze the debates around medical cybernetics as a window on 
the normative structure of Soviet biomedical epistemology. Although I examine medical 
cybernetics in practice by following the progress of this discipline from the mid 1960s to 
the late 1970s within the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology, my focus is on 
ideas and rhetoric. I argue that despite official backing, which enabled the new discipline 
to lay claim to space, equipment and positions within biomedical institutions, medical 
cybernetics failed to secure a place for itself both in medical research and practice, and 
that at the root of this failure lies the incompatibility of the cybernetic discourse with the 
prevailing epistemic commitments of Soviet biomedicine.217 I also want to make the case 
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that epistemic commitments are inextricable from ethical ones—that abstract ethical 
principles inform practical epistemic norms.218   
 I argue that Soviet biomedicine in this period was understood by its practitioners 
to be a composite of three sciences—the biological, the social and the humanistic.219 
These distinct bodies of knowledge and technical skill cohered in the person of the 
individual practitioner. To be sure, individual practitioners were embedded in complex 
administrative bureacratic structures and also in a dynamic scientific community which 
both sought to govern individual practices—the former through the imposition of 
methodological guidelines and recommendations, the latter through peer review. But 
these entanglements were thought to be productive as well as restrictive, and they did not 
negate the rhetorical importance of the individual practitioner in Soviet biomedicine as 
the entity unifying both the three components of medical knowledge and the experimental 
and clinical realm. While decisions about what constitutes an appropriate methodology of 
knowledge production, as well as which knowledge claims were valid and which not, 
were made collectively, the selection of the right course of action in biomedical practice 
and research was left to the discretion of the individual practitioner, who was to make 
these decisions based on his or her understanding of the needs of the patient. That is, 
experimental considerations were subordinated to therapeutic ones and collectively 
produced methodological recommendations and guidelines were subordinated to 
individual decision making. 
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 In trying to introduce quantitative methods of evaluation and decision making into 
medical practice, the proponents of medical cybernetics attempted to redefine the 
epistemic commitments of Soviet medicine in two ways. First, they attempted to exclude 
the humanistic component on the grounds of unreliability, drawing a distinct boundary 
between the experimental and therapeutic realms which were hitherto considered 
inseparable. More important, they sought to subordinate individual authority of the 
practitioner to that of collectively produced decision making tools—both discursively and 
in actual practice. In striving to mediate the doctor-patient encounter through a 
technological intervention, and to subordinate the judgment of individual clinicians to the 
rationality of numbers, medical cyberneticians anticipated the efforts of EBM advocates. 
But unlike advocates of evidence-based medicine, medical cyberneticians failed to 
advance their agenda even though, with respect to institutional and financial resources, 
they were arguably better placed. 
 The discursive incompatibility of medical cybernetics with the epistemic culture 
of Soviet biomedicine is only a partial explanation for this failure—under conditions of 
instability epistemic commitments can and do shift, and new rhetorical devices emerge to 
validate the new rules of practice, as I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters. But in the 
1960s and 1970s the Soviet system of health protection appears to have enjoyed relative 
institutional stability and comparative prosperity. The IECO, for example, had a stable 
core leadership that shepharded the institution through a period of significant expansion 
and growth from a narrowly specialized institute into a multi-disciplinary center.220 This 
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growth and expansion slowed to a screeching halt by the late 1970s, and frustration was 
certainly building within the system, but there was no perception of crisis until the late 
1980s—although numerous organizational and economic problems were self-evident, the 
principles on which the system was built seemed sound, the leadership remained stable, 
and the status quo seemed unshakeable.221 
 
Medical Cybernetics in the Soviet Union 
 In the Soviet Union as elsewhere, cybernetics by the 1960s had become a 
heterogeneous interdisciplinary field unified by its focus on regulatory systems.222 This in 
itself was a remarkable achievement, considering the hostile reception cybernetics 
encountered from the Soviet authorities when it first appeared on the world stage in 1948. 
Growing popularity of cybernetics in the west coincided with a domestic anti-American 
campaign, making cybernetics an easy target for party idealogues.223 But while 
cybernetic ideas were condemned in the Soviet press, the discipline's connection to the 
US military sector ensured financial support for domestic computer and automated 
control projects. Upon Stalin's death, a group of Soviet intellectuals took up cybernetic 
discourse in an attempt to cleanse Soviet science of stalinist rhetoric, and it took off like 
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wildfire, not only rising to prominence in scientific circles but diffusing into the popular 
culture as well.  
 The discipline of medical cybernetics got its start outside of the biomedical 
research establishment, under the umbrella of the ‘Big Academy’ (the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences), which in 1962 created a separate Section of Biological and Medical 
Cybernetics chaired by the physiologist V.V. Parin as part of its Council of 
Cybernetics.224 In their 1966 Introduction to Medical Cybernetics, V.V. Parin and R. M. 
Bayevskiy described medical cybernetics as a “division of applied cybernetics which 
utilizes the concepts and achievements of cybernetics to deepen medical knowledge, 
improve the quality of medical service, and increase the effectiveness of the scientific and 
practical work of physicians.”225  
 At first, the distance from the biomedical community made for a fairly 
circumscribed disciplinary agenda. The section oversaw research in three main areas:  
physiological cybernetics, which was concerned with developing mathematical models of 
physiological systems and processes; medical cybernetics, which in practice was 
primarily to do with problems of diagnostics and instrumentation; and biological 
cybernetics, which focused on mathematical models of cellular processes. By the late 
1960s, the new discipline had grown substantially and appeared to make considerable 
headway in the biomedical community. This progress was in large part buoyed by 
support from the government.   
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 In 1966, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of 
Ministers passed a resolution pushing the production and utilization of computing and 
automating technologies in all sectors of the economy, to which MinZdrav and the 
Academy of Medical Sciences responded by developing their own policies of the 
“organized mathematicization of health protection.”226 The emphasis was placed on 
mathematicization (and not computerization or automation) because cybernetics was 
defined as a science “interested in fundamental probabilistic systems,” and “the study of 
the general rules that are inherent to extremely diverse …systems requires a great deal of 
abstraction based on a number of mathematical disciplines.”227 Computers in this context 
were a means to an end, and not necessarily an end in themselves.  
 Although it took the slow-moving Ministry bureacracy a long time to formulate 
the policy (a directive on the matter finally came out only in 1968), its implementation 
was surprisingly swift. Whereas in 1968 there was a total of only twenty-six medical 
research institutes nation-wide that could boast a cybernetics division, by 1970 the 
number had more than doubled to fifty-four. The number of people employed in these 
divisions grew even more rapidly—from 200 to 1350 in the same period of time, 
although this was largely a result of reorganization that moved people with engineering 
and mathematical backgrounds already employed in various departments of medical 
research institutes into the newly created cybernetic divisions. There was some capital 
investment as well (4.35 million rubles) which funded the purchase of equipment. All this 
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activity was accompanied by promotional efforts—a series of lectures, courses, and 
conferences on medical cybernetics.228 
 As their numbers expanded and the institutional base stabilized, practitioners of 
medical cybernetics began to formulate a more ambitious disciplinary agenda, attempting 
to expand their sphere of influence and legitimate their expertise in the eyes of medical 
scientists and practitioners. And, as in other divisions of cybernetics, the most important 
tools medical cyberneticians could resort to in their struggle for professional legitimacy 
were discursive. As Slava Gerovitch has persuasively demonstrated, Soviet cybernetics as 
a whole was in many ways a social movement that coalesced around a particular 
discourse.229 The goal of this movement was to cleanse Soviet science of the ideological 
rhetoric that had wreaked so much havoc during Stalin's reign.  Its mission was “to bring 
objectivity to the entire family of the life sciences and the social sciences” through the 
application of the  “precise language of cybernetics,” which “was to replace the vague 
and manipulative language of ideological discourse in fields that mathematics had not yet 
reached.”230 
 Medical cyberneticians were typical of this larger movement in the sense that they 
took up the mission of bringing objectivity to medicine through the precise language of 
mathematics, and staked their professional legitimacy on this discourse. This strategy 
failed, but the failure of medical cybernetics was different from the failure of Soviet 
cybernetics as a whole. Gerovitch locates the failure of Soviet cybernetics in its 
success—he demonstrates that in several disciplines the language of cybernetics did in 
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fact replace ideological discourse, but that it did so by taking on the very generality and 
flexibility of the ideological discourse that it originally sought to combat, in effect simply 
substituting ‘cyberspeak’ for ‘newspeak.’   
 This is where the history of Soviet medical cybernetics departs from the trajectory 
of the history of Soviet cybernetics in general. Despite enjoying official backing for their 
discipline, medical cyberneticians never succeeded in dominating biomedical discourse. 
In fact they attempted to modify their rhetoric to reconcile their notion of objectivity with 
the epistemic commitments their biomedical colleagues adhered to.  To demonstrate this 
trajectory, I will first analyze what medical cyberneticians were offering to bring to 
biomedical research and practice, and will then follow the fate of medical cybernetics 
within the walls of a particular biomedical institution by describing the practice of 
medical cybernetics at the Institute of Experimental and Clinical Oncology in Moscow. I 
argue that although medical cyberneticians had secured resources for the establishment of 
the discipline within the institute, they could not make room for themselves in the 
scientific and clinical work of the Institute, and were ultimately relegated to irrelevance. 
 
The promise of medical cybernetics 
 As advocates of medical cybernetics saw it, there were two central problems 
facing biomedical researchers and clinicians alike. The first was that the biomedical data 
with which they had to work were often unreliable. As K.N. Gurarii lamented in an 
unpublished editorial,  
There are still many branches of science and technology where we cannot 
guarantee the quality of data.  This is especially true in medicine and 
biology, where historically there developed descriptive, qualitative 
methods of evaluation with a majority of nebulous, heterogeneous signs, 
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and where quantitative methods are highly imperfect in the metrological 
sense and often depend on the subjective qualities of the laboratory 
technicians conducting the analysis.231 
 
Biomedical data were unreliable both because they were for the most part qualitative and 
descriptive—that is, not amenable to precise measurement—and because, in those rare 
cases where data could be rendered in quantitative measurements, such rendering was 
often unreliable thanks to the failure of laboratory technicians to rein in their subjectivity. 
 The second central problem was that biomedical science routinely produced far 
more data than the human brain was capable of processing. Confronted with mounds of 
information, individual practitioners had to correctly weigh various factors and 
understand the relationships between them—tasks that frequently employed such 
unreliable cognitive tools as intuition and guessing. The result of this was errors—errors 
in the design of research protocols, which resulted in the production of more unreliable 
knowledge, and errors in diagnosing and treating patients, which could result in patient 
injury or death.   
 Cybernetics possessed the methodological tools that practitioners of biomedicine 
needed to navigate this complexity: 
The contemporary state of information theory and the available capacity of 
computers already allow us in many cases to solve with some certainty the 
problem of selecting factors for the composition of mathematical models 
without intuitive evaluation and practically without limiting the number of 
data points involved, and accounting for the possible interrelationships and 
interconnections between them.232 
 
That is, what cybernetics offered to biomedical researchers and clinicians was a way to 
get reliable, actionable information out of their unreliable data through mathematical 
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modeling.  An investigator employing cybernetic methods had essentially only two 
responsibilities—to include all the factors that could possibly be relevant to the research 
question, and to collect enough statistical data to ensure the accuracy of the model.233  
For the clinician, cybernetics promised to take the guesswork out of the process of 
assigning a diagnosis and charting the prognosis of the illness.   
 To take advantage of these tools, all biomedical practitioners had to do was 
redefine their professional role and make room for cybernetic approaches. Namely, they 
had to understand that their art consisted not of “intuition, a special gift, or divine 
inspiration” but of the “art of applying fortunately available methods of objective 
evaluation of the informational value of various factors.”234 Objective methods for 
Gurarii meant quantitative methods.235 In other words, what proponents of medical 
cybernetics were trying to achieve was essentially the same thing that all proponents of 
cybernetics in the Soviet Union were trying to achieve—a firm methodological 
foundation for the creation and application of scientific knowledge rooted in 
mathematical certainty.236 
 But although cyberneticians were actively trying to realize their vision by 
designing various tools that could serve as vehicles for this methodology, the biomedical 
profession did not take advantage of these approaches. Despite securing access to various 
institutional resources such as laboratory space, equipment, and positions, the discipline 
found itself increasingly isolated and marginalized. While cybernetic laboratories figured 
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in the official plans, they could not get a foothold in either biomedical research or 
therapeutic practice. 
 
Medical cybernetics in practice 
 As an institution that placed a high priority on being at the forefront of its field, 
the IECO was quick to make room for the new discipline of medical cybernetics within 
its walls. In the early 1960s, it already employed several experts in computers and 
mathematics, and by 1974 there was a well established laboratory of medical cybernetics 
with 34 employees.237  
 In the early days of medical cybernetics at the Institute, its small team of 
practitioners was apparently subordinate to the medical personnel and confined 
themselves to two research problems: the development of cybernetic tables for the 
differential diagnosis of stomach cancer and epidemiological modeling. The small 
number of the projects belies their complexity. The first of these problems, differential 
diagnosis of stomach cancer, was being developed in cooperation with a research team at 
the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.238  
Being part of the plan of the Government Committee on Science and Technology (which 
was part of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), it was a very high level project. The 
team at the IECO was headed by Professor V. I. Yanishevskii, a doctor of medical 
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!121!
sciences, and was composed of a physician (V.I. Fokin), a candidate of technical sciences 
(K.N. Gurarii), and an engineer (T.K. Glazkova). 
 The accurate diagnosis of stomach cancer—particularly accurate initial 
diagnosis—presented a serious practical challenge to clinicians. As a project report put 
together by the IECO team in 1963 noted, only 20-30 percent of stomach cancer patients 
were diagnosed correctly when they first turned to their polyclinic, and only in the 
following six months did 70-75 percent of patients receive the correct diagnosis. The 
reason was that in its early stages, the symptoms of stomach cancer closely resemble 
those of several common and less serious conditions—ulcers, polyps and gastritis. The 
development of new diagnostic tests was not solving the problem both because the 
cumulative information from the various tests was hard for clinicians to interpret and 
because the vast majority of polyclinics were not equipped to carry out the specialized 
tests. Medical cybernetics promised a way out of this problem by applying a novel 
solution—teaching computers to classify complex situations.239 
 Fokin and Yanishevskii designed an initial examination card, which consisted of 
the various signs and symptoms routinely noted in the diagnosis of stomach cancer. The 
initial card spanned six densely packed letter pages, which had to be filled out in binary 
form (that is, with yes or no answers, the first of which was assigned a value of 1, the 
second 0). Using verified patient data from the IECO and the clinic of the Institute of 
Nutrition (another AMS institute) and an algorithm developed by the Institute of 
Automation and Telemechanics, the research team then culled the original table, 
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eliminating those signs and symptoms that were deemed to be statistically uninformative. 
The remaining signs were used to code histories of cancer and ulcer for patients with  
confirmed diagnoses, and then another computer algorithm was applied to create a 
mathematical portrait of the two groups. This portrait was tested for accuracy against the 
patient histories of confirmed cancer, ulcer, polyp, and gastritis patients, a sizeable 
undertaking in itself, considering the work required to make these patient histories legible 
to the machines. The result of this was another examination card with only 60 signs and 
symptoms (which fit on two letter-sized pages) that served as the basis of the differential 
diagnostic tables that were to undergo clinical testing. To assign a diagnosis, a clinician 
had to fill out all the tables, with each table rendering a cancer/not cancer verdict. 
Although computers were instrumental for developing the tables, clinicians were not 
required to use them—they filled in the table by hand in binary form, and then had to 
perform some basic math. The final diagnosis was cancer if two of the three tables gave a 
positive answer. The developers of the tables claimed a 91 percent accuracy rate for these 
tools prior to clinical testing. 
 The second project was internal to the institute, and was being carried out for the 
epidemiology department. It applied the principles of teaching computers to classify 
complex situations developed by the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics for the 
differential diagnosis project to come up with a methodology for multifactor modeling of 
cancer epidemiology.240   
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 In the decade that followed, the discipline of medical cybernetics seemed to 
expand considerably at the institute. By 1974 the laboratory of medical cybernetics was 
staffed by 34 employees divided into three distinct units.241 By far the largest of these 
units was composed of the biomedical and programming groups, which together were 
responsible for numerous projects designed to support the clinical and experimental 
research programs at the Institute.  Besides continuous work on various problems of 
differential diagnosis and cancer epidemiology, by 1974 this unit was also responsible for 
carrying out statistical analysis of the results of the experimental and clinical studies 
conducted throughout the various divisions of the Institute and counseling the Institute’s 
experimental and clinical investigators on appropriate study design.242 The second unit, 
which bore the clunky title of the “Group of Computer Exploitation,” was responsible for 
the Institute’s routine computer operations. This included managing the utilization of the 
institute’s computer equipment—putting together and enforcing machine schedules, 
maintaining equipment and bringing new installations online, and performing routine 
administrative calculations such as payroll and inventory control. The last unit, the group 
of administrative systems and information processing, was responsible for a number of 
database projects.  
 But although both the number of people engaged in medical cybernetics and the 
list of their responsibilities had grown considerably, the impact on clinical and research 
practices of the rest of the institute remained negligible. The differential diagnostic tables 
for stomach cancer, which were ready for clinical testing as early as 1963 (and had 
apparently been approved for implementation by the Institute’s Scientific Council), still 
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had not made it into the institute’s own clinical practice over a decade later, to say 
nothing of Soviet oncology practice in general.243   
 The laboratory’s statisticians, for their part, apparently found themselves shut out 
of the institute’s research. When James Holland arrived at the IECO in 1972 to learn 
more about Soviet clinical trial methods in preparation for joint tests, he came away from 
his eight months at the Institute convinced that the Soviets knew nothing of the role of 
statistical methods in medical research. And, although he was apparently taken on a tour 
of the cybernetics laboratory, the only impression that he retained of this experience was 
the recollection that the computers his hosts were so proud of were machines 
manufactured by GE, with the company logos awkwardly painted over.244  
 Despite the fact that the use of statistical methods was clearly gaining ground in 
the Institute after the creation of the All-Union Chemotherapy Center and the adoption of 
joint study protocols with the Americans in the course of the exchange, the isolation of 
medical cyberneticians only deepened as the decade wore on. At a joint meeting of the 
Oncology Center’s Scientific Council and methodological seminar held in May 1980, 
V.V. Dvoirin, an expert in biostatistics and a senior staff member of the medical 
cybernetics laboratory, complained that methodological errors continued to be a routine 
part of the institute’s clinical trial designs and went as far as to suggest that, instead of 
centralizing statistical support services in the medical cybernetics laboratory, it would 
make more sense to create positions for biostatisticians on the staff of the institute’s 
various clinical and experimental departments (a suggestion uniformly rejected by 
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members of the Council)—or at the very least allow the biostatisticians within the 
medical cybernetics laboratory to specialize.245 
 The situation within the IECO was not atypical. In fact in the rest of the Academy 
system, medical cybernetics seems to have fared even worse in the long term. A 1986 
survey of Academy institutes conducted in advance of a meeting of the Presidium on the 
state of computing technologies within the AMS system found that there were 
approximately 298 machines of various types (not all of them functional) and only 400 
computer specialists to service and operate them.246 AMS clinical and experimental 
researchers, for their part, remained completely ignorant of what cybernetic methods 
could bring to their work, despite the fact that both the technology and the techniques 
were reported to be ready for immediate implementation. 
 What accounts for this failure of medical cybernetics to make an impact on Soviet 
biomedical science and practice? Lack of funds, which resulted in shortages of both 
equipment and expertise, as several participants of the 1986 Presidium meeting 
emphasized, is one obvious culprit. But lack of funds is only a partial explanation. For 
one thing, although there is no doubt that by 1986 medical cybernetics was severely 
hindered by a shortage of funding (as was all of Soviet biomedical science), this funding 
shortage does not explain why the discipline’s impact on medical research and practice 
was so limited in the period spanning the late 1960s to mid 1970s, when funding was 
comparatively good. 
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 This explanation is especially inadequate considering that the vision of success 
for Soviet medical cybernetics advanced by its practitioners was not predicated on the 
ubiquity of computing technologies or even trained cyberneticians. On the contrary, 
Soviet medical cyberneticians were not only well aware but also accepting of the scarcity 
of equipment, accommodating their disciplinary agenda to this scarcity. The prevailing 
opinion among medical and cybernetic practitioners alike seems to have been that it was 
neither practical nor desirable to establish the ubiquity of computers within clinical 
institutions. Computers were thought to be a highly specialized tool that belonged in the 
hands of professionals specifically trained to work with them. Accordingly, both the 
computers and the cyberneticians could serve the medical profession better when 
concentrated in specialized centers of calculation.247  
 The example of the diagnostic tables for stomach cancer clearly illustrates this 
point. Although the tables were intended to transform the clinical practices of diagnosing 
stomach cancer, their use did not require that a clinician have access to either a computer 
or possess an expertise in cybernetics. On the contrary, the assumption that informed the 
design of the tables was that such access and expertise would not be available. What was 
necessary for the successful implementation of the tables was that the clinician 
subordinate his or her judgment to the dictates of the table—that he focus on those signs 
and symptoms that the table designers deemed relevant, follow instructions faithfully and 
accept the verdict of the numbers. 
 Subordinating clinical and experimental judgment to the verdict of numbers 
entailed not only a redistribution of professional power, but a reconfiguration of 
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biomedical epistemology. What cybernetics was offering—a numerical form of 
objectivity that rested on a mathematical foundation—entailed prioritizing of collective 
evaluations over individual ones. Soviet biomedicine had a strong epistemic commitment 
to the individual clinician’s judgment. To understand the incompatibility of numerical 
objectivity with Soviet biomedical epistemology, it is important to first analyze how the 
terms 'science' and 'medicine' were defined, as well as to know something about the 
peculiarities of Soviet medical deontology.  
 
The individual in the collective: more paradoxes of developed socialism 
 The direct translation of 'science' into Russian is 'nauka', but the two terms are not 
equivalent. Whereas 'science' typically signifies a systematic body of knowledge that 
deals with observable facts and demonstrates the operation of general laws (as in physics, 
chemistry and biology), and thus excludes certain kinds of systematic bodies of 
knowledge (such as history or philosophy, which are categorized as humanistic rather 
than scientific disciplines), the word ‘nauka’ applies equally to all systematized 
knowledge. This does not imply that in the Russian context all science is created equal—
distinctions similar to those in the west between exact, social, and humanistic sciences 
apply—but the disciplines in each category are considered to be a science in their own 
right. Medicine occupied a unique position in the system of sciences because it was 
understood to be simultaneously an exact, a social, and a humanistic science.   
 It was an exact science in so far as it dealt with biology, chemistry, physiology 
and the like, and it was a social science in so far as its object of study was human 
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populations. As a 1971 volume on the place of statistical research methods in medicine 
and health protection explained,   
Medicine as a science holds a peculiar position in the system of 
sciences.  It is, on the one hand, a biological science—a science about 
the human organism as such, examining it on its different levels (from 
the molecular and cellular to the organ and the whole) and in its 
different relationships with its internal and external environment; on 
the other hand—[it is] a social science, studying human populations 
from a medical position, from a position of their public health.248 
 
 Finally, medicine was a humanistic science in so far as it dealt with individual 
patients, each with his or her own unique experience of life and disease and thus 
requiring a unique approach to treatment. As a textbook on medical ethics admonished,  
No technical methods of treatment must nullify the personality of the 
physician and the individual approach to the patient.  Knowledge of 
disease is an abstract knowledge, torn away from the human.  This 
knowledge needs to be concretized, which requires looking at the patient 
as an individual and taking into account his varied connections to the 
social context.249 
 
The role of a biomedical professional was not so much to bridge the gap between these 
three different sciences of medicine, but to unite them in the person of the practitioner—it 
was in the practitioner as an individual that these three different systems of knowledge 
came together, and it was the practitioner as an individual who brought these combined 
knowledges to bear on the treatment of each patient.  
 This is why Soviet medical deontology emphasized that a physician was 
something one was, and not something one did, focusing on outlining the individual 
characteristics that a physician must possess. These characteristics included professional 
qualifications such as extensive scientific knowledge and technical skill, and personal 
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qualities such as honesty, integrity and selflessness—both types of qualification were 
equally necessary to enable medical professionals to do their job, since besides settling on 
a correct diagnosis and designating an appropriate course of treatment, a physician was 
expected to “exert a psychological and a psychotherapeutic influence on the patient” 
because one could not “treat a patient without treating his soul.”250  
 Encountering an earnest discussion of the importance of the soul in doctor-patient 
interactions in a text that claims Marxism-Leninism as its philosophical foundation is 
surprising to say the least. Accepting the centrality of the individual to an ethical system 
embedded in an ideological context that emphasized the primacy of the collective over 
the individual is equally counter-intuitive. All the more so when this system is labeled 
deontological, since deontology is a term that refers to a rule-based approach to 
normative ethics and seems to belong to the realm of philosophical discussion rather than 
the practice of biomedical knowledge production. And yet in order to understand this 
practice, we need to take these intellectual puzzles seriously and tackle them on their own 
terms. 
 In the Soviet context, medical deontology took a different discursive form and 
played a very different practical role from that occupied by ethics in the American 
context. In the US the discipline of medical ethics has become in the second half of the 
twentieth century a mechanism of external regulation of medical practice, providing 
medical practitioners with clear rules of conduct, such as informed consent laws that are 
aimed at protecting patient autonomy and circumscribing the power of the medical 
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profession.251 In the Soviet context, medical deontology played the role of an internal 
compass rather than external regulator—its focus was not to provide rules of conduct but 
to outline a set of duties, and to paint a portrait of the ideal practitioner to which real 
practitioners could be compared and which they were supposed to seek to emulate. The 
goal was to ensure the authority of medical practitioners, not to circumscribe it. As an 
edited volume on various aspects of medical deontology explained, medical deontology 
was “not ...a set of rules determining the professional conduct of physicians, but ...a 
teaching about the physician's duty, his civic obligations.”252  
 The primary duty of the medical profession was to protect and restore the health 
of people, and to do that its practitioners had to have the trust and respect of patients.  
This trust and respect could only be vested in individuals, and had to be based on a 
combination of theoretical knowledge, moral values, and practical skill.253 Far from 
trying to impose rules of conduct on practitioners, Soviet medical deontology actually 
emphasized the primacy of duties over rules, and explicitly sanctioned breaking official 
rules of conduct when these interfered with the fulfillment of the primary obligation of 
the profession.254 For example, a 1967 text on medical deontology describes the case of a 
war-time physician who, while serving on the frontlines during the Great Patriotic War, 
violated official orders to transport wounded soldiers with damage to the spinal column 
to hospitals behind the front lines. Knowing that these patients were likely to die in 
transit, he operated on them in the field hospital, and only then authorized their 
evacuation. The text praises the moral qualities of this physician whose “conscience ... 
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was expressed not in a formal attitude towards his responsibilities, not in the paragraphs 
of orders and instructions, but in an internal moral need to save the wounded from 
death.”255 
 In this way the rhetoric of individual responsibility gave Soviet biomedical 
practitioners practical rights—rights to define what constituted the best interest of the 
patient and to act in accordance with their understanding of those interests even when 
such actions violated various bureacratic restrictions on their conduct. The second 
practical consequence of this rhetoric was that, by placing the interests of the patient at 
the top of the list of biomedicine's concerns, it ranked therapeutic concerns over 
experimental ones. As we saw in the previous chapter, this had very important 
consequences for clinical trial practices—clinicians at external testing sites felt (and in 
fact, were) free to violate clinical trial protocols to accommodate the needs of patient care 
by ignoring enrollment criteria or altering drug administration protocols in accordance 
with patient response.  
 
Conclusion 
 The rhetoric of individual responsibility, and the practical rights with which it 
endowed Soviet biomedical professionals, had a crucial role to play in creating the 
conditions of practice in which the efforts of medical cyberneticians to introduce 
quantitative methods into medical research and decision making tools into medical 
practice could be effectively ignored despite the official backing of medical cybernetics 
by both the biomedical bureacracy and the highest echelons of the Soviet government. 
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Although government support meant that medical cyberneticians could not be kept out of 
biomedical institutions, securing an institutional base in the form of equipment and 
laboratories was not sufficient to advance the discipline's agenda—acceptance from the 
biomedical community was equally necessary, and this acceptance was not forthcoming.    
 For the biomedical establishment, the acceptance of cybernetics meant not only 
ceding professional authority to practitioners of the new discipline.  It also 
required that the biomedical community accept a redefinition of their epistemic and 
ethical commitments. To make room for their discipline in medical science, 
cyberneticians attempted to simplify the definition of medical science, cutting out the 
humanistic component of the definition as irrelevant and leaving only those that were 
amenable to the use of quantitative methods of evaluation and mathematical modeling.  
And to make room for cybernetics in medical practice, they needed to reconfigure the 
identity of the medical professional, disciplining the individual practitioner and 
subordinating his or her authority to that of collectively produced decision-making tools.  
In the era of what Leonid Brezhnev termed 'developed socialism,' when the system of 
health protection appeared as unshakeable as the rest of the Soviet state, biomedical 
practitioners successfully subverted these attempts by ignoring them. The system, 
however, turned out to be far more fragile than most of its observers realized. In the next 
chapter, I provide a partial description of the degradation and collapse of the system of 
health protection by focusing on the Academy of Medical Sciences. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOVIET BIOMEDICINE DURING PERESTROIKA 
!
Yesterday I was given freedom-- 
What am I going to do with it? 
Vladimir Vysotskiy, Give the Dogs Meat, 1965 
 
 The Soviet system of health protection, and the state of which it was a part, turned 
out to be far from indestructible. In this chapter, I attempt a sketch not so much of the 
process of its destruction as of how this process was understood by members of the 
biomedical elite as events unfolded. Making any kind of sense of this period is a 
herculean task that can by itself fill several volumes, and so I make no pretense at 
offering a complete account of this process, nor do I address the causal question.256 
Instead my goal is simply to demonstrate that on every layer at which Soviet biomedical 
epistemology was constituted—that is, on the level of institutions, practices and ideas and 
rhetoric—the 1980s saw major upheaval and precipitous decline, and that the 
organizational principles, practical conventions and normative structures that biomedical 
professionals had employed to structure and navigate their domain failed them.257  
 Thus, what follows is a kaleidoscopic, non-linear account. I focus on the 
institutions of Soviet biomedicine, basing my account largely on the deliberations of the 
Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences in the final six years of Soviet history 
and the first year of the Russian Federation.258 I argue that the events of the 1980s can be 
described as a process of epistemic erosion. While at the level of institutions and 
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organizations nothing substantive appears to have changed until the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution—the institutions of planning and administration remained as problematic as 
they had been in the 1960s and the 1970s—the rhetorical responses to the challenges they 
posed could not be more different. Whereas in the preceding decades, as we have seen in 
chapter two, these problems were discussed with a can-do attitude as challenges to be 
overcome, the discussions of the late 1980s reflect a perception of the biomedical 
profession as a victim of the mindless bureaucratic machinery, caught in a catch-22 and 
unable to come up with a viable plan of action. The profession’s perceived loss of power 
coincided with a very public crisis of legitimacy, with the biomedical establishment 
increasingly unable to repel the challenges of various unorthodox medical practitioners. It 
is in this crisis of legitimacy that the extent of the epistemic erosion of Soviet 
biomedicine becomes most visible. 
 I begin at the end by examining how the administration and members of the AMS 
attempted to cope with the reality of suddenly finding themselves in a different country. 
 
Institutions 
 On April 28, 1992, the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 
called a meeting with the directors of Academy institutes to discuss the issue of strikes 
among medical workers in the Russian Federation. 
 The strikes, called by the Coordinating Council for the Defense of the Rights of 
Scientific Workers—a recent creation of the Workers of Health Protection union—had 
already begun the day before and were to proceed in three phases.  In the first phase, 
medical research institutes with clinical facilities were to stop external consultations and 
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deny the transfer of patients from other treatment facilities, including hospitals. They 
were also to provide patients with treatment and diagnosis consistent with their financing, 
which meant satisfying 40 percent of the demand, and to stop signing off on sick leaves 
for patients.  In the event that the government did not respond to their demands, on May 
4th the strikes were to enter phase two—the complete cessation of routine patient 
appointments. If that too did not help, as of May 10th no medical assistance of any kind 
would be provided. 
 The Presidium of the AMS fully agreed with the Council’s assessment that, as F.I. 
Komarov—a Vice-President of the AMS and the chairman of the Presidium meeting—
put it, “medical science is on the verge of collapse.”259 There was still no government 
program for supporting and developing medical research and virtually no funding, and 
the few funds available were distributed on a quarterly or monthly basis, making planning 
impossible and exacerbating the already considerable psychological burdens of 
uncertainty. The Presidium also supported the Council’s demands that the government 
must do something to address the problem, even going so far as to write an appeal to 
Boris Yeltsin, but their letter to the President said nothing about the strikes and did not 
spell out the Academy’s position on them. The meeting was convened to formulate such 
a position. 
 Komarov, a military man, tried to keep the meeting under control and made his 
own position clear from the start—“we cannot, in the name of the Presidium of the 
Academy of Medical Sciences, support the Coordinating Council, all the phases.”260 
Although the situation undoubtedly called for protest, strikes were not an acceptable form 
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for the protest to take because they ran counter to the duty of the physician. As Komarov 
argued, “to support [the strikes] means to say ‘don’t react to any pleas, not even from 
other doctors.’  But we gave an oath.  And we are violating that oath. Before all else [we 
must] save the sick person.”261 Instead, he suggested that the discussion should focus on 
coming up with other tactics for getting the government to act on the situation. 
 But although Komarov wasn’t alone in thinking that the strikes were 
unacceptable, arriving at a resolution condemning them was not an easy matter. This was 
because, as V.D. Fedorov, head of the Vishnevskii Surgical Institute, whose staff had 
voted the week before to join the strike, pointed out, “the question that we are discussing 
today is not a simple one.”262 As Fedorov saw it,  
… we are talking about, I want to underscore, …not about the social 
protection of [healthcare] workers, but about the defense of health 
protection, …about the possibility or impossibility of providing medical 
assistance in those impoverished conditions in which all of health 
protection is operating.  
 
Accordingly, what was at stake was much more than the welfare of the workers in the 
system, but the survival of the system itself,  
…the wave of strikes that has gripped Russian health protection …cannot 
not receive the support of the workers in health protection because they 
know that this is leading to the complete destruction of health protection, 
to the refusal to provide care only because there is nothing to provide it 
with. 
 
For Fedorov, the gravity of the situation meant that the strikes could not be simply 
condemned as immoral because doing nothing was ultimately worse. 
 For other meeting participants, the most salient question wasn’t even whether or 
not one should support the strike, but a more fundamental question of “how to conduct 
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oneself under these conditions?”263 Some participants called for hunger strikes, others 
suggested marching on hospitals that served members of government. Still others 
implored senior academicians, “who have for so many years ruled medicine” to band 
together and pick up the gauntlet in defense of the system of health protection.264 
 The transcript of this meeting is striking on multiple levels. First, because it 
captures a perception in the upper echelons of the AMS that things were suddenly falling 
apart—that the system of health protection was either on the brink or in the throes of 
collapse, taking Russian biomedical science with it. As I.I. Dedov characterized the 
situation, “it’s as though we got freedom, but something collapsed—there are no 
structures that are ready to support [us].”265 
 It is also striking because, by the criteria that the Presidium invoked to define the 
state of collapse of the system of health protection, the collapse had occurred at least ten 
years earlier. Finally, it is striking because it demonstrates that when faced with what the 
Presidium members perceived to be the collapse of the institutional structures of the 
system, they turned to normative structures—their understanding of the duties of the 
physician as the defender of patient interests and the champion of the system of health 
protection overall—for guidance on how to work through the crisis.266 The normative 
structures, however, did not prove to be of much help—not only because, as one might 
expect, they were unequal to the task without the institutional component, but also 
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because, by the time the Soviet state finally collapsed, they had already been largely 
dismantled.  
 The institutional structures of Soviet health protection were undergoing rapid 
change in the early 1990s.267 By decree of President Yeltsin, the Soviet Academy of 
Medical Sciences was reconstituted as the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences on 
January 4, 1992. The decree was perceived as a victory for the Academy in its 
administrative circles.  Not only did the Academy survive the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (an outcome that was by no means certain), but the decree also gave the Academy 
long-desired independence from the Ministry of Health.   
 The newly independent Academy’s mission was to provide “planning, 
coordination, expert evaluation, funding and control over the completion of [biomedical] 
research projects” in the Russian Federation.268 This mission was very much in line with 
the historical responsibilities of the Academy, but in the new context of post-Soviet 
Russia they were essentially impossible to carry out.  The Academy faced daunting 
problems in its attempt to meet these goals. As V.I. Pokrovskiy, the President of the AMS 
asserted in his address to the first general session of the Russian Academy of Sciences on 
March 24, 1992, the main problem was lack of funds. The entire Academy budget for 
1991 was 324,793,000 rubles. And although for 1992 the Academy requested 809.5 
million, it was clear that it wasn’t about to get that amount. This was at a time when, as 
Pokrovskiy noted with bitterness,  
the increasing complexity of the methods of studying man as a 
biological object has been accompanied in the civilized world (as it’s 
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become customary to call western nations) by a several-fold increase in 
funding. Along many priority trajectories funding of medical science in 
developed countries has grown 20-30 times or more in five-six years.269 
 
This in contrast with the Soviet Union, where medicine was next to last in the sciences in 
terms of funding, and where spending on biomedical research and education grew on 
average by 1.3 percent a year during the XI five-year plan.270  
 The shortage of funds impacted every facet of Academy operations. Construction 
of new research and clinical facilities came to a halt because construction sites could not 
be supplied with materials and equipment, and the Academy was trying to auction off 
several unfinished buildings on the orders of the Moscow city government—this despite 
the fact that many of its existing buildings were falling apart and several of its institutes 
were in desperate need of laboratory space.271 
 The Academy’s clinical facilities were in dire straits. Although their budget for 
the first quarter of 1992 was nearly tripled, this increase could not begin to keep up with 
the increase in costs, which jumped on average 10-15 times because the government 
system of allocations was replaced by direct contracts with suppliers.272 To back up his 
claims Pokrovskiy cited the costs of some common medical supplies:  the cost of vaseline 
jumped from 1 ruble/kg to 15 rubles; of iodine from 7 to 73 rubles; and the unit cost of 
bandages went from 10 kopeeks to 5 rubles 50 kopeeks. At the same time, even in those 
rare instances when money was available to pay the increased prices, the direct contracts 
did not guarantee delivery. As a result, the Academy’s clinics “experienced objective 
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difficulties in maintaining a minimal level of the therapeutic process.”273 If the system of 
financing and supply did not change in the nearest future, Pokrovskiy warned that the 
institutes would soon be unable to offer treatment, including a number of surgical 
interventions, and that this would lead to a decline in the quality of treatment the 
institutes are able to offer.  
 The system of financing, of course, was about to get worse, not better. Per a 
decree of the Ministry of Economics and Finance of the Russian Federation from 
February 6, 1992, funding of Academy institutes for the year was to proceed on a 
monthly basis and was to be minimal—covering only rent, electricity, heat, 
communications, salaries and pension, food and medication.   
 That is, there was no money at all budgeted for research of any kind.274 This 
meant that Academy researchers not only could forget about new expensive equipment, 
but even basic supplies such as laboratory animals; and that Academy divisions 
producing such supplies had no hope of finding customers and faced destruction. There 
was no money for publishing, and the salaries of Academy researchers were 
“significantly below the survival minimum” leading to a depletion of talent.275 
 Pokrovskiy concluded his address by emphasizing 
...that such a catastrophic state of affairs as regards the funding of 
science, the question of cadres (the loss of cadres inside and outside the 
country), the full collapse of the publishing business, the continuing lag 
in material and technological supply of scientific research, etc, in which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid., 65 
275 Ibid., 70. The survival minimum (prozhitochniy minimum) is defined by Russian law as the value of the 
consumer basket—the minimal selection of food items and consumer goods and services necessary for the 
preservation of human health and the enabling of his/her life activities. The problems Pokrovskiy was 
describing were not confined to biomedical science—for their broader impact, see Loren Graham and Irina 
Dezhina, Science in the New Russia: Crisis, Aid, Reform (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
!141!
the AMS finds itself today, domestic medicine has not experienced in the 
48 years of the existence of the AMS.276 
 
Considered in light of the fact that the Academy of Medical Sciences was founded in 
1944, when the Soviet Union was in the midst of World War II, this is a grim 
characterization indeed.277 
 Along with the problems caused by the shortage of funding, the system of health 
protection faced a crisis in the health of the Russian population. Both the quantity and the 
quality of the population were in steep decline (Pokrovskiy measured the quality of the 
population by the health of women and children—according to his figures, 75.1 percent 
of women of childbearing age had health problems, and the percentage of children born 
healthy decreased to 36.5 percent).278 
 Reading Pokrovskiy’s assessment of the state of the Academy, it is hard not to 
agree with Dedov’s characterization that something had, indeed, collapsed. But if one 
takes seriously the criteria by which Pokrovskiy constituted the problem, then we must 
date the collapse at least a decade earlier. More, in fact, because a decade earlier the 
collapse was already so far along that it was visible to western analysts.   
 In 1981, Nick Eberstadt, a political economist, published an article in The New 
York Review of Books in which he concluded that “measured by the health of its people, 
the Soviet Union is no longer a developed nation.”279 Eberstadt based his conclusion 
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entirely on life expectancy and mortality figures, observing that the former were falling 
and the latter rising for every age, sex and ethnic group in the USSR. Noting that 
The spectacle of an industrial nation embarking on a path toward 
preindustrial standards of health is deeply disturbing.  A mortality crisis 
of the sort the USSR is now suffering is alien to everything we 
understand about modern life.  In the world as we know it, in fact, the 
Soviet health crisis should be impossible,  
 
Eberstadt concluded that such a crisis could only mean that the Soviet social order was 
“in the midst of a deadly decay.”280 
 As for the critical shortage of funds to which Pokrovskiy and the other Presidium 
members pointed as the other defining characteristic of the collapse, while the situation of 
the early 1990s was certainly particularly acute, it was not altogether unprecedented.  
Shortage of funding had been a perennial condition in which the Soviet system of health 
protection operated. Moreover, within the Soviet system of central planning, spending 
money was often as difficult as getting it, and the possession of cash was far from a 
guarantee that one would be able to purchase the equipment, supplies, and services 
necessary to sustain both therapeutic and research practices. 
 For example, in 1986 the Academy was flush with cash for capital projects with a 
budget for construction of 123,199,000 rubles (compared to only 16 million the year 
before), plus another 11 million earmarked for equipment. This was more money than its 
institutes could manage to spend, despite considerable pressure to do so. The Oncology 
Center, for example, only managed to spend 53% of the 4 million rubles it was allocated 
because it refused to accept unfinished buildings. This stance, as V.V. Gromyko, Vice 
President of the Academy in charge of administrative and financial questions chided the 
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Center’s administrators, damaged the Academy’s relationship with the construction 
agencies: 
And here the builders hit a dead end, and we take away the desire to 
continue to work with us further, because they have their own plan, 
they also must spend the funds.  If we don’t accept finished projects, 
then the next projects they will be constructing for us, knowing that we 
won’t accept them, and naturally there are tons of loose ends there, that 
means they are going to go to other sites where they can finish and get 
their plans fulfilled.281 
 
And while some institutes were scrambling to spend money, others such as the 
Pharmacology Institute continued to scrape by without adequate facilities.  
 The institutional crisis in Soviet biomedicine, therefore, cannot be reduced 
entirely to a shortage of funds. For the entirety of these institutions’ history, people 
within them operated under conditions of inadequate and fickle funding. Yet, as the 
example of the Soviet anti-cancer drug development program examined in chapter two 
illustrates, they were not defeated by these constraints. Instead, biomedical practitioners 
worked around the system to achieve their professional goals.282 Finally, as the 
Academy’s records make readily apparent, the mere presence of money was not enough 
to ensure institutional functioning. Fraud and theft were major problems. In 1986, the 
Academy administrators audited 37 institutes and Gromyko characterized the results as 
too frightening to report.283  While Gromyko did not quantify the losses from fraudulent 
transactions, he reported that since the beginning of the year, 153,000 rubles had been 
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stolen, and some institutes, such as the Cancer Center, which accounted for nearly half of 
that sum, were out of control. 
 While I was not able to find any systematic data on fraud and theft either in the 
Academy system as a whole or within the Cancer Center for this period, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that such infractions had become both more common and more severe 
by the late 1980s. Whereas in the 1970s the Center’s office of the director was 
investigating such transgressions as the theft of personal wallets within a laboratory or 
institute letterhead from office stock rooms, in the 1980s the administration had to deal 
with trying to track down the furnishings of entire rooms which seemed to have dissolved 
into thin air behind locked doors.284 
 What these anecdotes illustrate is not that a shortage of funds wasn’t a problem, 
but that it was not the problem—debilitating as the budget crisis of the early 1990s had 
been, it was the culmination of a protracted process of disintegration, not its beginning.  
Moreover, although funding shortages were an integral part of this process of 
disintegration, equally important was the loss of morale which, I argue, is a sign of the 
erosion of the normative structures of Soviet biomedicine. The emphasis on glasnost 
during the perestroika era made this loss of morale starkly visible, as the next section 
demonstrates.. 
 
Perestroika 
 
 In May 1987, over 1500 biomedical professionals gathered in Moscow for the 56th 
session of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences. The Academy regularly organized 
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such general sessions, which were usually dedicated to an in-depth discussion of a 
particular research problem, with talks by leading specialists and reports from high-level 
administrators. These meetings provided the attendees with opportunities to not only listen 
to the leading authorities in the field, but to be heard as well, with lively discussions 
following official presentations. 
 Although these general sessions were usually well attended, the crowd at the 56th 
session was exceptional not only because of its size but its diversity as well. In addition to 
full and corresponding members of the Academy, the session was attended by large 
contingents from the Ministry of Health Protection and the Ministry of Medical and 
Microbiological Production (headed by the ministers themselves), the ministers of Health 
Protection of all the republics, representatives of the Central Committee, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Moscow Party apparatus as well as members of the medical and the 
general press. 
 The session opened on May 13th with organizational questions. Academy members 
were to hold elections for a new President and a new Vice-President of the Academy—
after ten years at the helm, N.N. Blokhin resigned his post, as did his right hand man for 
those ten years, S.S. Debov.  Blokhin’s resignation was forced by resolution !174, 
passed on February 5, 1987, which stipulated that management positions within the 
various academies were to be occupied by persons no older than 65 and that directors of 
Academy Institutes were to be no older than 70.285 The resolution further stipulated that, 
once an academician turned 75, elections could be held for his post (the individuals thus 
forced out of their positions would retain their salaries and would occupy honorary 
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positions within their organizations, acting as advisors to their replacements). As Blokhin 
explained at a meeting of the Academy Party members following the Presidium session, 
“someone has to be first,”286 and he wanted to set an example of compliance with the 
Central Committee’s resolution.287 
  After a ten minute break, the delegates were treated to a long talk by the newly 
appointed Minister of Health Protection, E.I. Chazov (himself a full member of the 
Academy and the former head of the Cardiology Center) on the “perestroika of medical 
science in light of the decisions of the XXVII Party Congress and the January plenum of 
the Central Committee.” The new minister delivered a scathing critique of the state of 
biomedical science in the USSR, citing, among other shortcomings, the inordinate 
proliferation of scientific councils and coordinating committees, the waste of resources on 
anemic institutes, the failure to implement scientific and technological advances in 
medical practice, and the overarching emphasis on clinical rather than experimental 
concerns which, Chazov argued, led to a neglect of basic research.288 
 With its long-established leadership gone and the new minister attacking the very 
foundations of the Academy's structure and calling into question its ability to perform its 
functions, it is little wonder that the discussion that followed was incoherent. Some 
speakers took refuge behind the familiar smokescreens of party rhetoric. A.I. Potapov, the 
minister of health protection of the Russian Federation, for example, began his remarks 
with a rhetorical question: “Will we, workers of medical science, realize the decisions of 
the TsK Plenum or drown them in pompous rhetoric?” He then proceeded to do the latter, 
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working every single buzzword of the period—perestroika, glasnost, stagnation and even 
democratization—into what amounted to a proposal to create a duplicate academy at the 
level of the Russian Federation. 
 Others were defiant in their refusal to condemn Academy activities. N.P. 
Bekhtereva, the director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine in Leningrad, began her 
remarks with a heartfelt thanks to Blokhin for his years of service and went on to point out 
that all the criticisms laid at the Academy leadership were equally applicable to the 
directors of the individual institutes. She then went on to use the example of her own 
institute to argue that there was room in the Academy system for more than just shuffling 
papers, and that despite considerable organizational difficulties and material constraints, 
interesting and productive work was still being done. 
 Still others, such as A.V. Val’dman, the director of the Institute of Pharmacology, 
tried to put a positive spin on things. Val’dman characterized the current situation not as a 
crisis of the Academy but as growing pains, expressing hope that if some of the irrational 
features of the bureaucratic system were eliminated (such as the prohibition on contract 
research for Academy employees who had to resort to driving a taxi to make extra 
money), the state of affairs would quickly improve. 
 The majority, however, took the opportunity to express a litany of complaints.289  
V.N. Smirnov’s remarks are representative in this regard. Observing that the strongest 
aspect of the Academy was its ossified structure, he complained that researchers working 
within the Academy system were always resisting developing new directions of research 
because, with the glacial pace of the system of funding allocation, starting new programs 
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wasn’t worth the trouble—by the time the research got off the ground, scientists in the 
west would have solved all the interesting problems. Smirnov’s critique was not confined 
to the Academy: he directed equally critical comments at the policies of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Health Protection. Even the perestroika campaign came under 
criticism. G.I. Sidorenko in his remarks went so far as to complain that all it amounted to 
so far was more bureaucracy. 
 As the day’s proceedings were coming to a close, the mood was becoming so grim 
that Chazov tried to salvage the situation by arguing that he had been misunderstood—that 
he did not mean to imply that the Academy was failing in its mission, merely that its 
structures could be improved, and that a program for revamping the system of health 
protection, including the Academy system, was on the verge of implementation and would 
in short order revolutionize the entire system. Such attempts to raise morale among the 
biomedical establishment weren’t very effective, however.   
 The decline in morale had an impact beyond the administrative circles of the 
Academy—it left the biomedical establishment unable to resist challenges to its epistemic 
authority, leading to a crisis of legitimacy. 
  
Crisis of legitimacy 
 
 In 1989, a well-timed visitor to the Soviet Union could bear witness to a very 
peculiar mass phenomenon. Public spaces would suddenly empty out—adults rushed 
home from work without so much as checking out what was on offer in the neighborhood 
store, children abandoned their games in the street, and the elderly women that occupied 
the benches outside virtually every apartment building would cut short their endless 
conversation and shuffle back to their homes as rapidly as their ailments would allow.  
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This behavior was not a response to a bomb drill—virtually everyone was rushing home 
to assume comfortable positions on the futon and tune into one of two state channels that 
broadcast nation-wide.290   
 The television would show a stern-looking man with intense brown eyes who wore 
his dark hair in a slightly uneven caesar cut. Dressed in a simple, dark shirt, the man sat at 
the front of a large stage, positioned behind a plain desk heaped with letters. Behind him 
was a thick blue curtain, and in front of him was a microphone. Soft music, dominated by 
a soothing piano melody, played in the background. Every seat in the cavernous, dimly lit 
theater was filled, and although there were many young children in attendance, the 
audience was rapt with attention. With his hands interlocked in front of him, the man 
would lock his gaze on the camera and begin speaking in a calm but firm baritone. He 
would start counting, interspersing the numbers with detailed descriptions of the 
invigorated state his viewers were to experience. Reassuring the audience that it was 
perfectly fine to feel as though they felt nothing, and equally fine if they found that they 
suddenly lost control over their neck and limbs, he slowly made his way up to twenty, 
firmly promising that at the end of the session those who suffered from chronic pain 
would find that it disappeared, those with high blood pressure would have it return to 
normal, new mothers having trouble with milk supply would start lactating, and everyone 
would feel a profound sense of health and wellbeing.   
 Millions of Soviet citizens watched the six televised Kashpirovskiy sessions, and 
uncounted numbers reported being healed of various ailments. Anataolii Mihailovich 
Kashpirovskiy was not the only unorthodox healer to enjoy mass popularity in the waning 
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years of the Soviet Union—Allan Chumak, who, in addition to treating patients over the 
airwaves, claimed to 'charge' water and topical creams with healing properties, also 
enjoyed a large following and regular access to state television—but he was, nonetheless, 
unique. What set Kashpirovskiy apart from Chumak and other healers was his 
education.291 Unlike Chumak, who had a background in journalism, or the numerous if 
generally less renowned babki—traditional women healers who often lacked formal 
medical education and employed herbal medicines as well as whispering in their craft—
Kashpirovskiy was a psychiatrist with formal medical training and over 25 years of 
practical experience. 
 Kashpirovskiy's performances were remarkable for several reasons.  First, for their 
reach. They were broadcast on national television—no mean feat considering that there 
were only two national TV channels—and they were watched by practically every man, 
woman and child. And second, for the way they transgressed the boundaries and 
conventions of the Soviet biomedical establishment—despite his decidedly unorthodox 
methods, Kashpirovskiy's gained access to the national stage with the apparent 
cooperation of this establishment. His first appearance on Soviet national television on 
March 31, 1988, consisted of remotely hypnotizing from a Moscow studio a patient 
undergoing a lumpectomy in Kiev (a similar appearance, this time with the patient in 
Tbilisi and Kashpirovskiy in Kiev, followed in 1989). The hypnosis took the place of 
anesthesia, to which the patient was severely allergic. This operation was organized by 
Nikolai Bondar’, a former classmate of Kashpirovskiy and a leading Ukranian 
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oncologist.292 Finally, the very occurrence of such performances in a nation with a highly 
educated population that espoused scientific rationality as a central value is remarkable in 
itself.  
 Not that the biomedical establishment was in any position to effectively oppose 
him even if they had tried.  By the time Kashpirovskiy took his activities, which had made 
him a local celebrity in Kiev in the 1970s, onto the national stage, the biomedical 
establishment’s ability to police its boundaries and repel attempts to undermine its 
authority was already severely compromised. One arena where this loss of authority can 
be seen is in the Academy’s long-standing struggle with homeopathic medicine.   
 In October of 1986, the Presidium of the AMS met to hear the report of A.V. 
Val’dman, director of the Academy’s Pharmacology Institute, on the place of homeopathy 
in contemporary medicine.293 The report had been commissioned by the Presidium at the 
request of the Ministry of Health Protection, which had been provoked by several recent 
articles in the national press.294  In April of that year, the newspaper Izvestiya had 
published an editorial titled “Homeopathy: dragging debates,” which argued that, although 
homeopathic medicine lacked an accepted scientific basis, two hundred years of 
experience proved its methods effective and it deserved more resources such as training 
courses, publications, and a nation-wide network of dedicated hospitals and policlinics.  
The piece had apparently struck a chord with readers, and the paper followed up on the 
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editorial a few weeks later with a large spread of letters calling for state investment in 
homeopathic medicine.  
 The Ministry took such publications very seriously and felt compelled to address 
them, and asked the Presidium to form a commission to evaluate the claims regarding the 
value of homeopathy. This is not the first time these issues had come up. In 1960, the 
Presidium formed a similar commission in response to another article in Izvestiya. On that 
occasion, the Academy literally secured the last word in the debate, with an editorial by 
N.N. Blokhin, who at the time was serving his first term as the President of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences, closing the public discussion by arguing that homeopathy had no 
right to an independent existence, and that homeopathic remedies should undergo clinical 
testing, with standard treatments providing the control. The issue, however, came up again 
and again. As a result of further prompting from the Ministry, the Academy actually 
conducted clinical trials of homeopathic remedies in 1975-76, and concluded that they 
were no more effective than a placebo. Additional trials—this time on pediatric patients—
were conducted by an Academy institute in 1978. In addition, there was an attempt to 
subject homeopathic remedies to pharmacological analysis, which had to be abandoned 
because no active ingredient could be isolated from homeopathic preparations.   
 Citing these studies as well as the expert opinions of the commission’s members, 
the Presidium drafted yet another resolution at the 1986 meeting that condemned 
homeopathic medicine as unscientific on the grounds that its methods had no basis in 
experiment and that its approach, after having remained essentially unaltered for 200 
years, was based on dogma rather than science. This unequivocally negative assessment, 
however, is hard to reconcile with the resolution’s recommendations, which were to 
!153!
include homeopathic physicians in the structure of general polyclinics and to continue 
systematic clinical testing of homeopathic remedies, developing standard scientific and 
technical documentation for those that were found to be effective so they could be mass 
produced and added to the state formulary.  
 The transcript of the Presidium’s session sheds some light on this apparent 
contradiction. First, as the Presidium members privately acknowledged, the Academy and 
the Ministry were powerless to do anything to reduce the public demand for homeopathic 
services because from the standpoint of the patient, homeopathy worked. Although there 
was no reason to suppose that homeopathic remedies were effective in a scientific sense, 
in a pragmatic sense they helped some patients in the same way that psychotherapy would.  
More importantly, where homeopathy worked, biomedicine didn’t. While it could produce 
a scientific rationale for its interventions, it often fell far short in the pragmatic sense.  
Citing the example of asthma, A.G. Chuchalin, a corresponding member of the AMS and 
the chair of the Department of Internal Pediatric Medicine of the Second Moscow 
Government Medical Institute, wrote in his response to the commission that  
In recent years due to the considerable growth of allergic ailments, 
patients are seeking modes of therapy that could improve their physical 
condition.  In the USSR there are no domestically produced drugs.  
Purchase of imported products can satisfy only a fraction of the demand.  
The low level of professional training among physicians in the areas of 
allergic and immunological ailments is a cause for great concern.  This 
explains the appearance in the national press of articles about such modes 
of treatment as ‘Buteiko’s method,’ … homeopathy.295 
 
Chuchalin’s implication was that although homeopathy was only effective in 10-15 
percent of patients, and although patients turning to homeopathic physicians ran a risk of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
295 AMS F 9120 Op 4 D 14, 16. 
!154!
incurring complications from foregoing regular medical treatment, they would continue to 
seek such care because standard medical facilities often offered them no care at all.   
 Thus the recommendation to incorporate homeopathic care into the general 
polyclinic system was not so much an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of homeopathy 
as a therapeutic tool as it was an attempt to render it worthless in the eyes of patients.  
Blokhin, who presided over the meeting, acknowledged as much in his closing remarks: 
Let’s talk straight, that if in our health protection everything had been 
smoothly organized, it would probably reduce the stream of people 
that are trying to go somewhere outside the normal health protection.  
Let’s invite the homeopaths (they are doctors) into our polyclinics, let 
them see ten patients an hour or whatever (our standards are cruel), 
and there he can talk with a patient for an hour, prescribe him an 
infusion of tarantula or an extract of marijuana in micro doses.  Over 
there he has completely different working conditions.  Of course, here 
[in the USSR] their longevity is predicated primarily on the weakness 
of our health protection.296 
 
Bringing homeopathic physicians into the same setting as biomedicine was meant to 
sabotage their effectiveness.  Since their efficacy rested on their ability to spend time with 
their patients, to offer them comfort through close attention to their problems, putting 
them alongside regular doctors who had to receive ten patients an hour would expose 
homeopathic interventions as worthless. 
 The second recommendation—to continue the clinical testing of homeopathic 
remedies—was similarly motivated not by any lingering doubts about the efficacy of 
homeopathic treatment, but by a lack of confidence in the ability of the clinical trials 
hitherto conducted to withstand close scrutiny. Particularly suspect were the pediatric 
clinical trials of 1978, which, as the director of the institute that conducted them confessed 
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in the course of discussion, were so poorly designed and executed that they could not, in 
fact, be relied upon to say anything about the efficacy of homeopathic treatment. 
 The discussion at this meeting demonstrates a remarkable lack of confidence on 
the part of the most senior members of the country’s premier biomedical research 
establishment in their ability to effectively dispute the claims of homeopathic practitioners 
and offer an effective public defense of their own practices. It demonstrates an even more 
remarkable lack of confidence in their own institutional structures and therapeutic 
practices, as well as in their ability to constructively reform these structures. 
 
Conclusion 
 The meetings of the AMS Presidium discussed in this chapter offer a glimpse into 
the way the most privileged members of the Soviet biomedical establishment understood 
their system in the waning years of the Soviet Union, as well as into the kinds of problems 
that the system was facing in the course of perestroika and right after the collapse. These 
problems were, in many ways, nothing new. Limited resources, disciplinary issues, and 
low individual morale were perpetual sources of dissatisfaction for the Soviet biomedical 
profession—though the fact that these complaints were stable rhetorical tropes does not 
mean that the degree to which these phenomena impacted practice did not vary 
considerably over time (the shortage of funding after the Soviet Union collapsed was, in 
fact, so severe as to make it a qualitatively different phenomenon from the shortages of 
the Soviet era). 
 What was new in the era of perestroika was the way that the leadership of the 
biomedical profession responded to these problems. Except for the most vacuous rhetoric 
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and the most vicious attacks on the system as such, there were neither rallying calls nor 
concrete proposals aimed at resolving the difficulties facing the Academy or the system of 
health protection more broadly. The discussions convey a sense of collective confusion 
and quiet desperation, and this confusion and desperation is instantly visible not only in 
the rhetoric, but in the daily operation of the institutional structures and the public 
standing of the biomedical profession, resulting in yet more confusion and desperation. 
The downward spiral culminates in the collapse of the system, which the historical actors 
allow themselves to admit as a possibility only after the collapse has already taken place. 
 I argue that what was happening to Soviet biomedicine in the 1980s can be 
understood as a process of epistemic erosion—a gradual, simultaneous disintegration of 
the institutional and normative structures as well as the rhetorical tropes that together 
constitute biomedical epistemology. In the next chapter, I turn to an analysis of how the 
now Russian biomedical profession has been trying to renegotiate its epistemic 
commitments by taking up the ideas and rhetoric of Evidence-Based Medicine and 
adapting them to fit into the post-Soviet Russian context. 
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CHAPTER 5: SURROGATE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The systems here are systemless, 
The standards are not standard, 
The space isn’t Euclid’s— 
Hell knows whose it is. 
Timur Shaov 
 
 This chapter provides an analysis of how the Russian biomedical profession has 
responded to the slowly unfolding crisis in the system of health protection that began in 
the 1980s and was exacerbated by and continued after the collapse of the USSR.  
Specifically, I follow the way the Russian biomedical community used the rhetoric of 
evidence-based medicine in its quest for greater professional autonomy and a renewed 
sense of identity, as well as certain practitioners’ attempts to assume a leadership role in 
directing healthcare reform in the first fifteen years of Russian independence.  
 While at first glance EBM seems to have played the same role in Russia as it has 
in the west, I argue that the dynamics of the adoption of this term among Russian medical 
circles were quite different. In the context of post-socialist Russia, I argue that EBM was 
a surrogate epistemology—while its proponents had mastered the ideas of evidence-based 
medicine and become fluent in its rhetoric, they were unable to create the conditions of 
practice necessary for its implementation within impoverished healthcare institutes. 
Moreover, the normative structures that underpin EBM sometimes directly conflicted 
with those carried over from the Soviet era. Thus evidence-based medicine, though 
increasingly deployed by Russian biomedical professionals as a rhetorical device, 
remains mostly that—a rhetorical device rather than an epistemology that is constituted 
not only discursively but also through institutional structures and practices and normative 
commitments.  
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The term evidence based medicine (EBM) has come to permeate biomedical 
discourse in the English-speaking world and beyond. The most often cited definition of 
EBM has been supplied by David Sackett and colleagues, who define it as “the 
conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions 
about the care of individual patients” by means of “integrating individual clinical 
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research.”297  
While this definition of EBM is simple and widely agreed upon,298 the simplicity 
is misleading. Characterizing EBM is not a straightforward matter. EBM has been 
described as a standardization movement, a doctrine and creed, a technology, a 
methodology of governance, and a paradigm, to list but a few of its definitions.299 I argue 
that in the west, EBM has emerged as the latest incarnation of an evolving 
epistemology—proponents of this epistemology have achieved a reorganization of 
institutional structures, a reconfiguration of practice and a reformulation of discourse, 
changing the rules and power dynamics of knowledge production.300 
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297 David Sackett et. al., “Evidence-Based Medicine: What it is and what it isn’t.” BMJ 312(1996):71-72. 
298 For some analysts the definition of EBM is such a straightforward matter that they attribute many of the 
critiques leveled at EBM to the confusion of EBM itself with the context in which it is applied [Howard 
Brody et. al., “Evidence-Based Medicine: Watching out for its Friends,” Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 48/4(2005): 570-84]. 
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!159!
I argue that in Russia EBM was first and foremost a discourse.301 In its original 
context of development—the UK, the United States and Canada—the paradigmatic shift 
to which the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group (1992) had aspired seems to have 
been achieved, bringing with it new institutional arrangements and practices. In Russia 
however EBM was still very far from achieving the same kind of status, as its 
institutional arrangements were only beginning to emerge and its proponents still struggle 
to implement EBM principles into practice. Although Russian advocates of EBM have 
made considerable headway in recent years, establishing an Interregional Society of 
Specialists in Evidence-Based Medicine in 2003,302 opening a branch of the Cochrane 
Collaboration in Russia, and issuing a journal dedicated to the popularization of EBM 
among Russian physicians, the position of these institutions remains precarious. As for 
the impact EBM has on the practice of the average physician in Russia, the most frequent 
assessment I heard is that so far, there is almost none.   
In part, this slow progress is due to the fact that the Russian context is still largely 
incapable of providing adequate material support for the implementation of EBM. The 
endemic problems of the Soviet system of health protection, exacerbated by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, evolved into a profound crisis that had lasted through the 
1990s. The medical infrastructure fell into disrepair and the medical profession endured a 
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period of intense economic hardship.303 Considering that the healthcare system has lacked 
such basics as cotton and rubbing alcohol, it almost goes without saying that it has lacked 
the ability to supply its physicians and researchers with the information technology 
necessary to ensure timely and expedient access to the latest medical evidence. As one 
analyst observed, “all the evidence in the world can be of no use if the context of practice 
fails to provide support.”304 And in part it is because the epistemic commitments of EBM 
medicine, which necessitate the disciplining of both patient and physician subjectivity, 
are incompatible with the epistemic culture developed by Soviet biomedicine. 
Despite these challenges, segments of the Russian medical profession have 
actively picked up the discourse of evidence-based medicine and have taken on the task 
of championing EBM approaches to medical practice. In arguing that the function of 
EBM has thus far been largely discursive I do not intend in any way to imply that this 
diminishes its significance. On the contrary, it is precisely its discursive nature that gives 
EBM its importance.  As Nancy Ries has argued, “discourses are a primary mechanism 
by which ideologies and cultural stances are shaped and maintained.”305 This is certainly 
true of EBM, the discourses around which, I argue, encapsulate the emergence of a 
Russian biomedical epistemology out of the wreckage of Soviet epistemic culture.   
I argue that in the setting of post-Soviet Russia, evidence-based medicine is a 
discourse of power, both in the sense of being the dominant discourse of a group that is 
vested with tremendous symbolic power (the western medical profession) and in the 
sense that it is a discourse that confers power on those who use it effectively (the Russian 
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advocates of EBM). In their attempts to redefine the biomedical profession, carve out a 
space for this profession among the shifting institutional arrangements of Russian 
biomedicine, and redefine their relationship to the rest of the world, advocates of EBM 
are actively reconfiguring the epistemic culture of which they are a part. 
I begin with a discussion of the role of EBM discourse in its original context, 
explain the challenges to its adoption in the context of post-socialist Russia, and then 
analyze the way various groups in the medical profession employ this discourse.   
 
EBM and the western medical profession 
 
 Within social studies of medicine, there has been a great deal of work 
documenting the decline in the autonomy and authority accorded to the American 
medical profession. From the benevolent and authoritative figure theorized by Talcott 
Parsons, the American doctor has become increasingly dependent on a vast healthcare 
industry.306 No longer master of his own practice, the doctor has become ensnared in the 
bureaucratic web of insurance companies.307 The medical profession has also ceded a 
great deal of its control over modern medical knowledge to third parties such as the 
pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies have not only taken over many of the 
functions of producing medical research but increasingly control the dissemination of 
findings as well.308 Moreover, patients demand and assume an increasingly active role in 
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their care, and legal controls (in part in the form of ethics boards) are being erected to 
protect the patients’ interests.309   
In the United States, EBM is both a response to and a consequence of these 
changes. For its advocates within the medical profession, it is a way to re-establish 
professional authority over medical knowledge and practice by designating an area of 
scientific expertise that belongs to the profession.310 For its critics, on the other hand, 
EBM is just the latest move to rob the physician of that authority.  One of the most bitter 
points of contention around EBM is the accusation that introducing its principles into 
practice makes medicine into a cook-book practice, with the physician’s role reduced to 
that of a mere technician whose job it is to match the list of symptoms the patient is 
presenting with to those in the guideline and then implement a standard treatment.311  
Recently, some social scientists have been developing alternatives to this critique of 
standardization. For example Timmermans and Berg argue for understanding 
standardization as “a dynamic process of change” that helps “to bring into existence new 
ideas, entities, values, and even subjects for medicine.”312 
 From this body of work one can deduce that EBM is a double-edged sword for the 
medical profession. On the one hand, it is being used in the defense of professional 
expertise. On the other hand, the highly political nature of standards means they can also 
become tools for external institutions such as the state or insurance companies to regulate 
the professions and demand legal accountability, further eroding professional autonomy.   
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The Russian context 
 While its significance to the western medical profession can be—and is—actively 
debated, there can be no doubt that in countries such as the US, evidence-based medicine 
has achieved not only the paradigmatic status to which its advocates aspired, but also the 
material and institutional support required for implementing it. This is not the case in 
Russia—EBM advocates there are still struggling to establish a solid institutional base for 
themselves, and the context of practice of the majority of Russian physicians makes 
implementing EBM principles into practice a very daunting task. 
As I argued in the previous chapter, the system of health protection in Russia had 
been in a state of profound crisis well before the Soviet Union crumbled.  Still, the 
collapse of the state proved devastating. Although following the dissolution of the USSR 
the Russian government retained its obligation to provide all of its citizens with medical 
care—the Russian constitution continues to promise free medical assistance provided 
wholly by government and municipal institutions—this was on paper only. As written, 
the state’s obligations are very vague, and in practice it was beyond the government’s 
means to fulfill this obligation.313  
Beset by a litany of disasters on the domestic front, in the 1990s the state 
effectively dropped support of the healthcare system, leaving the medical profession to 
deal with the crisis.314 The central government agencies, unable to cope, implemented a 
series of reforms that shifted responsibility to the regions, which were ill prepared for the 
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task of keeping the system going.315 Privatization was embraced as a solution (although 
of course not everything could be privatized—as the director of one of the regional 
hospitals pointed out, the best equipped, potentially lucrative facilities quickly 
transitioned to the private sector, leaving the public system to deal with the rest). The 
heaviest burden fell on practicing physicians, their patients and the local hospital 
administrators. As a hospital administrator put it during a discussion of privatization, 
… before everything was government-owned, everything, and now in a 
different direction.  That is the government cunningly, quietly apparently 
wants to, from a series of guarantees, will say that “this isn’t ours, this is 
private, and so we do not provide for it.”  That’s a light push to the side.316 
 
Access to medical assistance was disrupted. Hospitals and polyclinics lacked not 
only medication but also basic supplies such as rubbing alcohol and cotton.317 Free 
healthcare became virtually a myth. The situation in the provinces was particularly 
catastrophic. A Russian acquaintance told me of losing a friend in 2001.  The young man 
was brought to the hospital after losing consciousness, and the physician on duty told the 
family that nothing could be done until they brought the necessary medications and 
supplies to the hospital. By the time the patient’s relatives got back from their frantic 
search of the city’s pharmacies, it was too late.318 Another informant recalled being 
brought to the hospital with a broken arm suffered in a car accident, only to have the 
physician demand payment prior to taking x-rays. As he could not use his arm, the 
physician reached into his pocket for the wallet and removed the cash for him.319  
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In Moscow, where funding and supplies were always more plentiful and where 
there still seems to be some faith in free access to the healthcare system, instances in 
which care was, in fact, provided free of charge are scarce. I had observed some instances 
of routine care provided free of charge when I accompanied an elderly informant on visits 
to her local polyclinic320 (the physician on duty listened to her complaints, conducted a 
routine exam and prescribed medication), but the same informant reported that she was at 
times unable to get in to see her physician, and had to resort to making an appointment 
for a fee.321 As it turned out, the appointment was with her regular doctor, and the 
informant drew particular attention to the evident embarrassment of the physician at 
charging a patient who was entitled to free care (according to the informant, this 
embarrassment manifested itself in a much greater level of attentiveness and patience on 
the part of the physician than was normally the case). Even in life-threatening 
emergencies, payment must frequently come before care. A medical researcher bitterly 
recounted the story of a neighbor who was taken to a hospital with a heart attack, and was 
left without treatment for over a day until she finally guessed to offer the attending 
physicians payment. “There is no medicine here, you should study something else” was 
how he prefaced his account.322  
 Being pushed aside and abandoned by the government on which it depended both 
for financial and policy support, the medical profession experienced severe pressures of 
uncertainty and perpetual economic problems. The financial situation of many physicians 
was grim. A top notch cardiac surgeon working in one of the most prestigious Moscow 
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hospitals, for example, commanded a salary of 15,000 rubles a month. In 2005, when 
these data were gathered, that translated to approximately 526 US dollars.323 In the 
provinces salaries are lower, and while the cost of living in Russia’s provincial cities is 
also lower than that in Moscow, it is still quite high relative to salaries. Although the 
income of physicians “is not limited to salary,” as one of my informants delicately 
referred to the practice of supplementing income by accepting unofficial payments for 
care or taking on second jobs, the fact remains that making ends meet is a constant 
challenge for most.324 
 Those just starting out in the profession face a different set of difficulties.  
Learning the art of giving bribes is as much a part of medical education as biology and 
chemistry courses. The student forum of the unofficial site of the Stavropol Government 
Medical Academy is more akin to a rate table, listing how much a given faculty member 
charges for a passing grade, with the majority of posts devoted to topics such as: 
Q:  How to pay Mrs. X? 
A: Very simple.  Just come into her office and say: you know, I am 
completely behind on the grades, help me please—let’s solve this 
problem on a commercial basis.  That’s what I did.  She took it without 
a problem.  The main thing is not to go overboard on the price.325 
 
Given that it is possible to buy your way through much of medical school, it is not 
surprising that some physicians enter into practice poorly equipped for the job. One 
informant reported coming to her polyclinic physician with a complaint of frequent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
323 At the time, $1=29 rubles. 
324 VF, personal interview, Moscow, August 2005It should be noted that in Russia, both during and after 
the Soviet period, most people’s income is not limited to salary. So widely known and accepted is this fact 
that it was quite openly referred to even in Soviet cinema.  In the iconic 1968 comedy The Diamond Arm, 
which details the exploits of a gang of criminals attempting to smuggle jewels into the Soviet Union and a 
hapless honest citizen who inadvertently foils their plans, one of the thieves curses at another: “May you 
live on your salary alone!” (Chtob ty zhil na odnu zarplatu).  
325 Taken from http://sgma.narod.ru/menu/index.htm on October 16, 2005. 
!167!
migraines and being asked by the doctor if she could also record a complaint of sleep 
disruption. When asked why, the doctor replied: “otherwise, my diagnosis is not coming 
out.”326 
 These problems made for a context of practice very inhospitable to the 
implementation of EBM principles. For one thing, Russian physicians simply did not 
have easy access to “current best evidence” in their daily practice.327 Very few physicians 
had access to computers in their work space (most doctor’s offices I observed are 
equipped only with rotary phones), and fewer still were able to gather information on the 
internet because of both limited access to information technology and widespread 
computer illiteracy.328  Subscribing to medical journals is often prohibitively expensive 
for individual physicians—a marketing study commissioned by a Moscow medical 
publisher revealed that several physicians working in the same institution are often forced 
to pool their resources to subscribe to a couple of journals that they then exchanged.329  
While many hospitals subscribed to medical journals, and some cities have specialized 
medical libraries, these were not user friendly, and their limited hours and cumbersome 
procedures made consulting them for routine cases impractical. Even when journals were 
available, their contents were often suspect, consisting in large part of ‘sponsored’ 
articles—that is, articles commissioned by a pharmaceutical or medical device company 
with the primary aim of promoting a product. 
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 Access to quality current medical information, though difficult, is also not 
enough—doctors must also be able to apply it in order to practice EBM. This condition 
too was frequently not met. To illustrate this point, I will examine prescription practices.  
Each medical institution works with a formulary of drugs that its physicians may 
prescribe to patients (the MinZdrav formulary serves as the basis for these) and which the 
patients are entitled to for free.330 A hospital or polyclinic physician has no right to 
recommend drugs that do not appear on the formulary to patients. As one physician put it, 
“you must always say that you don’t need anything else.331 A physician who makes such 
recommendations risks being punished, as a Moscow informant found out first hand—
having recommended a drug not on the formulary to one of her patients, she ended up 
having to pay for the prescription out of her own salary when the patient went to the 
administration complaining that the pharmacy refused to fill it free of charge.332 In this 
case, the physician got off easy—punishment for such transgressions can be as severe as 
a reduction in category (roughly equivalent to demotion in seniority), which carries with 
it a reduction in salary. 
 EBM advocates are the first to admit that the principles they are propounding 
have yet to make a large impact on medical practice. In answer to the question of what 
effect, if any, EBM has had on medical practice in Russia, most advocates answered that 
so far, there has been virtually none: as one informant put it, “I can say with some 
certainty—the majority of physicians don’t hold to this approach.”333 In part, advocates 
blame this state of affairs on an absence of material support, and the resulting lack of 
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motivation on the part of the majority of physicians to question the status quo and seek 
out new developments: 
One big problem is the extreme disinterestedness in change 
among…medical personnel, mid-level personnel.  What’s the reason? 
There’s no motivation of activity of any kind, one of the most important 
stimuli is material…material incentive as such is practically absent.  That 
is, the system works in principle so that officially, it is not necessary [to go 
beyond narrowly defined professional duties].334  
 
There are, of course, some exceptions—several hospital administrators in Stavropol 
assured me that they were actively engaged in subjecting hospital practices to the tests of 
EBM—gathering data, revising and implementing existing guidelines. They also 
admitted, however, to running into some resistance from their staff. Thus even in these 
cases it remains unclear to what extent local medical practices have changed. 
 While Russian EBM advocates frequently complain of the resistance their 
colleagues to their ideas, despite my best efforts I failed to locate a single member of this 
opposition or find any trace of this opposition in print. The closest I came was an 
experienced Moscow physician who, in a spontaneous meeting arranged by one of my 
contacts, responded to my questions about his take on EBM with the evasive phrase: 
“sometimes, the new is the thoroughly forgotten old.”335 The only harsh critiques I heard 
from physicians were not directed at EBM, but at the industrial medical model of which it 
is a representative. Such critiques were not common, and the people offering them 
usually did not use many words. The words that were used, however, were quite colorful 
and expressive, and though a direct translation would both be impossible and 
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inappropriate, the point being made was very clear—that this model is a distortion of 
what medicine is and should be about. 
 
Dokazatel’naia meditsina 
If the problems that have beset the healthcare system are posing significant 
challenges to implementing EBM into practice, what is EBM’s significance in the 
Russian context? A prominent advocate of EBM pointed to the answer when he assessed 
the success of his efforts:  “...first of all, it’s now on everybody’s lips.”336 I argue that so 
far EBM in Russia has served primarily a discursive function, being used by the 
beleaguered medical profession as a discourse of power through which to shore up its 
professional identity and redefine its relationship to newly emergent institutions within 
the healthcare system. 
 The term evidence based medicine first sounded in Russian medical circles in the 
mid-nineties, during what was arguably the most difficult period following the 
dissolution of the USSR. It was actively introduced and promoted by western medical 
experts who came to Russia as part of international aid efforts to help alleviate the 
healthcare crisis and contain the threat of infectious diseases, and it found some 
enthusiastic advocates among a number of senior Russian physicians. Courses were 
organized, websites launched, talks given, and publications disseminated.   
 Slowly, these educational efforts began to yield results, and physicians not only in 
Moscow but on the periphery as well took up the discourse of EBM. In Stavropol, for 
example, active efforts to promote EBM began in 2003, after a senior physician from the 
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local regional hospital returned from a workshop and heeded the call of EBM promoters 
to organize a local society. A parallel student group at the medical academy quickly 
followed the founding of this local professional society. Eventually, enough momentum 
was gathered across the country to found an Inter-regional Association of Specialists in 
EBM (the Russian acronym is OSDM).  
 At first glance EBM advocates in Russia are using the discourse of dokazatel’naia 
meditsina in much the same way as their western counterparts—to assert professional 
authority in the face of challenges from third parties, and to bolster professional identity. 
Although, unlike their American counterparts Russian patients do not at present represent 
a challenge to medical authority, now that the system of health protection is no longer a 
constitutive part of the Russian state doctors do have to contend with a number of outside 
parties that attempt to impose controls on their decision-making. Among these parties are 
the state (which, after being forced by the political and economic crisis of the 1990s to 
loosen its grip, is once again trying to reassert centralized control over healthcare, 
although its current relationship to the system is qualitatively different from what it was 
in the Soviet period), the emerging insurance companies, and the pharmaceutical 
industry.   
 Much as in the west, the state and the insurance companies are a threat because 
they have a direct interest in controlling healthcare costs, and to that end are prone to 
interfering in medical practice. A hospital administrator described this threat as regards 
the selection of medication: 
We used to be a budget institution, which means that we also got little, 
insufficient money, but we got it.  We’ve been transferred to the OMS 
system (Mandatory Medical Insurance).  From this moment on we are 
paid by set standards by corresponding insurance companies and the 
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OMS fund. … The system centers on how much money there is.  And 
the set of medical services a patient receives is tailored to that money.  
So the work allocations, this is what happens:  here we’ve diagnosed, 
here’s a patient with hepatitis.  Well maybe approximately 30, 50 
thousand (rubles) is needed for his treatment, and we get 75 rubles per 
patient.  That’s where the story starts:  let’s give him an IV with some 
fluids, and as for the rest…(makes a gesture of empty hands)337  
 
Adopting EBM rhetoric helped counter this threat because the rhetoric provided a way 
for doctors to reclaim some of the decision-making authority when it came to financing 
by giving them a vocabulary with which to try to assert their right to decide how limited 
funds should be allocated. 
 The threats the pharmaceutical industry posed were also similar to those in the 
west, although the Russian physician’s relationship to the industry was made somewhat 
more complex and problematic by the fact that physicians were dependent on it to a 
greater extent. In a setting where shortages of funding are severe and chronic, the perks 
the industry offered physicians could be critical to practice.  In addition to being 
sometimes the only easily accessible source of up-to-date medical information (by 
handing out free journals and articles and promotional information), the industry’s 
sponsorship of talks, financing for conference travel, and hosting of lunches may have 
been the only thing that enables many doctors to stay in touch with the larger biomedical 
community. Practitioners invoked EBM as a tool to mitigate the industry’s influence on 
physician choices of medication, which was seen as undermining the medical 
profession’s credibility by compromising physician decision-making. Explaining how 
decisions about medication are made at his hospital, an administrator put it this way: 
So [for a physician at the hospital] it’s not just:  “I want to treat with 
this.”  What about safety, and what are the ramifications?  And again:  
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prove that you need this specific medication.  Why are you taking not 
the cheap penicillin but the more expensive ampicillin or gentomicin, 
or…list of antibiotics attached.  And this is where the doctor says:  
“you know, we looked, here it’s not sensitive, this patient has already 
been treated with this and it wasn’t effective,” so in this system it’s 
statistically proven, proven that these types of diseases, when treated 
with these medications, yield a rate of recovery that’s two times faster.  
All of this is in place and is in practice constantly.338  
 
In this scenario, EBM was supposed to prevent physicians from basing their drug 
selection practices on pharmaceutical industry propaganda by forcing them to justify their 
medication choices to the hospital administration (and on up the hierarchy) in terms of 
evidence of efficacy.  
 
Surrogate epistemology  
While on one level the power dynamics of EBM initiatives in Russia were similar 
to those in the western setting, on another they differed markedly. For the Russian 
medical profession, EBM was more than a tool with which to defend professional 
authority—it was a larger strategic discourse through which segments of the medical 
profession were trying to redefine their professional identity, as well as the relationship of 
the Russian medical profession to the world. It was also a borrowed discourse whose 
origins in the western context endowed it with considerable power and yet also weighed 
it down with political baggage. The significance of such rhetoric will become clearer 
upon a further examination of how the Russian advocates of EBM were using this 
discourse, as well as how they themselves perceived their application of EBM.  
As has already been mentioned, two groups of actors were involved in 
introducing EBM discourse into Russia.  One group was made up of the western medical 
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experts who came to Russia to help reform the healthcare system and strongly advocated 
EBM. The other was a handful of Russian physicians who sought it out themselves.  
Early advocates of EBM began their work during the time of social and economic crisis 
that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Western and international agencies 
quickly stepped in to mitigate and manage the crisis. In the healthcare arena, several large 
aid programs such as the ZdravReform program funded by USAID, were launched, 
which aimed at restructuring and bolstering the healthcare system. This brought a new set 
of Russian healthcare practitioners into close contact with their western colleagues, and 
gave Western medical experts an opportunity to observe the Russian system up close.339   
 In the post-Soviet context, EBM served two purposes for western medical experts.  
One was to set a benchmark against which to compare the Russian medical system and 
recommend changes. The other was to provide a relatively non-threatening and 
apparently value-neutral language to communicate with their Russian counterparts.  
Instead of directly challenging Russian practices, formulating critiques in the language of 
EBM allowed western experts to express them in more rationalistic and impersonal 
terms. Doing so reduced the potential for conflict and masked the power differential 
between the western experts and the Russians, making the central issue the presence or 
absence of sanctioned evidence and not their respective national identities. An American 
physician who worked in Russia as part of the ZdravReform program noted: 
There were some parallels, some things that were being done ... as far as 
treatment in the former Soviet Union that were similar to what was being 
done in the west, but a lot of things that were not.  And when you have 
these differences, it's not particularly helpful to say "well, we're from the 
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west so we know better," I mean, that's ridiculous.  … And this is why 
EBM was so important because we could at least say that we now consider 
that many of the things we used to do in the West when evaluated by 
randomized controlled trials, particularly with total mortality as the end 
point, turned out to be not helpful or potentially even harmful.340 
 
 However, although EBM masked the power differential between Russian and 
Western medical experts, it did not eliminate it. In fact, to some extent the authority that 
EBM enjoys in Russia was predicated on its western origins. Russian advocates of EBM 
very carefully cultivated this association, both for EBM and for themselves. Not one of 
the EBM advocates I interviewed failed to emphasize that, as one hospital administrator 
put it, “this [EBM] was all developed by the international medical community abroad.341 
To Russia it came just a few years ago” (NE, personal interview, Stavropol, July 2005). 
 This emphasis on EBM’s western origins was more than just a matter of 
acknowledging an intellectual debt—it was an appeal to a higher authority, as well as a 
way to discredit local knowledge and practices while re-credentializing the Russian EBM 
physician at the same time. Sometimes, the local knowledge and practices were dismissed 
out of hand. This reaction was especially strong among the younger generation of EBM 
enthusiasts, who have picked up its principles from reading the writings and taking the 
courses offered by prominent advocates based in Moscow and St. Petersburg. For one 
EBM advocate, all medical interventions inherited from the Soviet era reside in a kind of 
purgatory of unproven effectiveness, awaiting to be redeemed or decisively damned by 
the highest level of testing: 
… they don’t have evidence of efficacy.  Maybe they were tested, of 
course, in those scientific trials of, let’s say, not high evidence level that 
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allows us to make conjectures that maybe there’s something there, or 
maybe not, or maybe there is.   But in the highest level of trials they were 
not properly tested.  This means they don’t have proven efficacy.  It 
doesn’t mean that they are not effective—we don’t know that because we 
haven’t tested them.342 
 
 Sometimes, the value of local knowledge and practices was acknowledged, but 
they were still seen as not sufficiently trustworthy, and therefore in need of confirmation.  
A physician occupying a high-level administrative position explained his views on the 
‘traditions of the fatherland’s medicine’ as follows: 
Let's say certain schools that have, naturally, a certain amount of 
experience treating patients with a particular pathology. ... It worked out 
that they treated tens of thousands of patients with this pathology, and in 
the periphery these patients were seen as single cases.  That's why they, on 
the basis of their experience treating these patients, created their 
principles, recommendations that formed the basis of our textbooks and 
that direct our practices to this day.  But nonetheless this experience is still 
not international experience.  The quality of clinical trials that were 
conducted in these centers today don't deserve the kind of trust that we 
have in trials of an international level.343 
 
For this physician, practices and guidelines formulated in the Soviet era could not be 
dismissed, nor could they be considered untested, since they were based on very 
extensive clinical experience. But they nevertheless required external (that is, not simply 
Russian) validation. They had to be compared to the evidence provided by the 
‘international’ medical community. 
In addition to defining the Russian medical community’s relationship to 
colleagues abroad, EBM provided a useful tool for mobilizing the medical community 
and laying firmer foundations for professional unity—an important service in the context 
of post-Soviet transition, where the ground underneath the physician’s feet was 
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continuously shifting. Advocates used EBM as a foundation for a renewed professional 
identity.  This hope for EBM came through very clearly in one of my interviews with a 
medical student who was involved with a voluntary EBM student group: 
It is clear why we got together, why for us-we-to put it bluntly, won’t 
disperse [our group] even if we won’t get funding for this.  Because this is 
an essential need, primary need first of all of colleagues that understand 
you-we-I myself understand that if, for example, I will work in Stavropol 
region, without brothers-in-arms. Friends and colleagues that are working, 
trying to put these principles into practice, are coming up against a wall of 
misunderstanding.  That is frightening.  That is one of the components of a 
person, like family, successful work, is exactly this understanding, 
colleagues, brothers in arms.  That means, that’s why I personally am 
willing to do this in part on this [voluntary] basis, because-because, well, 
there’s absolutely no other way.344  
 
 By invoking the western origins of EBM, Russian practitioners were not only 
trying to align themselves with global biomedical practices—they were also distancing 
themselves from the legacy of Soviet biomedicine, actively redefining the epistemic 
culture that underpins their practice. This surrender of one’s culture and imagination for a 
culture perceived to be more powerful is the essence of colonization.345 It would be 
wrong to conclude, however, that the adoption of EBM in Russia was a straightforward 
example of the successful colonization of the Russian medical mind by western 
proponents of EBM.346 Although Russian physicians have eagerly seized on EBM 
discourse to bolster their position and further their attempts at directing reforms (and 
although for some younger physicians EBM did seem to be a fervently held creed), many 
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saw EBM as only a means to an end and not necessarily an end in itself. This was 
especially true for the older generation of physicians, who took a pragmatic approach to 
EBM and clearly saw its limitations. This became clear in an interview with a very 
prominent advocate of EBM: 
The thing is, EBM is conceptually very simple and at the same time 
conceptually attractive.  … people that are educated in philosophy, in 
history, they understand that it is primitive, in the intellectual sense 
primitive.  But the majority of people don’t read Hegel, yes?  And that’s 
why for them with its simple references of efficacy and verification it 
seems attractive.  I don’t think there is anything bad about that, it’s 
natural. At three it is natural to play in the sand box, at fourteen to think 
your parents are out of date, at thirty to understand that at fourteen you 
were a jackass-same here.347 
 
 Although some advocates saw EBM as a limited concept, they were nonetheless 
actively applying it to a number of uses on behalf of the Russian medical profession. As 
outlined above, one of the uses of EBM was to assert the unique authority and expertise 
of the medical profession. Another important function of EBM was as a crucial tool for 
communicating with administrators and government bureaucrats. As the same EBM 
advocate observed, “for them evidence-based medicine is also accessible.  And as a result 
the opinion of EBM doctor, from the EBM position, easily finds its way into the heart of 
the administrator.”348 
 Employing EBM to communicate with the powers that be was an application of 
EBM discourse that Russian advocates have developed in part by watching Western 
medical experts wield this tool: 
I think EBM as a concept, as practice, is important for Russia.  But this 
isn’t my discovery, it is widely used, used by international organizations, 
organizations that provide technical assistance … British organizations, 
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Norwegian, American, as a means of bringing to life in Angola, Russia, 
Kyrgyzia those programs that in a different wrapping would pass with 
difficulty.349 
 
And, as this interview excerpt subtly illustrates, it was not an easy lesson to learn.  This 
was because for the Russian medical profession EBM was not just the ‘international’ 
benchmark for which physicians can strive in their practice—it was also a reminder of 
how much ground Russian biomedicine had lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Going from one of the most powerful medical establishments in the world whose 
accomplishments were widely acknowledged and whose methods served as a model for 
other countries (particularly in the developing world), the Russian medical profession 
now found itself on equal footing with ‘third world’ countries. 
 Thus for its most influential and sophisticated advocates, EBM was not so much a 
credo as an instrument for achieving professional goals.  And while the advocates 
attribute great importance to the introduction of EBM into Russia, even as they are 
dedicating the majority of their time and energy to advocating this approach and 
educating their colleagues about EBM, they are already beginning to look past this 
movement, to the next phase of the reconstruction of Russian medicine. This came 
through in an interview with another prominent EBM advocate: 
…lately I’ve been thinking about how to… Well if you take any of ours or 
a Western journal, 90 or 95% of the information is their research, 
evidence, what’s better or worse… But in the work of a physician 
evidence is about 15-20 percent.  Everything else is things connected to 
human interaction, with the development of the individual, etc.  It seems 
to me that now we need to think about how to re-work this literature… in 
order to develop physicians as individuals.350  
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This concern with the development of the physician as an individual, coming from an 
advocate of EBM, may at first seem surprising. Not that EBM is not concerned with 
individual physicians—EBM advocates in the west make educating individual physicians 
in the principles of EBM one of the top priorities of the movement. But the intent of this 
education is precisely to limit the individuality of the physician, to reduce its impact as a 
variable in clinical practice. One of the promises of EBM is to reduce the variation in 
medical practice that results from different levels of physician experience and the 
inconsistencies of medical training. But this desire to invest in and empower the 
individual makes sense, when considered in light of the epistemic commitments of Soviet 
biomedicine, in which the individual practitioners occupied a central role both in the 
production and application of biomedical knowledge. It also attests to the importance of 
the legacy of the Soviet biomedical epistemology.  
 
Is the new the thoroughly forgotten old? 
 In conclusion, the primary role of evidence-based medicine in the Russian context 
seems to have been as a discursive tool, which its advocates were using both to reinvent 
the Russian medical profession and to redefine its relationship to the world. While the 
material and institutional conditions of the Russian healthcare system made the 
implementation of EBM into day-to-day practice difficult (to say the least), its discursive 
power should not be underestimated.  The discourse of dokazatel’naia meditsina was 
being asked to perform several roles. 
 On one level, EBM discourse in Russia was used in much the same way as in the 
west—as a tool that could be deployed in the struggle for professional authority, which 
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was being threatened by institutional actors such as the state, the newly minted insurance 
companies and the increasingly influential pharmaceutical industry. It was also an 
important factor in the way the Russian medical profession was redefining its relationship 
to the world on a global level. Its importance in the Russian context also signifies how 
low the status of Russian medicine has fallen; yet at the same time it provided a 
benchmark towards which the medical profession had to strive in order to once again 
become a respected member of the international medical community.  
 In addition EBM in Russia was a strategic discourse through which the Russian 
physicians were redefining their professional identity—re-evaluating their professional 
past and charting a new course for the future. This re-definition project is ongoing and 
extensive, encompassing the epistemic foundations of Russian medicine. And it is 
necessary. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been accompanied by changes in the 
institutional organization of Russian biomedicine, a reconfiguration of its practices and a 
profound transformation in its normative structures. And although the emerging Russian 
biomedical epistemology in many ways bears the stamp of its Soviet predecessor, it 
cannot but be qualitatively different. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang but a whimper 
T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men 
 
 In December of 1991 the Soviet Union was dissolved. The imposing Soviet 
empire collapsed like a house of cards with barely a whimper. In some sense, the event 
really was the end of the world, or at least it was the end of a world.  As Susan Buck-
Morss argues in her provocative meditation on the collapse of faith in the modernizing 
process, “this fundamental shift in the historical map shattered an entire conception of the 
world, on both sides [of the East-West divide].”351  Her account draws out the similarities 
between the capitalist and socialist conceptions of the world, arguing that, far from being 
capitalism’s polar opposite, Soviet socialism was in fact deeply rooted in the Western 
modernizing tradition and that its collapse calls into question the Western narrative as 
well.   
 Buck-Morss’ work brings up an important question: what exactly was lost in this 
collapse?  In this dissertation, I have offered a partial answer, arguing that the collapse of 
the Soviet Union has resulted in an epistemic shift in Russian biomedicine. The epistemic 
culture of Soviet biomedicine, once instantiated in the institutions of the system of health 
protection, the practices of clinicians, and the discursive practices of the field, has been 
giving way—though what precisely is going to take its place remains unclear. As I have 
shown in chapter four, the crisis of the Soviet system of health protection has eroded both 
the institutional and normative structures on which this system was dependent, creating a 
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need and space for new approaches. A vocal and growing group of Russian physicians 
have seized on the rhetoric of evidence-based medicine to formulate such an approach. 
 What will come of these efforts remains to be seen. Although EBM has come to 
dominate Russian biomedical rhetoric, there is a great deal of continuity between the 
Soviet and Russian period at the level of institutions, practices and norms. Change is 
proceeding slowly and erratically. As one EBM advocate complained,   
… the healthcare system, the one we have now, it’s so to say perpetually 
under reform, and at the same time there is an absence of reform, yes?  
Because there is no understanding in society of what needs to be done, no 
consensus and that’s why it’s always getting postponed.352 
But, although there is no way of knowing what the outcome will be, the intentions of the 
advocates are clear.  
 Proponents of EBM are trying to accomplish several things. First, they are trying 
to redefine the relationship between biomedicine and the state. As I argued in chapter 
one, Soviet biomedicine was an integral part of the Soviet state, with the pinnacle of the 
profession integrated into state structures at the highest levels. While with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the state was very quick to relinquish its support for the system of 
health protection, it did not relinquish its control. Reasserting professional authority 
through EBM rhetoric is an important strategy in the process of loosening state control 
and integrating Russian biomedicine into the fledgling market economy. 
 Second, EBM advocates seek to redefine biomedical epistemology—to alter the 
practices of knowledge production by taking those practices out of therapeutic medicine 
and abstracting out the subjectivities of both clinicians and patients. This is an important 
strategy in the process of repositioning Russian biomedicine within the global biomedical 
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enterprise. As I have argued in chapter one, Soviet biomedical practitioners envisioned an 
important role for themselves on the global stage as the purveyors of a superior 
methodology of healthcare provision. With the collapse of the state structures that 
supported their role on the global stage, Russian biomedical practitioners suddenly found 
themselves relegated to the role of recipients of both material and methodological aid. 
As I have demonstrated in chapters two and three, this goal represents a stark departure 
from Soviet biomedical epistemology, which insisted on the hybrid nature of medical 
science and reserved an important role for individual clinicians and patients for producing 
and applying biomedical knowledge.   
 These features of Soviet biomedical epistemology may seem incongruent with the 
collectivist ideology espoused by the Soviet propaganda machine and the existence of a 
centralized state bureaucracy (also espoused by the propaganda machine). And indeed 
they are incongruent. But rather than merely noting the paradox, I want to argue that its 
presence indicates that we need to reconsider our assumptions about what the Soviet 
Union was like, especially in the period of late socialism. Both ideology and hierarchy 
were declining in importance throughout this period, and centralized state bureaucracy of 
planning and control was simply not working as intended.  
 The third goal of EBM advocates is to redefine the professional identity of the 
biomedical practitioner. Soviet deontology defined biomedicine as a calling, not just a 
profession.  Being a physician was something one was, not something one did, and in 
taking the Hippocratic oath the Soviet physician was (at least in principle) committing to 
a life long project of continuous self-improvement. EBM advocates are attempting to 
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redefine these normative structures and recast biomedicine as a profession guided not by 
a concept of duty but by a commitment to methodology. 
 This redefinition of normative structures has important implications for 
knowledge production practices. In the Soviet epistemic tradition the validity of 
knowledge was guaranteed by the integrity of the individual practitioner, which meant 
that while knowledge could not be produced by anyone, it could be produced just about 
anywhere. Biomedical researchers were empowered to alter their methods to 
accommodate their conditions of practice without fear that doing so would automatically 
render their data illegitimate. 
 For EBM advocates, valid biomedical knowledge is knowledge produced through 
the implementation of an appropriate methodology, and, although there are multiple 
methodological possibilities, they are not equal—some are better then others.  The best 
method is the one that most completely purges the subjectivity of the individual from the 
process of knowledge production.  A consequence of this is that while valid knowledge 
can in principle be produced by anyone, it can’t be produced just anywhere—knowledge 
production requires access to the various technologies of mediation that can be relied 
upon to achieve objectivity. 
 Both EBM and the Soviet epistemic culture that it seeks to replace is, each in its 
own way, an adaptation to the conditions of practice prevalent in a particular period. That 
is, each epistemic culture is a response to the political economy.  But neither biomedical 
system is the political economy. What keeps biomedical epistemology from collapsing 
into political economy is culture. Cultural norms and practices are just as important to the 
constitution of biomedical epistemology as they are for political and economic 
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institutional structures, and they endow the individual with the power and the 
responsibility to get out of the rubber cage. 
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